Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
External Effects (external + effects)
Selected AbstractsFear of Floating and the External Effects of Currency UnionsAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2008Thomas Plümper The introduction of the Euro has considerably affected the de facto monetary policy autonomy,defined as independence from monetary policy in the key currency areas,in countries outside the European Currency Union (ECU). Using a standard open economy framework, we argue that de facto monetary policy autonomy has significantly declined for countries that dominantly trade with the ECU and slightly increased for countries that dominantly trade with the Dollar zone. The predictions of our model find support in the data. We estimate the influence of the Bundesbank's/ECB's and the Fed's monetary policies on various country groups. The de facto monetary policy autonomy of both non-Euro EU members and EFTA countries declined with the introduction of the Euro. This effect was slightly stronger for the EU member countries than for EFTA countries as our theory predicts. At the same time, the de facto monetary policy autonomy of Australia and New Zealand vis-à-vis the US Dollar has (moderately) increased. [source] Economic aspects of human cloning and reprogeneticsECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 36 2003Gilles Saint-Paul SUMMARY While most discussions of human cloning start and end with ethics, this paper analyses the economics of human cloning. I analyse the incentives for cloning and its implications for the long-run distribution of skills and income. I discuss models of human cloning for different motives, focusing on those that tend to produce new human beings with improved ability. I distinguish three cases: cloning as a means of assisted reproduction for infertile couples, cloning by fertile couples aimed at producing high ability offspring and, finally, financially motivated cloning. The third case supposes that the creator of a clone can appropriate some fraction of the clone's future income. Even if this fraction is small, the possibility of producing exceptionally talented clones with correspondingly high incomes might make it profitable, and thus turn cloning into a form of financial investment. An important consequence of these models is that to the extent that ability is genetically determined and cloners prefer to make high-ability clones, cloning will act as a form of what might be called ,unnatural selection'. Following standard Darwinian logic, such selection will tend to increase the proportion of high ability people in society. Indeed, under some assumptions the distribution of ability eventually converges to a mass point at the highest possible ability level. Under weaker assumptions, it is shown that ability-reducing genes are eventually eliminated. These results do not depend on cloning displacing sexual reproduction or even being widespread; they hold even if a small, or even negligible number of top ability workers are cloned at a small (but not negligible) number of copies. The paper discusses the plausibility of the models and their results in light on the evidence on marriage markets, child selection, human assisted reproduction and animal husbandry. Finally, it is shown how the analysis can be used to help formulate policies toward cloning, whether they aim at preventing it or managing its external effects. , Gilles Saint-Paul [source] Measuring Housing Subsidies: Distortionary and Distributional Effects in the NetherlandsFISCAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2003Harry Ter Rele Abstract This paper measures the distortionary and distributional effects of housing subsidies in the Netherlands. Its broad scope allows us to discuss the results in the light of the main justifications for subsidising housing, i.e. the merit,good argument, external effects and the distribution motive. Our measurements reveal some patterns of subsidisation that seem difficult to justify on these grounds. This applies especially to the differences between subsidisation of rental and owneroccupied housing and between mortgage, and equity,financed ownership. Moreover, the inelastic supply of housing in the Netherlands entails that subsidisation has only a limited effect on promoting housing quality. [source] On expectations-driven business cycles in economies with production externalitiesINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2009Stefano Eusepi C62; E32 Expectations-driven business cycles are defined as positive co-movement between consumption, investment and hours that result from a change in expectations, holding constant technology, preferences and government intervention. This note explores the possibility of expectations-driven business cycles in business cycle models with external effects. It is found that in one-sector models conditions for expectations-driven business cycles and conditions for multiple equilibria are tightly connected. In two-sector models those conditions appear to be mutually exclusive. [source] The Importance of Actor Cleavages in Negotiating the European ConstitutionINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2010Madeleine O. Hosli This paper aims to explore government preferences and cleavages in the bargaining process on the European Constitution, across the range of 25 EU member states. The study focuses on preferences concerning socioeconomic policymaking and explores whether divisions can be discerned between preferences held by actors according to locations on the left-right policy scale, actors in older as compared to newer EU states, net EU budget positions, domestic rates of support for European integration, and smaller as compared to larger states. The analysis also controls for possible external effects, such as recent domestic macroeconomic developments. Negotiations on the European Constitution are found to be determined less by general transnational left-right divisions, but cleavages according to the length of EU membership and the size of EU member states. [source] Migration and welfare: a very simple modelJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 7 2007Roberto Cellini Abstract The paper presents a very simple model of migration, relying on three widely accepted points: first, labour productivity and wages in a country depend on the present average human capital; second, agents maximise their utility, so that migration decisions depend on the wage gap across economies; third, the larger the personal human capital, the higher the propensity is to migrate (ceteris paribus). The model shows that migration through its external effects always lowers the welfare in the sending country, while the effects on the receiving country can be positive or negative. As a consequence, selfish developed economies could desire a larger migration than the optimal level for a benevolent World Planner. This calls for international coordination concerning the regulation of migration flows. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Inefficient Local Regulation of Local ExternalitiesJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2005GREGORY BESHAROV The consequences of commitment failure have been missing from debates about the decentralized regulation of automobile emissions and other sources of local consumption externalities. Even when the direct external effects of such products are limited to a single jurisdiction, the presence of increasing returns-to-scale production causes one jurisdiction's choice of regulatory standard to affect the prices and availability of goods elsewhere. Decentralized regulatory equilibria may be inefficient as a result. Because of a commitment failure, production may be split between standards,and consumers denied the full range of products,when it is efficient to have standards that allow products to be consumed everywhere. Coordination failures may cause similar inefficiencies. The results question the usefulness of the principle of subsidiarity as commonly employed. [source] An Introduction to Spatial DiscountingJOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2001Charles Perrings Research on the valuation of environmental externalities shows that decision makers tend to discount not only over time but across space. Just as time discounting has implications for intergenerational equity, geographical or spatial discounting has implications for intragenerational equity. Similarly, just as positive time discount rates are warranted by positive net rates of growth of the capital stock, positive spatial discount rates may be warranted by the fact that enviironmental (or other external effects of economic activity are diffused at positive rates. This paper introduces the notion of spatial discounting and explores its welfare implications through a simple diffusion model. [source] Endogenous Growth, Increasing Returns and Externalities: An Alternative Interpretation of the EvidenceMETROECONOMICA, Issue 4 2001Jesus Felipe A number of recent papers have used aggregate production functions in an attempt to measure the degree of returns to scale and possible external effects in US manufacturing industries. In this paper I argue that the methods used and the results obtained are deceptive. The reason is that underlying every aggregate production function is the income accounting identity that relates output in value terms to the sum of wages and profits. This identity can be transformed, depending on the empirical paths of the wage and profit rates and of the factor shares, into different mathematical forms which resemble neoclassical production functions. Estimation of these forms, as is done in the literature discussed in the paper, poses serious problems for the interpretation of the results. [source] Fossile Energiepolitik jenseits von KyotoPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 2 2003Reto Schleiniger Due to varying external effects a national policy will differentiate energy taxes between fuels. Using Swiss estimates of external effects, it is shown that a national policy would fulfil the Kyoto goal as a secondary benefit. Moreover, a nationally based fossil fuel policy would affect the scope for an international trade of CO2 emission rights, as a net-buyer of emission rights will lose from participating in such a trade. [source] XIV,The Moral Limits of Markets: The Case of Human KidneysPROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1pt3 2008Debra Satz This paper examines the morality of kidney markets through the lens of choice, inequality, and weak agency looking at the case for limiting such markets under both non-ideal and ideal circumstances. Regulating markets can go some way to addressing the problems of inequality and weak agency. The choice issue is different and this paper shows that the choice for some to sell their kidneys can have external effects on those who do not want to do so, constraining the options that are now open to them. I believe that this is the strongest argument against such markets. [source] Altruism and Determinacy of Equilibria in Overlapping Generations Models with ExternalitiesTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2003Alain Venditti This paper deals with an OLG model with production and a single commodity, in which agents are assumed altruistic and the aggregate production function contains external effects. I prove that, if the technology satisfies a minor assumption, which encompasses positive and negative externalities, some curvature conditions on the utility function ensure local determinacy of stationary and period 2 equilibria. I prove that non-separable, strictly concave preferences are a fundamental ingredient for the occurrence of indeterminate equilibria. Finally, considering the case of unbounded growth, I establish that for any utility and production functions a unique balanced growth path is globally determinate. JEL Classification Numbers: C62, E32 [source] Casino regulations and economic welfareCANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2010Juin-Jen Chang Abstract This paper studies the entry and tax regulation of oligopolistically competitive privately run casinos and government-run casinos in a jurisdiction. We highlight three important external effects from casino-style gambling: non-casino income creation, social disorder costs, and cross-border gambling. The laissez-faire equilibrium need not be overcrowding compared with regulated or government-run regimes. Entry regulation may lead to higher jurisdiction welfare than tax regulation. Government-run casinos always operate on a larger scale and achieve higher welfare than other regimes, given the same number of casinos. With an endogenous fraction of external gamblers, a dispersed casino configuration yields higher welfare than a centralized one. Ce texte étudie les réglementations à l'entrée et de nature fiscale dans un monde oligopolistique concurrentiel où coexistent des casinos opérés par les secteurs privé et gouvernemental. On souligne trois effets externes importants des jeux d'argent de style casino : la création de revenu de type non-casino, les coûts du désordre social engendré, et le fait que ces jeux d'argent transgressent les frontières. L'équilibre de laissez-faire n'engendre pas nécessairement sur-encombrement par rapport à des régimes réglementés ou opérés strictement par le gouvernement. Les régulations de l'entrée peuvent engendrer des effets de bien-être plus grands pour la juridiction que la réglementation fiscale. Les casinos opérés par le gouvernement opèrent toujours sur une plus haute échelle et engendrent des effets de bien-être plus grands que les autres régimes pour un nombre donné de casinos. Compte tenu qu'il existe une fraction endogène de joueurs externes, une configuration dispersée de casinos donnent des effets de bien-être plus grands qu'une configuration centralisée. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||