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Governance
Kinds of Governance Terms modified by Governance Selected AbstractsCHANGING PATTERN OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING IN THE KOREAN CHAEBOLSECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 3 2007BYUNG S. MIN The de jure financial system in Korea has moved from mainly R (relationship)-mode financial contracts towards M (market)-mode contracts since the 1997 financial crisis, due largely to reforms introducing Anglo-American style corporate governance and the disintermediation of the larger business groups in corporate financing. Analysis shows that the effectiveness of this change in improving firms' performances has yet to be demonstrated. Unlike the disintermediation of the big-name firms, the affiliates of small and medium business groups and small and medium-sized independent firms have relied heavily on bank loans and internal finance. The impact of a more concentrated banking system and intensified competition on the type of corporate investment has yet to be analysed. [source] TRENDS IN ASX-LISTED BANK GOVERNANCEECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue S1 2006STEPHEN CHU This paper reviews trends in bank governance in Australia over the past 15 years. It reviews changes in board size, board committee structures and executive remuneration trends. Remuneration has increased substantially, but there is not a strong relationship to bank performance. Changes in board committee structures have occurred independent of regulatory requirements. [source] DOES MORE TRANSPARENCY GO ALONG WITH BETTER GOVERNANCE?ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2006ROUMEEN ISLAM This paper explores the link between information flows and governance. It develops a new indicator, the transparency index, which measures the frequency with which governments update economic data that they make available to the public. The paper also uses the existence of a Freedom of Information Act and the length of time for which it has been in existence as an indicator reflecting the overall legislative environment for transparency. Measures of the type developed in this paper have hitherto not been used in the cross-country literature on governance and growth. Cross-country regression estimation shows that countries with better information flows as measured by these indices also govern better. [source] GOVERNANCE AND CHARITIES: AN EXPLORATION OF KEY THEMES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RESEARCH AGENDAFINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY & MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2009Noel Hyndman The concept of governance has been widely discussed in both the business and non-business sectors. The debate has also been entered into within the charity sector, which comprises over 169,000 organizations in the UK. The UK-based Charity Commission, which describes itself as existing to ,promote sound governance and accountability', has taken a lead in this debate by promoting greater regulation and producing numerous recommendations with regard to the proper governance of charitable organizations. However, the concept of what is meant by governance is unclear and a myriad of ideas are placed under the umbrella of ,good governance'. This paper explores the major themes that form the basis of much of this discussion, examining both the theoretical underpinnings and empirical investigations relating to this area (looking from the perspective of the key stakeholders in the charity sector). Based on an analysis of the extant literature, this paper presents a broad definition of governance with respect to charities and outlines a future research agenda for those interested in adding to knowledge in this area [source] MANAGEMENT PAY, GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF LARGE UK NONPROFITSFINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY & MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2006Gregory O. Jobome First page of article [source] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ETHICS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTUREJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2003James A. Brickley Effective corporate leadership involves more than developing a good strategic plan and setting high ethical standards. It also means coming up with an organizational design that encourages the company's managers and employees to carry out its business plan and maintain its ethical standards. In this article, the authors use the term organizational architecture to refer to three key elements of a company's design: ,the assignment of decision-making authority,who gets to make what decisions; ,performance evaluation,the key measures of performance for evaluating business units and individual employees; and ,compensation structure,how employees are rewarded for meeting performance goals. In well-designed companies, each of these elements is mutually reinforcing and supportive of the company's overall business strategy. Decision-making authority is assigned to managers and employees who have the knowledge and experience needed to make the best investment and operating decisions. And to ensure that those decision makers have the incentive as well as the knowledge to make the best decisions, the corporate systems used to evaluate and reward their performance are based on measures that are linked as directly as possible to the corporate goal of creating value. Some of the most popular management techniques of the past two decades, such as reengineering, TQM, and the Balanced Scorecard, have often had disappointing results because they address only one or two elements of organizational architecture, leaving the overall structure out of balance. What's more, a flawed organizational design can lead to far worse than missed opportunities to create value. As the authors note, the recent corporate scandals involved not just improper behavior by senior executives, but corporate structures that, far from safeguarding against such behavior, in some ways encouraged it. In the case of Enron, for example, top management's near-total focus on boosting reported earnings (a questionable corporate goal to begin with) combined with decentralized decision making and loose oversight at all levels of the company to produce an enormously risky high-leverage strategy that ended up bringing down the firm. [source] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCEJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2001Eric Nowak Financial economists continue to point to Germany as a relatively successful model of a "bank-centered," as opposed to a market-based, economy. But few seem to recognize that, in the years leading up to World War I, German equity capital markets were among the most highly developed in the world. Although there are now only about 750 companies listed on German stock exchanges, in 1914 there were almost 1,200 (as compared to only about 600 stocks then listed on the New York Stock Exchange). Since German reunification in 1990, there have been signs of a possible restoration of the country's equity markets to something like their former prominence. The last 10 years have seen important legal and institutional developments that can be seen as preparing the way for larger and more active German equity markets, together with a more "shareholder-friendly" corporate governance system. In particular, the 1994 Securities Act, the Corporation Control and Transparency Act passed in 1998, and the just released Takeover Act and Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act all contain legal reforms that are essential conditions for well functioning equity markets. Such legal and regulatory changes have helped lay the groundwork for more visible and dramatic milestones, such as the Deutsche Telekom IPO in 1996, the opening of the Neuer Market in 1997, and, perhaps most important, the acquisition in 2000 of Mannesmann by Vodafone, the first successful hostile takeover of a German company. [source] FREE CASH FLOW AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF ALASKAJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2000Dwight R. Lee In a widely cited 1986 article in the American Economic Review, Michael Jensen gave the concept of free cash flow (FCF) a new twist by redefining it as cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects with positive net present values. Put another way, FCF represents funds available in the firm that managers may choose to hold as idle cash, return to shareholders, or invest in projects with returns below the firm's cost of capital. In redefining FCF in this way, Jensen converted FCF from a measure of economic income and value into a measure of corporate assets available for discretionary, and potentially value-destroying, use by firm managers. And, as he argued in his important article, managers in mature businesses with substantial free cash flow have a tendency to destroy value by plowing too much capital back into those businesses or, often worse, making ill-advised acquisitions in unrelated businesses. Several methods have been developed in financial markets and internal corporate governance systems to discourage managers from wasting FCF. Better monitoring by boards of directors, large ownership blocks, and properly aligned management compensation contracts are all parts of the solution. And the extraordinary increase in stock repurchases in recent years, invariably applauded by investors, is another illustration of the market's success in encouraging companies to address their free cash flow problems. But if the "FCF problem" of the private sector has attracted considerable attention from finance scholars, the problem is even more acute in the public sector, where FCF can be thought of as tax revenue in excess of what is required to finance well-defined and generally accepted levels of public services. Unlike the private sector, in the public sector there are neither measures nor mechanisms by which to monitor and constrain wasteful spending by elected officials. In this article, the authors attempt to measure the costs to taxpayers of government FCF using the case of Alaska, which since 1969 has received a huge windfall of tax revenue from North Slope oil leases. After examining the state's public finances from 1968 through 1993, the authors offer $25 billion as a conservative estimate of the social losses from Alaska's waste of free cash flow during that 25-year period. [source] URBAN GOVERNANCE AT THE NATIONALIST DIVIDE: COPING WITH GROUP-BASED CLAIMSJOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2007SCOTT A. BOLLENS ABSTRACT:,This article examines how urbanism and local governance address group differences in cities of nationalistic conflict. I investigate four settings,Basque Country and Barcelona (Spain) and Sarajevo and Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina),that have experienced intergroup conflict, war, and major societal transformations. Findings come primarily from over 100 interviews with urban professionals (both governmental and nongovernmental), community officials, academics, and political leaders in these cities. I find that urban areas can constitute unique and essential peace-building resources that can be used to transcend nationalist divides. Urban interventions aimed at creating inter-group coexistence can play distinct roles in societal peace building and constitute a bottom-up approach that supplements and catalyzes top-down diplomatic peace-making efforts. I discuss why some cities play a progressive role in shaping new societal paths while others do not, how this peace-constitutive city function is actualized, and how this type of urbanism can be misplaced or neglected. [source] "BACK THE BID": THE 2012 SUMMER OLYMPICS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF LONDONJOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2007PETER NEWMAN ABSTRACT:,The Olympic Park being developed in east London for the 2012 Games is one large urban renewal project among many in the city. The impact of the Games on urban development may be of less significance than the impact on city politics. Bidding for and delivering the Games has contributed to a reassessment of the recent experiment with mayoral government. The article examines these changing representations of the structures of London government that are now seen as a success. Much of the literature on Olympic cities is highly critical of the impact of the games, but the (current) substantial support for London 2012 also needs to be explained. We examine how London has created opportunities for support, and moments and spaces for celebration when political leaders and Londoners can come together around particular representations of themselves and the city. [source] GEOGRAPHIC SCALE AND FUNCTIONAL SCOPE IN METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE REFORM: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM GERMANYJOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2006Joachim K. Blatter New dichotomies emerge, for example, "jumping of scale" versus "relativation of scales"; "deterritorializiaton" versus "reterritorialization"; "spaces of place" versus "space of flows." These dichotomies can be interpreted as different proposals and/or diagnoses in respect to the geographic scale and functional scope of emerging institutions of metropolitan governance. The paper aims to trace the empirical question of which direction we are heading by analyzing recent metropolitan governance reforms in six West German metropolitan areas. The findings show that there is a general trend to create soft institutions of governance on a larger scale as a reaction to global competition and continental integration. Beyond this commonality, we discover quite different institutional trajectories. The regions which are strongly embedded in the global economy tend toward a "deterritorialized" form of metropolitan governance with rather weak institutions characterized by large geographic scales and functional specialization. In contrast, the regions which are not as much embedded in the global economy have been able to create strong governance institutions on a regional level characterized by a rather small geographic scope and based on a territorial logic of functional integration and geographic congruence. [source] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND THE UK: CODES, THEORY AND PRACTICEPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 5 2009Mitsuru Mizuno We reflect on the evolution of corporate governance and the role of institutional investors in enhancing governance in Japan and the UK. Japan places emphasis on stakeholder capitalism, whereas the UK places emphasis on shareholder capitalism. Nonetheless, in both countries, institutional investors have exerted significant influence on the evolution of corporate governance. Institutional investors in the UK have more power over company management than their Japanese counterparts, although it is alleged that these powers are not exercised to their best potential in either country. [source] PERSUASION AS GOVERNANCE: A STATE-CENTRIC RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVEPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 3 2010STEPHEN BELL Debates about governance and the relationship between governance and government have focused upon markets, hierarchies and networks as principal modes of governance. In this paper we argue that persuasion constitutes a further and distinctive mode of governance, albeit one which interpenetrates other modes of governance. In order to assess the nature, limitations and scope of persuasion and the complex relationships between markets, hierarchies, networks on the one hand and persuasion on the other, we interpret persuasion through the prism of two theoretical perspectives on governance. We argue that the society-centred perspective usefully draws our attention to the role played by non-state actors in the exercise of governance through persuasion but that a state-centric relational account can help us to better understand important facets of persuasion as a mode of governance. [source] PERFORMING GOVERNANCE: A PARTNERSHIP BOARD DRAMATURGYPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 4 2007TIM FREEMAN This paper explores the governance of complex public sector partnerships through a detailed case study of a Joint Commissioning Partnership Board (JCPB) in the South East of England. It argues that a theoretical and empirical focus on the instrumental roles of boards has resulted in an under-appreciation of their symbolic purposes, especially in the context of the governance of inter-organizational relationships. The paper considers the performative dimension of partnership governance, highlighting the role of the symbolic in institutional enactment. Following a brief overview of governance in public sector partnerships, the case study site for the empirical research is introduced. The instrumental and symbolic roles of management boards are considered from a new institutionalist perspective and a dramaturgical analysis of institutional enactment undertaken to explore interplays of the symbolic and instrumental in strategy formation. Some implications for our understanding of the symbolic in partnership governance are discussed. [source] CAPITAL STRUCTURE, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCETHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2007Pornsit Jiraporn Abstract We show how capital structure is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our empirical evidence shows an inverse relation between leverage and shareholder rights, suggesting that firms adopt higher debt ratios where shareholder rights are more restricted. This is consistent with agency theory, which predicts that leverage helps alleviate agency problems. This negative relation, however, is not found in regulated firms (i.e., utilities). We contend that this is because regulation already helps alleviate agency conflicts and, hence, mitigates the role of leverage in controlling agency costs. [source] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DETERMINATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE UK,THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 1 2007SOURAFEL GIRMA This paper examines the effect that the ,Cadbury reforms' have had on the pay determination process of executives in the UK. Our results suggest that, on average, the impact has been disappointing. The relationship between pay and performance remains weak and the link to firm size has, if anything, been strengthened. However, our results suggest considerable heterogeneity in the impact of the reforms, and for those firms above median employment the link between pay and profits appears to have been reinforced. [source] JOINT BIDDING, GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT COSTS:A CASE OF ROAD PROJECTS,ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009Antonio Estache ABSTRACT§:,To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices. [source] HUMAN ETHICS AND RESEARCH GOVERNANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR SURGICAL RESEARCHANZ JOURNAL OF SURGERY, Issue 6 2008A. Simon Carney MD, FRACS No abstract is available for this article. [source] Globalization and Disciplinary Neoliberal GovernanceCONSTELLATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY, Issue 4 2001Jarrod Weiner First page of article [source] Corporate Governance in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Era: Auditors' Experiences,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2010JEFFREY COHEN First page of article [source] The Wide-Ranging Effects of Corporate Governance Throughout the WorldCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2010William Judge Editor in Chief No abstract is available for this article. [source] Asian Corporate Governance or Corporate Governance in Asia?CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2009Shaomin Li First page of article [source] Business Group Affiliation, Firm Governance, and Firm Performance: Evidence from China and IndiaCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2009Deeksha A. Singh ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study seeks to understand how business group affiliation, within firm governance and external governance environment affect firm performance in emerging economies. We examine two aspects of within firm governance , ownership concentration and board independence. Research Findings/Insights: Using archival data on the top 500 Indian and Chinese firms from multiple data sources for 2007, we found that group affiliated firms performed worse than unaffiliated firms, and the negative relationship was stronger in the case of Indian firms than for Chinese firms. We also found that ownership concentration had a positive effect on firm performance, while board independence had a negative effect on firm performance. Further, we found that group affiliation , firm performance relationship in a given country context was moderated by ownership concentration. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study utilizes an integration of agency theory with an institutional perspective, providing a more comprehensive framework to analyze the CG problems, particularly in the emerging economy firms. Empirically, our findings support, as well as contradict, some of the conventional wisdom, and suggest useful avenues for future research. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study shows that reforms in general and CG reforms in particular are effective in emerging economies, which is an encouraging sign for policy makers. However, our research also suggests that it may be time for India and China to stop the encouragement for the empire building through group formation in the corporate world. For practioners, our findings suggest that firms need to balance the need for oversight with the need for advice, while selecting independent directors. [source] Editorial , Toward a Global Theory of Corporate GovernanceCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2009William Judge No abstract is available for this article. [source] International Corporate Governance , A Comparative Approach , By Thomas ClarkeCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2008Bob Tricker No abstract is available for this article. [source] Competing Rationales for Corporate Governance in France: Institutional Complementarities between Financial Markets and Innovation SystemsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2008Soo H. Lee ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Conceptual Research Question/Issue: This paper identifies the causes and consequences of corporate governance reform with reference to the French case. By disaggregating institutional complementarities into global and domestic dimensions, we analyze the path of institutional change compelled by financial efficiency and cooperative innovation. Research Findings/Results: Our analysis of the French case shows that both converging and diverging forces of institutional change coexist, shaping selective responses to globalization. While the adoption of the shareholder model is necessary for resource acquirement from the global capital markets, resource allocation in the cooperative innovation systems reinforces the stakeholder model. The French case confirms the sustainability of distinctive institutional complementarities, albeit with selective adaptation based on a sense-making social compromise. Theoretical Implications: The French case reminds us of the importance of distinctive institutional traditions and dominant social rationalities to understand the underlying logic of governance reform. The comparative research on corporate governance needs to address not just the cross-country variations in institutional arrangements and practices, but also the clash of competing rationales for reform explicitly in comparative terms within a single country context. Practical Implications: For foreign investors, it is vital to understand the unique institutional environment of state-centred stakeholder economies if they are to negotiate the best terms of return and to avoid unnecessary conflicts. French managers are expected to devise strategic choices responding to the competing rationales of governance. Managerial sense-making is essential for achieving sound long-term performance, upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of the constellation of selective governance rests. [source] Why Adopt Codes of Good Governance?CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2008A Comparison of Institutional, Efficiency Perspectives ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Given the global diffusion and the relevance of codes of good governance, the aim of this article is to investigate if the main reason behind their proliferation in civil law countries is: (i) the determination to improve the efficiency of the national governance system; or (ii) the will to "legitimize" domestic companies in the global financial market without radically improving the governance practices. Research Findings/Insights: We collected corporate governance codes developed worldwide at the end of 2005, and classified them according to the country's legal system (common or civil law). Then, we made a comparative analysis of the scope, coverage, and strictness of recommendations of the codes. We tested differences between common law and civil law countries using t-tests and probit models. Our findings suggest that the issuance of codes in civil law countries be prompted more by legitimation reasons than by the determination to improve the governance practices of national companies. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The study contributes to enriching our knowledge on the process of reinvention characterizing the diffusion of new practices. Our results are consistent with a symbolic perspective on corporate governance, and support the view that diffusing practices are usually modified or "reinvented" by adopters. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our results support the idea that the characteristics of the national corporate governance system and law explain the main differences among the coverage of codes. This conclusion indicates the existence of a strong interplay between hard and soft law. [source] Corporate Governance and International Location Decisions of Multinational EnterprisesCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2007Lammertjan Dam This paper analyses international location decisions of corporations based on corporate governance considerations. Using firm level data on 540 Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) with 44,149 subsidiaries in 188 countries, we test whether firms with relatively good governance standards are more often located in countries with a weak governance system. We find empirical support for this hypothesis, especially for those corporations present in low-income countries. [source] Shareholder Activism: Corporate Governance Reform in Korea , By Han-Kyun RhoCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2007Woochan Kim No abstract is available for this article. [source] Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in Asia's Emerging MarketsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2007Chung-Hua Shen This paper studies the impacts of corporate governance on earnings management. We use firm-level governance data, taken from Credit Lyonnais Security Asia (CLSA), of nine Asian countries, in addition to the country-level governance data used in past studies. Our conclusion is as follows. First, firms with good corporate governance tend to conduct less earnings management. Second, there is a size effect for earnings smoothing, that is, large size firms are prone to conduct earnings smoothing, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect on average. Third, there is a turning point for leverage effect, i.e. when the governance index is large, leverage effect exists, otherwise reverse leverage effect exists. It shows that a highly leveraged firm with poor governance is prone to be scrutinised closely and thus finds it harder to fool the market by manipulating earnings. Fourth, firms with higher growth (lower earnings yield) are prone to engage in earnings smoothing and earnings aggressiveness, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect. Finally, firms in stronger anti-director rights countries tend to exhibit stronger earnings smoothing. This counter-intuitive result is different from Leuz et al. (2003). [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||