Firms Increases (firm + increase)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Long-term Investments and Financial Structure

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, Issue 1 2000
Noriyuki Yanagawa
This paper examines how the financial structure of a firm affects the incentives of managers to act myopically. The paper shows that managers tend to choose investments that pay off too quickly if there is a possibility that shareholders will fire the managers in the future. However, this problem can be avoided if firms are appropriately financed. Since the gains from firing the managers accrue first to the creditors, the shareholders' incentive to fire the managers is reduced when the firm increases its debt ratio. The firm should thus choose an optimal financial structure to ensure that the level of incentive for shareholders to dismiss managers is appropriately controlled. [source]


The Allocational Effects of the Precision of Accounting Estimates

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2007
RONALD A. DYE
ABSTRACT This paper studies the allocational effects associated with the precision of accounting estimates when the precision of estimates is a choice variable for firms. One part of the paper considers the effects of the observability of precision choices. We show that, generally, making precision choices private increases firms' equilibrium precision choices and also, as a by-product, their equilibrium investment choices. We further show that, when firms' precision choices are private, there may be a "disclosure trap," in which, unless investors conjecture the owner has chosen an estimate with the highest possible precision, the owner will respond to investors' conjecture by choosing an estimate whose precision is higher than investors' conjecture. In a multifirm version of the model with endogenous investment, we show that the equilibrium investment by the firm increases in the precision of the firm's own estimate and decreases in the precisions of other firms' estimates. Finally, we show that, in a setting where the firm's initial owner sells his stake in the firm over the course of two periods, with disclosures of estimates of the firm's value occurring prior to each sale of shares, if the precisions of the estimates are public, the equilibrium precisions of the estimates increase over time when the owner sells a sufficiently large fraction of the firm in the first period, and otherwise the equilibrium precisions of estimates remain constant over time. [source]


PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY,

JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2009
Antonella Nocco
ABSTRACT We investigate the effect of preference heterogeneity between skilled and unskilled workers on agglomeration, and we identify a new source of dependence of equilibrium prices on the demand properties shaped by the inter-regional distribution of workers. We find a new preference effect, and we show that when the intensity of skilled workers' preference for the modern good and its variety is strong enough, prices charged by firms may even increase when the mass of local firms increases, therefore acting as a new dispersion force when trade costs are low or as a new agglomeration force when trade costs are high. [source]


BUYING VERSUS HIRING,AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

METROECONOMICA, Issue 4 2009
Siegfried K. Berninghaus
ABSTRACT On a symmetric homogeneous oligopoly market with stochastic demand, firms can either hire employees or buy their labor input on a competitive labor market. Whereas the wage of hired labor does not depend on the realization of stochastic demand, the price of ,bought' labor reacts positively to product demand. We derive the equilibrium price vector to define an evolutionary process, assuming that the number of hiring firms increases when they earn more than buying firms. We then derive and discuss the stationary distribution of this stochastic adaptation process. [source]


Competition from Specialized Firms and the Diversification,Performance Linkage

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2008
JUAN SANTALO
ABSTRACT In this study, we show that the effect of diversification on performance is not homogeneous across industries and explore analytically and empirically the implications of this finding for the diversification literature. Diversified firms perform better in industries with a small number of nondiversified competitors or, equivalently, when specialized firms have a small combined market share, but worse as the presence of specialized firms increases in the industries in which they compete. The results are robust to the use of methods that alleviate the self-selection problem and call for a reassessment of the diversification,performance relationship. [source]