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Governance Mechanisms (governance + mechanism)
Kinds of Governance Mechanisms Selected AbstractsIs Board Size an Independent Corporate Governance Mechanism?KYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 3 2004Stefan Beiner SUMMARY Using a simultaneous equations framework with a comprehensive set of publicly listed Swiss companies, our findings suggest that the size of the board of directors is an independent corporate governance mechanism. This implies that any potential relationship between board size and firm valuation is indeed causal. However, in contrast to previous studies, we do not uncover a significant relationship between board size and firm valuation, which can be interpreted as support for the hypothesis of the existence of an optimal board size. On average, firms choose the number of board members just optimally. This indicates that cross-sectional variations in board size to a large extent reflect differences in firms' underlying environment, and not mistaken choices. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Die Ergebnisse der Schätzung eines simultanen Gleichungssystems mit einer repräsentativen Stichprobe börsengehandelter Schweizer Unternehmen zeigen, dass die Grösse des Verwaltungsrates einen eigenständigen Corporate Governance Mechanismus darstellt. Damit kann ein möglicher Zusammenhang zwischen der Grösse des Verwaltungsrates und dem Unternehmenswert als kausal interpretiert werden. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen aber keine Evidenz für einen derartigen Zusammenhang, was die Hypothese einer optimalen Grösse des Verwaltungsrates stützt. Im Durchschnitt weist der Verwaltungsrat Schweizer Unternehmen die optimale Grösse auf. Die Unterschiede in der Grösse der Verwaltungsräte der Stichprobenunternehmen können zum grossen Teil durch unternehmensspezifische Einflussgrössen erklärt werden, und sind nicht auf eine falsche Besetzung des Verwaltungsrates zurückzuführen. RÉSUMÉ En utilisant un système d'équations simultané, estimé sur l'ensemble des entreprises inscrites à la bourse suisse, nos résultats montrent que la taille du conseil d'administration résulte d'un mécanisme indépendant de gouvernance d'entreprise. Ceci implique qu'il existe véritablement un lien causal entre la taille du conseil d'administration et la valeur de l'entreprise. Néanmoins, contrairement aux études précédentes, nous n'avons pas découvert de relations significatives entre ces deux éléments, ce que l'on peut interpréter comme support pour l'hypothèse de l'existence d'une grandeur optimale du conseil d'administration. Le nombre de membres du conseil d'administration est en moyenne choisi de manière optimale. Ceci indique que la variation en coupe transversale de la taille du Conseil d'administration reflète en majeure partie des différences dans l'environnement de chaque enterprise plutôt que des mauvaises décisions. [source] Corporate Governance Mechanisms Throughout the WorldCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2010William Judge Editor in Chief No abstract is available for this article. [source] Factors Associated with the Development of Board Sub,committeesCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2002Elizabeth Carson This study examines the factors associated with the presence of board sub,committees, specifically audit, remuneration and nomination committees. Factors which are hypothesised in this study to affect sub,committee presence are Big 6 auditors, non,executive directors, non,executive chairmen, number of intercorporate relationships of the board and shareholder type. Company size, number of board members and leverage are employed as control variables as suggested by earlier research. An analysis of board sub,committees in the Australian corporate environment is relevant to other jurisdictions as there are no mandatory requirements on either board composition or board sub,committees. There is, however, a mandatory requirement to disclose corporate governance practices which allows for a study of this type to be reliably conducted. A sample of 361 Australian companies drawn from the largest 500 public companies is employed. Audit committee presence is found to be positively associated with Big 6 auditors and the number of intercorporate relationships of the directors of the board. Remuneration committees are also found to be associated with Big 6 auditors and intercorporate relationships and also higher levels of institutional investment. The presence of nomination committees is not associated with auditors, directors or investors, but is associated with board size and leverage. The study concludes that audit committees are a highly developed and mature governance mechanism, and that remuneration committees can be classed as a developing and maturing structure whilst nomination committees are relatively immature. [source] A Framework for Determining the Influence of the Corporate Board of Directors in Accounting StudiesCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2001Karen Cravens Accounting, auditing, and tax professionals constantly evaluate the integrity, competence, and financial performance of clients as factors in practice that influence both client acceptance decisions and the manner in which professional services are rendered. Yet, from an accounting perspective, previous research investigating the corporate board of directors as a governance mechanism has focused only on the representational role of board members. Moreover, many of these studies resulted in conflicting findings according to these attributes. Other disciplines address the particular influence of the board with respect to overall corporate performance, but arrive at little agreement on either the effect of or the most critical of board attributes. This literature review synthesizes the existing research to provide a framework in which to evaluate the effect of the board of directors in accounting settings and, in particular, when conducting future research that employs elements of corporate governance as dependent or independent variables in accounting studies. [source] Contract Formalization and Governance of Exporter,Importer RelationshipsJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 3 2008Preet S. Aulakh abstract Exporting relationships between manufacturers and foreign importers pose unique coordination problems because, on the one hand, transactions are recurrent and both firms make non-trivial relationship-specific investments, but at the same time, the exchange partners maintain separate legal entities with individual profit claims. This study examines the role of contracts as a governance mechanism in these relationships that are neither market-based discrete transactions, nor can be governed through ownership-based hierarchies. Drawing upon recent research on contract law and interorganizational relationships, we develop and empirically test a model that incorporates both the antecedents and performance implications of the nature of contract governing exporter,importer relationships. [source] Is Board Size an Independent Corporate Governance Mechanism?KYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 3 2004Stefan Beiner SUMMARY Using a simultaneous equations framework with a comprehensive set of publicly listed Swiss companies, our findings suggest that the size of the board of directors is an independent corporate governance mechanism. This implies that any potential relationship between board size and firm valuation is indeed causal. However, in contrast to previous studies, we do not uncover a significant relationship between board size and firm valuation, which can be interpreted as support for the hypothesis of the existence of an optimal board size. On average, firms choose the number of board members just optimally. This indicates that cross-sectional variations in board size to a large extent reflect differences in firms' underlying environment, and not mistaken choices. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Die Ergebnisse der Schätzung eines simultanen Gleichungssystems mit einer repräsentativen Stichprobe börsengehandelter Schweizer Unternehmen zeigen, dass die Grösse des Verwaltungsrates einen eigenständigen Corporate Governance Mechanismus darstellt. Damit kann ein möglicher Zusammenhang zwischen der Grösse des Verwaltungsrates und dem Unternehmenswert als kausal interpretiert werden. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen aber keine Evidenz für einen derartigen Zusammenhang, was die Hypothese einer optimalen Grösse des Verwaltungsrates stützt. Im Durchschnitt weist der Verwaltungsrat Schweizer Unternehmen die optimale Grösse auf. Die Unterschiede in der Grösse der Verwaltungsräte der Stichprobenunternehmen können zum grossen Teil durch unternehmensspezifische Einflussgrössen erklärt werden, und sind nicht auf eine falsche Besetzung des Verwaltungsrates zurückzuführen. RÉSUMÉ En utilisant un système d'équations simultané, estimé sur l'ensemble des entreprises inscrites à la bourse suisse, nos résultats montrent que la taille du conseil d'administration résulte d'un mécanisme indépendant de gouvernance d'entreprise. Ceci implique qu'il existe véritablement un lien causal entre la taille du conseil d'administration et la valeur de l'entreprise. Néanmoins, contrairement aux études précédentes, nous n'avons pas découvert de relations significatives entre ces deux éléments, ce que l'on peut interpréter comme support pour l'hypothèse de l'existence d'une grandeur optimale du conseil d'administration. Le nombre de membres du conseil d'administration est en moyenne choisi de manière optimale. Ceci indique que la variation en coupe transversale de la taille du Conseil d'administration reflète en majeure partie des différences dans l'environnement de chaque enterprise plutôt que des mauvaises décisions. [source] Counting on codes: An examination of transnational codes as a regulatory governance mechanism for nanotechnologiesREGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2009Diana M. Bowman Abstract This article examines the rise of nanotechnology-specific codes of conduct (nano-codes) as a private governance mechanism to manage potential risks and promote the technology. It examines their effectiveness as well as their legitimacy as regulatory instruments in the public domain. The study first maps the rise of voluntary nano-codes and the roles played by different actors. Focusing on five specific nano-codes, the article then discusses their adequacy in terms of scientific uncertainty, gaps in existing regulatory regimes, and broader societal concerns. It concludes that these voluntary nano-codes have weaknesses including a lack of explicit standards on which to base independent monitoring, as well as no sanctions for poor compliance. At the same time it also highlights the potential power of these governance mechanisms under conditions of uncertainty and co-regulation with government. It is likely that nano-codes will become the "first cut" of a new governance regime for nanotechnologies. [source] Board Characteristics and Audit Fees,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002Joseph V. Carcello Abstract This paper examines the relations between three board characteristics (independence, diligence, and expertise) and Big 6 audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies. To protect its reputation capital, avoid legal liability, and promote shareholder interests, a more independent, diligent, and expert board may demand differentially higher audit quality (greater assurance, which requires more audit work) than the Big 6 audit firms normally provide. The audit fee increases as the auditor's additional costs are passed on to the client, such that we expect positive relations between audit fees and the board characteristics examined. We find significant positive relations between audit fees and board independence, diligence, and expertise. The results persist when similar measures of audit committee "quality" are included in the model. The results add to the growing body of literature documenting relations between corporate governance mechanisms and various facets of the financial reporting and audit processes, as well as to our understanding of the determinants of audit fees. [source] Corporate Governance and Equity Liquidity: analysis of S&P transparency and disclosure rankingsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2007Wei-Peng Chen This paper sets out to investigate the effects of disclosure, and other corporate governance mechanisms, on equity liquidity, arguing that those companies adopting poor information transparency and disclosure practices will experience serious information asymmetry. Since poor corporate governance leads to greater information asymmetry, liquidity providers will incur relatively higher adverse information risks and will therefore offer higher information asymmetry components in their effective bid-ask spreads. The Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) rankings of the individual stocks on the S&P 500 index are employed to examine whether firms with greater T&D rankings have lower information asymmetry components and lower stock spreads. Our results reveal that the economic costs of equity liquidity, i.e. the effective spread and the quoted half-spread, are greater for those companies with poor information transparency and disclosure practices. [source] Governing Emerging Stock Markets: legal vs administrative governanceCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2005Katharina Pistor Transition economies face a fundamental dilemma. They need to develop financial markets, and yet they lack the ingredients it takes to do so. Recipes for legal governance mechanisms that have worked elsewhere, including reactive law enforcement by courts and proactive law enforcement by regulators, may not help in the short to medium term. Using evidence from stock market development in China and Russia, this paper suggests that at least in the short term, administrative governance may be a viable alternative to legal governance in emerging stock markets. [source] Global Stakeholders: corporate accountability and investor engagementCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2004Duncan McLaren In this age of transnational capitalism most victims of corporate malpractice have no means to hold the wrongdoers to account , especially those whose lives are blighted day-in, day-out by the "normal" operations of companies within the letter of the law. This paper argues that corporate social and environmental abuses are rooted in a lack of accountability of corporations to their stakeholders. It explores how governance mechanisms such as corporate engagement by "socially responsible" investors could enhance stakeholder accountability. It identifies and contrasts two paradigms in socially responsible investment engagement, and relates them to voluntary and regulatory responses to corporate abuses. It concludes that the development of standards for stakeholder-oriented engagement and governance could help stimulate effective regulatory measures to protect stakeholder interests. [source] Firm-Specific Human Capital and Governance in IPO Firms: Addressing Agency and Resource Dependence ConcernsENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 4 2009Jonathan D. Arthurs Entrepreneurs with firm-specific human capital represent both a potential source of competitive advantage and a threat to appropriate the rents that are ultimately generated by a new venture. This situation presents interesting agency and resource dependence challenges. While potential investors in these ventures will want assurances that their interests are protected, they will also want to ensure that these key entrepreneurs remain with the organization. Using agency theory and resource dependence theory, we examine the types of governance mechanisms that are implemented in firms going through an initial public offering comparing those ventures which indicate a dependence on these critical entrepreneurs versus those that do not. Our analysis reveals that ventures exhibiting dependence on key entrepreneurs are associated with higher insider and outsider ownership by the board, greater start-up experience by the board, greater use of contingent compensation, and greater use of involuntary departure agreements. [source] Corporate Governance and Asset Sales: The Effect of Internal and External Control MechanismsFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2006Robert C. Hanson G32; G34 Abstract We investigate firms that sell assets to determine whether corporate governance mechanisms are effective at controlling agency problems. Our evidence shows that these firms have lower managerial ownership and are more likely to make unrelated acquisitions, suggesting weak internal controls. Analysis of insider trading activity shows that, on average, net buying increases before the asset sale and shareholders benefit more when this occurs. Results suggest that how managers reach a given level of ownership provides more information about incentive alignment than just the level of ownership. Our results also highlight the dynamic nature of corporate restructuring as firms acquire and then sell assets. [source] Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option informationACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2010Jodie Nelson M40; M41 Abstract We examine the nature and extent of statutory executive stock option disclosures by Australian listed companies over the 2001,2004 period, and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on these disclosures. Our results show a progressive increase in overall compliance from 2001 to 2004. However, despite the improved compliance, the results reveal managements' continued reluctance to disclose more sensitive executive stock option information. Factors associated with good internal governance, including board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are found to contribute to improved compliance. Similarly, certain external governance factors are associated with improved disclosure, including external auditor quality, shareholder activism (as proxied by companies identified as poor performers by the Australian Shareholders' Association) and regulatory intervention. [source] Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana FallacyFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2006CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE Attempts to reconstruct weak and failed countries suffer from a nirvana fallacy. Where central governments are absent or dysfunctional, it is assumed that reconstruction efforts by foreign governments generate a preferable outcome. This assumption overlooks (1) the possibility that foreign government interventions can fail, (2) the possibility that reconstruction efforts can do more harm than good, and (3) the possibility that indigenous governance mechanisms may evolve that are more effective than those imposed by military occupiers. It is argued that reconstruction efforts focus on resolving the meta-level game of creating self-sustaining liberal democratic institutions while neglecting the nested games embedded within the general meta-game. An analysis of Somalia, a prototypical failed state, is provided to illuminate these claims. While Somalia lacks a central government, the private sector has developed coping mechanisms to fill the void. These mechanisms have proven to be more effective in generating widespread order than attempts by foreign occupiers to impose a self-sustaining liberal state. [source] Divestitures, wealth effects and corporate governanceACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2010Sian Owen G32; G34 Abstract We analyse the market reaction to divestiture decisions and determine the impact of corporate governance practices. We find the market reaction is significant and can be determined using internal governance mechanisms. We evaluate the determinants of the decision to sell using a control sample of firms displaying characteristics often associated with divestitures indicating that these firms may face the same incentives to divest but elect not to restructure in this manner. Our results suggest that a combination of strong internal and external governance may force managers to act in a manner that is incompatible with their personal desires. [source] Innate and discretionary accruals quality and corporate governanceACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2010Pamela Kent M40; M41 Abstract This paper extends previous research on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and accruals quality. We derive measures of the discretionary and innate components of accruals quality and regress them against corporate governance characteristics. For discretionary accruals, we find use of a Big 4 audit firm and a larger audit committee as the primary governance mechanisms associated with higher accruals quality. For innate accruals quality, we find that higher quality is associated with an independent board of directors, a larger, more independent and more active audit committee, and use of a Big 4 audit firm. Our findings suggest a stronger relation between sound governance mechanisms and innate accruals quality than discretionary accruals quality. [source] An exploratory study of governance in the intra-firm human resources supply chainHUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Issue 5 2010Elaine Farndale Abstract The human resource management (HRM) literature has paid insufficient attention to supply chain management (SCM) when exploring the architecture of human resources (HR). Drawing on an SCM perspective, this study develops our understanding of (1) the intra-firm HR supply chain, and (2) how this HR supply chain influences corporate governance processes within large organizations. We argue that the HR function, represented as an internal professional service supply chain, needs appropriate governance principles as it operates through multiple delivery channels and with a wide variety of HRM practices. Exploratory findings from a qualitative empirical study of seven large organizations investigating governance and risk management in the HR supply chain are presented. These in-depth interviews uncover how formal governance is relatively easy for these organizations to achieve, supported by outcome-focused monitoring tools, but informal governance mechanisms can fail due to insufficient attention. Although standardized approaches to HR delivery can maximize the opportunity for HR governance, little evidence was found that the organizations were considering the related governance implications explicitly. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] The impact of the 2007-2009 crisis on social security and private pension funds: A threat to their financial soundness?INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 2 2010Ariel Pino Abstract Social security and pension funds were affected on an unparalleled scale by the recent financial crisis. They reported massive unrealized investment losses and their governance mechanisms have been challenged, therefore endangering their financial soundness and questioning their capacity to deliver adequate benefits. The year 2009 ended with financial markets recovering, but also with portfolio reallocations and traditional risk management approaches being revisited. Governments have reacted to the crisis and implemented recovery plans that could issue a warning about the mid-term fiscal situation. Post-crisis fiscal stress may generate a trade-off between a re-establishment of a sound fiscal situation and a reduction in social expenditure. This article analyses the impact of the crisis on social security and pension funds and address all the aforementioned issues. [source] Voluntary Appointment of Independent Directors in Taiwan: Motives and ConsequencesJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 9-10 2008Chaur-Shiuh Young Abstract:, This study explores factors that motivate firms to increase board independence in the absence of legal requirements to do so. In addition, we examine the impact of voluntary enhancement of board independence on firm performance. Using a sample of listed companies in Taiwan, we show that voluntary appointment of independent directors is associated with both economic factors and managerial power. Specifically, we find that board independence increases with the weaknesses of alternative corporate governance mechanisms and the severity of agency problems. However, board independence decreases with managerial ownership and family control. In addition, by employing a simultaneous equations model with selectivity, we provide evidence supporting the positive performance impact of voluntary appointment of independent directors in Taiwan. [source] Where Corporate Governance and Financial Analysts Affect ValuationJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3 2009Ran R. Barniv We examine whether corporate governance and financial analysts affect accounting-based valuation models for B and H shares traded by foreign investors in China and Hong Kong, respectively. We expect that better corporate governance and more effective analyst activity mitigate potential adverse effects on accounting valuation models generated by country-specific problems in accounting, auditing, and legal systems. We find that valuation models perform better for companies with a greater analyst following, smaller forecast errors, relatively high public ownership and a strong board structure. Valuation models and accounting numbers have only limited explanatory power and valuation role for companies with weak governance and less effective analyst performance. The findings are robust across various market value, return, unexpected return, and other accounting valuation models. The results are consistent with less informed foreign investor clienteles searching for signals of more effective analyst activity and better corporate governance mechanisms. [source] Nonprofit versus corporate governance: An economic approachNONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 3 2008Gerhard Speckbacher This article proposes a new theoretical concept of nonprofit governance using transaction cost economics and the economic theory of contracts. After a short review of economic approaches to corporate governance, I clarify the specific nature of the governance problem in nonprofit organizations. Based on this analysis, I derive criteria for selecting an organization's relevant stakeholders. If stakeholders provide valuable specific resources without the protection of a comprehensive contract that details exactly how the organization is to use these resources, then such stakeholders seek decision and control rights in order to direct the use of the resources they have provided. I argue that the core problem of governance is how to enhance valuable specific contributions of the relevant stakeholders while keeping the costs of bargaining between stakeholders and the costs of collective decision making low. The theory developed is then applied in a discussion of practically relevant governance mechanisms, and the concept of governance is used to contribute to the discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the nonprofit character of organizations from a governance perspective. [source] Implementation challenges in protecting the global environmental commons: The case of climate change policies in BrazilPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 5 2008Rogerio F. Pinto Abstract The effective control of climate change rests, to a great extent, on governance mechanisms to protect the global commons as a type of common pool resource on a global scale. This calls for action beyond the boundaries of the state and of local interests. Collective solutions at the global level are needed as a means of sharing in the promises that globalisation holds. Moreover, global policies need to rest on the harmonisation of local and national interests in order to be effectively implemented. The attendant implementation challenges are addressed in this article with reference to Brazil's experience, against the backdrop of considerations also applicable to other developing countries. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock RepurchasesREAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2010Chinmoy Ghosh This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we examine how executive and employee stock option holdings influence the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a stock repurchase. Using a sample of REIT repurchase announcements, we find that the market reacts more favorably to announcements by firms where executives have larger option holdings and the chief executive officer is not entrenched. Our results with respect to the roles of stock option holdings of executives and nonexecutives differ from those reported for a cross-section of non-REIT firms. While we find evidence supporting the importance of executive stock options in aligning the incentives of management and reinforcing the positive signaling associated with a repurchase announcement, we find little evidence that the market views REIT repurchases as being used primarily to fund option exercise. We attribute these findings to greater dependence by REIT investors on internal governance mechanisms (such as stock option programs) as a result of regulatory restrictions that limit external monitoring such as hostile takeovers. [source] Counting on codes: An examination of transnational codes as a regulatory governance mechanism for nanotechnologiesREGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2009Diana M. Bowman Abstract This article examines the rise of nanotechnology-specific codes of conduct (nano-codes) as a private governance mechanism to manage potential risks and promote the technology. It examines their effectiveness as well as their legitimacy as regulatory instruments in the public domain. The study first maps the rise of voluntary nano-codes and the roles played by different actors. Focusing on five specific nano-codes, the article then discusses their adequacy in terms of scientific uncertainty, gaps in existing regulatory regimes, and broader societal concerns. It concludes that these voluntary nano-codes have weaknesses including a lack of explicit standards on which to base independent monitoring, as well as no sanctions for poor compliance. At the same time it also highlights the potential power of these governance mechanisms under conditions of uncertainty and co-regulation with government. It is likely that nano-codes will become the "first cut" of a new governance regime for nanotechnologies. [source] Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation EffectsTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2000Armando Gomes This paper addresses the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This problem is common among public firms in many countries where the legal system does not effectively protect minority shareholders against oppression by controlling shareholders. We show that even without any explicit corporate governance mechanisms protecting minority shareholders, controlling shareholders can implicitly commit not to expropriate them. Stock prices of such companies are significantly higher and firms are more likely go public because of this reputation effect. Moreover, insiders divest shares gradually over time, at a rate that is negatively related to the degree of moral hazard. [source] Increasing Learning and Time Efficiency in Interorganizational New Product Development Teams,THE JOURNAL OF PRODUCT INNOVATION MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2010Ludwig Bstieler Despite the growing popularity of new product development across organizational boundaries, the processes, mechanisms, or dynamics that leverage performance in interorganizational (I-O) product development teams are not well understood. Such teams are staffed with individuals drawn from the partnering firms and are relied on to develop successful new products while at the same time enhancing mutual learning and reducing development time. However, these collaborations can encounter difficulties when partners from different corporate cultures and thought worlds must coordinate and depend on one another and often lead to disappointing performance. To facilitate collaboration, the creation of a safe, supportive, challenging, and engaging environment is particularly important for enabling productive collaborative I-O teamwork and is essential for learning and time efficient product development. This research develops and tests a model of proposed factors to increase both learning and time efficiency on I-O new product teams. It is argued that specific behaviors (caring), beliefs (psychological safety), task-related processes (shared problem solving), and governance mechanisms (clear management direction) create a positive climate that increases learning and time efficiency on I-O teams. Results of an empirical study of 50 collaborative new product development projects indicate that (1) shared problem solving and caring behavior support both learning and time efficiency on I-O teams, (2) team psychological safety is positively related to learning, (3) management direction is positively associated with time efficiency, and (4) shared problem solving is more strongly related to both performance dimensions than are the other factors. The factors supporting time efficiency are slightly different from those that foster learning. The relative importance of these factors also differs considerably for both performance aspects. Overall, this study contributes to a better understanding of the factors that facilitate a favorable environment for productive collaboration on I-O teams, which go beyond contracts or top-management supervision. Establishing such an environment can help to balance management concerns and promote the success of I-O teams. The significance of the results is elevated by the fragility of collaborative ventures and their potential for failure, when firms with different organizational cultures, thought worlds, objectives, and intentions increasingly decide to work across organizational boundaries for the development of new products. [source] Master-planned residential developments: Beyond iconic spaces of neoliberalism?ASIA PACIFIC VIEWPOINT, Issue 2 2009Pauline McGuirk Abstract Master-planned residential development has proliferated as a new residential phenomenon in metropolitan areas globally. The trend, the new governance mechanisms it entails and resultant forms of urban development have been critically theorised as products and vectors of neoliberalisation and iconic spaces of the neoliberal city. However, tracing the emergence and enactment of master-planned residential estate (MPRE) development in Sydney, Australia, this paper suggests that more contingent and contextualised theorisations of such spaces can reveal possibilities for animating a different politics of MPREs. Deploying theorisation sensitive to the multiple drivers, logics and political projects played out through MPRE development in situated contexts, the paper traces the political genesis of these developments in Sydney, outlines the multiple drivers and logics accounting for their growing popularity and points to the salience of the complex performance of land and housing markets in their production. The post-structural political economy approach used here to investigate MPRE development can overcome the politically constraining effects of the dominant neoliberal critique. It does so, first, by opening analysis up to the importance of logics, actions and contexts that are irreducible to neoliberalism and, second, by gesturing towards the potential for an alternative politics to be animated through mechanisms, techniques and processes of MPRE development habitually associated with neoliberalism. [source] Strength in Networks: Employment Rights Organizations and the Problem of Co-OrdinationBRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 4 2006Charles Heckscher In recent decades, alternative organizations and movements ,,quasi-unions', have emerged to fill gaps in the US system of representation caused by union decline. We examine the record of quasi-unions and find that although they have sometimes helped workers who lack other means of representation, they have significant limitations and are unlikely to replace unions as the primary means of representation. But networks, consisting of sets of diverse actors including unions and quasi-unions, are more promising. They have already shown power in specific campaigns, but they have yet to do so for more sustained strategies. By looking at analogous cases, we identify institutional bases for sustained networks, including shared information platforms, behavioural norms, common mission and governance mechanisms that go well beyond what now exists in labour alliances and campaigns. There are substantial resistances to these network institutions because of the history of fragmentation and autonomy among both unions and quasi-unions; yet we also identify positive potential for network formation. [source] Internal and External Corporate Governance: An Interface between an Organization and its EnvironmentBRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2010Igor Filatotchev Most corporate governance research focuses on a universal link between corporate governance practices (e.g. shareholder activism, board independence) and performance outcomes, but neglects how interdependences between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations in the effectiveness of different corporate governance practices. This paper develops an organizational approach to corporate governance and focuses on two dominant streams that analyse internal and external governance mechanisms. First, we explore governance practices aimed at dealing with a complex set of problems internal to an organization, such as conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, different types of shareholders, and block-holder opportunism. Second, we discuss the importance of formal and informal governance arrangements that organizations use in managing their relationships with external parties, such as alliance partners, overseas subsidiaries and network members. We argue that an integrated approach bringing these two streams together helps to develop a more holistic view on the effectiveness and efficiency of various corporate governance mechanisms, and suggests a number of avenues for future research. This paper also sets the scene for this thematic issue on corporate governance, scopes the field and introduces 11 papers which make significant contributions towards our understanding of corporate governance. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||