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Game-theoretic Models (game-theoretic + models)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	80%

Selected Abstracts

Estimation and Confidence Regions for Parameter Sets in Econometric Models,

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 5 2007
Victor Chernozhukov
This paper develops a framework for performing estimation and inference in econometric models with partial identification, focusing particularly on models characterized by moment inequalities and equalities. Applications of this framework include the analysis of game-theoretic models, revealed preference restrictions, regressions with missing and corrupted data, auction models, structural quantile regressions, and asset pricing models. Specifically, we provide estimators and confidence regions for the set of minimizers ,I of an econometric criterion function Q(,). In applications, the criterion function embodies testable restrictions on economic models. A parameter value ,that describes an economic model satisfies these restrictions if Q(,) attains its minimum at this value. Interest therefore focuses on the set of minimizers, called the identified set. We use the inversion of the sample analog, Qn(,), of the population criterion, Q(,), to construct estimators and confidence regions for the identified set, and develop consistency, rates of convergence, and inference results for these estimators and regions. To derive these results, we develop methods for analyzing the asymptotic properties of sample criterion functions under set identification. [source]

Poliheuristic Theory, Bargaining, and Crisis Decision Making

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2007
Min Ye
In the past decade, the application of the Poliheuristic (PH) theory to foreign policy decisions of various types, by numerous leaders, and in association with different research methods, has demonstrated its theoretical merit in integrating the divided rational choice and psychological/cognitive approaches. This article argues for a complementary relationship between PH and formal theory. On the one hand, PH can provide a framework in which abstract formal models can be connected with specific domestic as well as international circumstances. On the other hand, formal theory sharpens the rational analysis used in the second conceptual stage of PH. In this study, I formulate a revised Rubinstein bargaining model with war as an outside option and apply it to Chinese crisis decision making during the Second and Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. In sum, this study makes three contributions to the literature on international crises and foreign policy analysis. First, it gives formal explanations on how PH can contribute to the game-theoretic approach in foreign policy analysis. Second, it presents what Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) called a "domestic politics version" of the canonical Rubinstein bargaining game, connecting international interactions with individual participants' domestic politics. Finally, it provides a way to test abstract game-theoretic models in particular domestic and international contexts of foreign policy making. [source]

Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 3 2000
Steven J. Brams
Four problems plague game-theoretic models in international relations (IR): (1) misspecifying the rules, (2) confusing goals and rational choice, (3) arbitrarily reducing the multiplicity of equilibria, and (4) forsaking backward induction. An alternative approach, theory of moves (TOM), is discussed and applied to Prisoners' Dilemma and then, more prescriptively, to the Iran hostage crisis of 1979,80. TOM incorporates into the framework of game theory an initial state in a payoff matrix, the moves and countermoves required to reach a "nonmyopic equilibrium," and threat, moving, and order power that reflect asymmetries in the capabilities of the players. It also allows for incomplete information, which in the Iran hostage crisis led to misperceptions and flawed play. Two general lessons come out of the U.S. foreign-policy failure in the Iran hostage crisis: (1) know the game you are playing, and (2) make threats only if they are likely to be credible. In specific games, TOM provides detailed prescriptions for optimal play, depending on where play starts and the powers of the players, that could aid foreign-policy makers, especially in crises. [source]

Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2001
Mark L. Haas
This article tests the predictions of expected-utility and prospect theories against the most important dimensions of the Cuban missile crisis. Largely through use of the most recently released information on the crisis from the American and Soviet governments, I attempt to ascertain the anticipated benefits, costs, and probabilities of success associated with each of the major policy choices that the key leaders in both superpowers perceived before each of the major decisions throughout the crisis was made. Using this information and the logic of extensive-form game-theoretic models of choice, I construct a baseline for expected-utility theory that helps us to understand when prospect or expected-utility theory provides the better explanation for a particular decision. Prospect theory predicts that when individuals perceive themselves to be experiencing losses at the time they make a decision, and when their probability estimates associated with their principal policy options are in the moderate to high range, they will tend to make excessively risky, non,value maximizing choices. I find that the evidence for the Cuban missile crisis supports this prediction for the most important decisions made by both Khrushchev and Kennedy. [source]

When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies?

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2009
Arthur Lupia
Many people claim that politicians use fear to manipulate citizens. Using a model, we examine how select attributes of fear affect a politician's ability to scare citizens into supporting policies that they would otherwise reject. In the model, the politician can alert citizens to the presence of a threat. But his claim need not be true. How citizens respond to this claim differs from most game-theoretic models. Our representation of this response follows from research in psychology, has distinct conscious and subconscious components, and does not presume efficient processing (i.e., Bayesian updating). Our conclusions counter popular claims about when politicians will use fear to manipulate citizens. They also highlight issues (abstract, distant) and leaders (secretive) for which recent empirical findings about how fear affects politics will,and will not,generalize to other cases. [source]