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External Finance (external + finance)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

COSTLY EXTERNAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY IN A MARKET EQUILIBRIUM MODEL

ECONOMIC INQUIRY, Issue 4 2009
JÁN ZÁBOJNÍK
The corporate finance literature suggests that a financially constrained firm invests less than an identical unconstrained firm. This does not imply that financial frictions cause firms to invest less than in a frictionless economy. When firms compete for investment funds, an increase in financial frictions can lead individual firms to increase their investment levels. A greater than the frictionless level of investment is likely in low-productivity firms, in cash-rich firms, and in firms with cheap external capital. Government programs that make capital cheaper for small firms may lead to lower levels of investment for all firms and decrease efficiency (JEL O16, E22, E44, G20) [source]

Identifying the Role of Moral Hazard in International Financial Markets

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 1 2004
Steven B. Kamin
Abstract Considerable attention has been paid to the possibility that large-scale IMF-led financing packages may have distorted incentives in international financial markets, leading private investors to provide more credit to emerging market countries, and at lower interest rates, than might otherwise have been the case. Yet, prior attempts to identify such distortions have yielded mixed evidence, at best. This paper makes three contributions to our ability to assess the empirical importance of moral hazard in international financial markets. First, it is argued that, because large international ,bail-outs' did not commence until the 1995 Mexican crisis, financial indicators prior to that time could not have reflected a significant degree of this type of moral hazard. Therefore, one test for the existence of moral hazard is that the access of emerging markets to international credit is significantly easier than it was prior to 1995. Second, the paper argues that because private investors expect large-scale IMF-led packages to be extended primarily to economically or geo-politically important countries, moral hazard, if it exists, should lead these countries to have easier terms of access to credit than smaller, non-systemically important countries. Finally, in addition to looking at bond spreads, the focus of earlier empirical analyses of moral hazard, the paper also examines trends in capital flows to gauge the access of emerging market countries to external finance. Looking at the evidence in light of these considerations, the paper concludes that there is little support for the view that moral hazard is significantly distorting international capital markets at the present time. [source]

Finance and Firm Export in China

KYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 1 2007
Jun Du
SUMMARY Using a rich panel data set, we provide a rigorous analysis of the relationship between access to external finance, foreign direct investment and the exports of private enterprises in China. We conclude that, in order to foster the exports of indigenous enterprises, the elimination of financial discrimination against private firms is likely to be a more effective policy tool than the reliance on spillovers from multinational firms. [source]

CORRUPTION AND CORPORATE FINANCE PATTERNS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

PACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008
Julan Du
Corruption contributes to a more prevalent and higher degree of corporate equity ownership concentration and more reliance on bank financing in raising external finance. It argues that corporate governance under corrupt governments is particularly poor. Firm management, taking advantage of political capital acquired through bribery, is especially powerful in expropriating from outside investors. Ownership concentration and reliance on bank financing are means of mitigating the corporate governance problem under a corrupt government. [source]

Law and Finance in Transition Economies

THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 2 2000
Katharina Pistor
This paper offers the first comprehensive analysis of legal change in the protection of shareholder and creditor rights in transition economies and its impact on the propensity of firms to raise external finance. Following La Porta et al. (1998), the paper constructs an expanded set of legal indices to capture a range of potential conflicts between different stakeholders of the firm. It supplements the analysis of the law on the books with an analysis of the effectiveness of legal institutions. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of legal institutions has a much stronger impact on external finance than does the law on the books, despite legal change that has substantially improved shareholder and creditor rights. This finding supports the proposition that legal transplants and extensive legal reforms are not sufficient for the evolution of effective legal and market institutions. [source]

Finance and the Business Cycle: International, Inter-Industry Evidence

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2005
MATÍAS BRAUN
ABSTRACT By considering yearly production growth rates for several manufacturing industries in more than 100 countries during (roughly) the last 40 years, we show that industries that are more dependent on external finance are hit harder during recessions. The observed difference in the behavior of industries is larger when financial frictions are thought to be more prevalent, linking the result directly to the financial mechanism hypothesis. In particular, more dependent industries are more strongly affected in recessions when they are located in countries with poor financial contractibility, and when their assets are softer or less protective of financiers. [source]