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Governance Factors (governance + factor)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option information

ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2010
Jodie Nelson
M40; M41 Abstract We examine the nature and extent of statutory executive stock option disclosures by Australian listed companies over the 2001,2004 period, and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on these disclosures. Our results show a progressive increase in overall compliance from 2001 to 2004. However, despite the improved compliance, the results reveal managements' continued reluctance to disclose more sensitive executive stock option information. Factors associated with good internal governance, including board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are found to contribute to improved compliance. Similarly, certain external governance factors are associated with improved disclosure, including external auditor quality, shareholder activism (as proxied by companies identified as poor performers by the Australian Shareholders' Association) and regulatory intervention. [source]

Corporate Governance and Financial Constraints on Strategic Turnarounds*

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 3 2006
Igor Filatotchev
abstract The paper extends the Robbins and Pearce (1992) two-stage turnaround response model to include governance factors. In addition to retrenchment and recovery, the paper proposes the addition of a realignment stage, referring specifically to the realignment of expectations of principal and agent groups. The realignment stage imposes a threshold that must be crossed before the retrenchment and hence recovery stage can be entered. Crossing this threshold is problematic to the extent that the interests of governance-stakeholder groups diverge in a crisis situation. The severity of the crisis impacts on the bases of strategy contingent asset valuation leading to the fragmentation of stakeholder interests. In some cases the consequence may be that management are prevented from carrying out turnarounds by governance constraints. The paper uses a case study to illustrate these dynamics, and like the Robbins and Pearce study, it focuses on the textile industry. A longitudinal approach is used to show the impact of the removal of governance constraints. The empirical evidence suggests that such financial constraints become less serious to the extent that there is a functioning market for corporate control. Building on governance research and turnaround literature, the paper also outlines the general case necessary and sufficient conditions for successful turnarounds. [source]

The Determinants of Successful Micro-IPOs: An Analysis of Issues Made under the Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR) Procedure

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2001
James C. Brau
In this article we extend the existing IPO literature to the case of micro-IPOs by analyzing a sample of Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR) documents from the U.S. state of Washington. Through theory, we identified variables that should impact the probability of success or failure in a SCOR offering and then empirically tested them. Empirical support was found for the relevance of (1) marketing mechanisms and expenses; (2) ownership and governance factors; (3) business life cycle stages; and (4) signaling factors consistent with our theoretical predictions. [source]

When Financial Institutions Are Large Shareholders: The Role of Macro Corporate Governance Environments

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2006
DONGHUI LI
ABSTRACT While financial institutions' aggregate investments have grown substantially worldwide, the size of their individual shareholdings, and ultimately their incentive to monitor, may be limited by the free-rider problem, regulations, and a preference for diversification and liquidity. We compare institutions' shareholding patterns across countries and find vast differences in the extent to which they are large shareholders. These variations are largely determined by macro corporate governance factors such as shareholder protection, law enforcement, and corporate disclosure requirements. This suggests that strong governance environments act to strengthen monitoring ability such that more institutions are encouraged to hold concentrated equity positions. [source]