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Good Grounds (good + ground)
Selected AbstractsA CRITIQUE OF THE INNOVATION ARGUMENT AGAINST A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMBIOETHICS, Issue 6 2007ALEX RAJCZI ABSTRACT President Bush and his Council of Economic Advisors have claimed that the US shouldn't adopt a national health program because doing so would slow innovation in health care. Some have attacked this argument by challenging its moral claim that innovativeness is a good ground for choosing between health care systems. This reply is misguided. If we want to refute the argument from innovation, we have to undercut the premise that seems least controversial , the premise that our current system produces more innovation than a national health program would. I argue that this premise is false. The argument requires clarifying the concept ,national health program' and examining various theories of human well-being. [source] BENEFITS TO RESEARCH SUBJECTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRIALS: DO THEY REDUCE EXPLOITATION OR INCREASE UNDUE INDUCEMENT?DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS, Issue 3 2008ANGELA BALLANTYNE ABSTRACT There is an alleged tension between undue inducement and exploitation in research trials. This paper considers claims that increasing the benefits to research subjects enrolled in international, externally-sponsored clinical trials should be avoided on the grounds that it may result in the undue inducement of research subjects. It proceeds from the premise that there are good grounds for thinking that, at least some, international research sponsors exploit trial participants because they do not provide the research population with a fair share of the benefits of research. This provides a prima facie argument for increasing the benefits for research participants. Concern over undue inducement is a legitimate moral concern; however, if this concern is to prevent research populations from receiving their fair share of benefits from research there must be sufficient evidence that these benefits will unduly influence patients' decision-making regarding trial participation. This article contributes to the debate about exploitation versus undue inducement by introducing an analysis of the available empirical research into research participants' motivations and the influence of payments on research subjects' behaviour and risk assessment. Admittedly, the available research in this field is limited, but the research that has been conducted suggests that financial rewards do not distort research subjects' behaviour or blind them to the risks involved with research. Therefore, I conclude that research sponsors should prioritise the prevention of exploitation in international research by providing greater benefits to research participants. [source] SUBJECTIVITY AS A NON-TEXTUAL STANDARD OF INTERPRETATION IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGYHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2010JARI KAUKUA ABSTRACT Contemporary caution against anachronism in intellectual history, and the currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity in the philosophy of mind, are two prevailing conditions that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. The former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that are alien to the historical intellectual setting under study, and combined with the latter suggests caution in relying on our intuitions regarding subjectivity due to the historically contingent characterizations it has attained in contemporary philosophy of mind. In the face of these conditions, our paper raises a question of what we call non-textual (as opposed to contextual) standards of interpretation of historical texts, and proceeds to explore subjectivity as such a standard. Non-textual standards are defined as (heuristic) postulations of features of the world or our experience of it that we must suppose to be immune to historical variation in order to understand a historical text. Although the postulation of such standards is often so obvious that the fact of our doing so is not noticed at all, we argue that the problems in certain special cases, such as that of subjectivity, force us to pay attention to the methodological questions involved. Taking into account both recent methodological discussion and the problems inherent in two de facto denials of the relevance of subjectivity for historical theories, we argue that there are good grounds for the adoption of subjectivity as a nontextual standard for historical work in philosophical psychology. [source] The Scope of Public ReasonPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2004Jonathan Quong This paper presents two conceptions of the scope of public reason. The narrow view asserts that the ideal of public reason must regulate questions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, but should not apply beyond this limited domain. The broad view claims that the ideal of public reason ought to be applied, whenever possible, to all political decisions where citizens exercise coercive power over one another. The paper questions whether there are any good grounds for accepting the narrow view. I survey and reject three potential reasons. The priority argument for the narrow view claims that constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are the only proper subjects of public reason because they have a special moral priority for our reasoning about justice. The basic interests argument supports the narrow view by arguing that public reasons only exist at the level of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Finally, the completeness argument defends the narrow view on the grounds that public reason can only be complete if it abstains from most legislative questions. I conclude that there are no good reasons for accepting the narrow view of the scope of public reason, whereas there are several reasons to prefer the broad view. [source] | ||||||||||