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Global Capital Markets (global + capital_market)
Selected AbstractsCompeting Rationales for Corporate Governance in France: Institutional Complementarities between Financial Markets and Innovation SystemsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2008Soo H. Lee ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Conceptual Research Question/Issue: This paper identifies the causes and consequences of corporate governance reform with reference to the French case. By disaggregating institutional complementarities into global and domestic dimensions, we analyze the path of institutional change compelled by financial efficiency and cooperative innovation. Research Findings/Results: Our analysis of the French case shows that both converging and diverging forces of institutional change coexist, shaping selective responses to globalization. While the adoption of the shareholder model is necessary for resource acquirement from the global capital markets, resource allocation in the cooperative innovation systems reinforces the stakeholder model. The French case confirms the sustainability of distinctive institutional complementarities, albeit with selective adaptation based on a sense-making social compromise. Theoretical Implications: The French case reminds us of the importance of distinctive institutional traditions and dominant social rationalities to understand the underlying logic of governance reform. The comparative research on corporate governance needs to address not just the cross-country variations in institutional arrangements and practices, but also the clash of competing rationales for reform explicitly in comparative terms within a single country context. Practical Implications: For foreign investors, it is vital to understand the unique institutional environment of state-centred stakeholder economies if they are to negotiate the best terms of return and to avoid unnecessary conflicts. French managers are expected to devise strategic choices responding to the competing rationales of governance. Managerial sense-making is essential for achieving sound long-term performance, upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of the constellation of selective governance rests. [source] Ambiguous incorporations: microfinance and global governmentalityGLOBAL NETWORKS, Issue 2 2010ROB AITKEN Abstract In the spring of 2007 an event dramatically reshaped conversations relating to microfinance. This event was the Initial Public Offering (IPO) of Mexico's largest microfinance organization, Compartamos. The IPO, as this article suggests, is indicative or a broader trend through which microfinance is increasingly becoming financialized, increasingly becoming governable as a financial object. This is important at one level because it crystallizes some of the key issues at stake as microfinance becomes increasingly more reliant on global capital markets. At another level, however, the Compatarmos case is significant because of the conceptual issues it raises in relation to global finance. The main argument I put forward in this article is that the Compatarmos case , and the process of financialization it represents , is important because it allows us to glimpse global finance, and the question of global financial governance, as a decentred process in formation. Drawing on a Foucauldian notion of governmentality, I argue that the Compatarmos case orbits around two processes; processes of incorporation and differentiation. In this context, the Compartamos case implies the importance of analyses that can make global finance visible as a diverse and mundane object that is never settled in any final kind of way. [source] Morgan Stanley Roundtable on Private Equity and Its Import for Public CompaniesJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2006Article first published online: 4 OCT 200 The role of private equity in global capital markets appears to be expanding at an extraordinary rate. Morgan Stanley estimates that there are now some 2,700 private equity funds that either have raised, or are in the process of raising, a total of $500 billion. With this abundance of available equity capital, the willingness of private equity firms to participate in "club" deals, and the leverage that can be put on top of the equity, private equity buyers now appear able and willing to pay higher prices for assets than ever before. And thanks in part to this new purchasing power, private equity transactions reportedly account for a quarter of all global M&A activity as well as a third of the high yield and IPO markets. The stock of capital now devoted to private equity reflects the demonstrated ability of at least the most reputable buyout firms to produce consistently high rates of returns for their limited partners. Although a talent for identifying and purchasing undervalued assets may be part of the story, the ability to produce such returns on a consistent basis implies an ability to add value, to improve the performance of the operating companies they invest in and control. And in this round-table, a small group of academics and practitioners address two main questions: How does private equity add value? And are there lessons for public companies in the success of private companies? According to the panelists, the answer to the first question appears to have changed somewhat over time. The consensus was that most of the value added by the LBO firms of the,80s was created during the initial structuring of the deals, a process described by Steve Kaplan as "financial and governance engineering," which includes not only aggressive use of leverage and powerful equity incentives for operating managements, but active oversight by a small, intensely interested board of directors. In the past ten years, however, these standard LBO features have been complemented by increased attention to "operational engineering," to the point where today's buyout firms feel obligated, like classic venture capitalists, to acquire and tout their own operating expertise. In response to the second of the two questions, Michael Jensen argues that much of the approach and benefits of private equity-particularly the adjustments of financial policies and stronger managerial incentives-can be replicated by public companies. And although some of these benefits have already been realized, much more remains to be done. Perhaps the biggest challenge, however, is finding a way to transfer to public companies the board-level expertise, incentives, and degree of engagement that characterize companies run by private equity investors. [source] Global Market Segmentation and Patterns in Stock Market Reaction to US Earnings Announcements: Further EvidenceJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 2 2005Tony Kang The purpose of this study is to investigate why the information content of US earnings announcements of non-US firms cross-listing in the US varies with the degree of capital market segmentation in the cross-listing firms' countries of domicile. My evidence shows that indirect barriers to investing (i.e., accounting rules and liquidity differences) rather than direct investment barriers (i.e., investment restrictions) mainly account for this difference. After controlling for the level of accounting disclosure in a firm's country of domicile, I do not observe a systematic difference in the size of market's reaction to earnings announcements depending on the degree of market segmentation in the firm's country of domicile. This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that accounting disclosure plays an important role in the integration of global capital markets. [source] Are German, Japanese and Anglo-Saxon Strategic Decision Styles Still Divergent in the Context of Globalization?*JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 6 2005Chris Carr abstract Issues of globalization and divergence in terms of national systems and cultures are equally contentious, yet equally important, in the context of increasing cross-continental co-operation. This article investigates comparative strategic decision styles in Britain, the USA, Germany and Japan. An industry at an advanced stage in terms of globalization, vehicle components manufacture, was selected in order to explore the extent of convergence and whether this has changed. Between 1989 and 1998, field case studies were made of 100 strategic investment decisions (SIDs) by manufacturers in these four countries. Longitudinal judgements were supplemented by earlier comparative strategy field research carried out in 60 suppliers between 1980 and 1983, and two longitudinal case studies, one from the UK and one from Japan, interviewed throughout both these periods and again in 2002. Two competing hypotheses, derived from rich research literatures, are investigated. The first (H1) suggests that national institutional and cultural factors exert profound differences, and should therefore be afforded more significance as globalization proceeds further. The second (H2) is apparently contradictory and emphasizes that institutions and organizations are likely to respond to convergence pressures, spurred by global capital markets and competition on the one hand, and a diffusion of ,professional management' practices on the other. Japanese firms generally, and German family firms in particular, were still found to exhibit deep-rooted differences from the Anglo-Saxon model, which appears to confirm H1. However study of German public companies reveals that their strategic approaches are far less divergent from what is now an increasingly consistent Anglo-Saxon model than they were a decade ago, which appears to confirm the competing hypothesis H2. [source] The Need for Effective Communication with Market StakeholdersAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 32 2004Karen Hamilton Good corporate governance practices have become increasingly important in determining the cost of capital in global capital markets. The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) aims to promote an environment of market confidence so that listed companies can obtain reasonably priced capital and maximise the value of their listing. As the market operator, the exchange has the ability to set and monitor disclosure standards and to support dialogue between companies and investors. However, a problem with corporate governance disclosures in Australia is that they have not delivered particularly meaningful information to investors about the performance of individual companies. [source] | ||||||||||