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Experimental Market (experimental + market)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

TACIT COLLUSION IN AUCTIONS AND CONDITIONS FOR ITS FACILITATION AND PREVENTION: EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

ECONOMIC INQUIRY, Issue 3 2009
JIN LI
The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. We design and implement a "collusion incubator" environment based on a type of public, symmetrically "folded" and "item-aligned" preferences. Tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the environment. Once tacit collusion developed, it proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of a game-theoretic model. The only successful remedy was a non-public change in the preference of participants that destroyed the symmetrically, "folded" and "item aligned" patterns of preferences, creating head-to-head competition between two agents reminiscent of the concept of a "maverick."(JEL L50, L94, D43) [source]

Game theory application to Fed Cattle procurement in an experimental market

AGRIBUSINESS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 1 2009
Jared G. Carlberg
Consolidation in meatpacking has elicited many market power concerns and studies. A noncooperative, infinitely repeated game theory model was developed and an empirical model estimated to measure beef packing firm behavior in cattle procurement. Experimental market data from three semester-long classes using the Fed Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS) were used. Collusive behavior was found for all three data periods though the extent of collusion varied across semester-long data periods. Results may have been influenced by market conditions imposed on the experimental market in two of the three semesters. One was a marketing agreement between the largest packer and two feedlots and the other involved limiting the amount and type of public market information available to participants. Findings underscore the need for applying game theory to real-world transaction-level, fed cattle market data. [EconLit Citations: C730, L100]. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source]

Independence in Appearance and in Fact: An Experimental Investigation,

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2003
Nicholas Dopuch
Abstract In this study, we use experimental markets to assess the effect of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) new independence rule on investors' perceptions of independence, investors' payoff distributions, and market prices. The new rule requires client firms to disclose in their annual proxy statements the amount of nonaudit fees paid to their auditors. The new disclosure is intended to inform investors of auditors' incentives to compromise their independence. Our experimental design is a 2 3 between-subjects design, where we control the presence (unbiased reports) or absence of auditor independence in fact (biased reports). While independence in fact was not immediately observable to investors, we controlled for independence in appearance by varying the public disclosure of the extent of nonaudit services provided by the auditor to the client. In one market setting, investors were not given any information about whether the auditor provided such nonaudit services; in a second setting, investors were explicitly informed that the auditor did not provide any non-audit services; and in a third setting, investors were told that the auditor provided nonaudit services that could be perceived to have an adverse effect on independence in fact. We found that disclosures of nonaudit services reduced the accuracy of investors' beliefs of auditors' independence in fact when independence in appearance was inconsistent with independence in fact. This then caused prices of assets to deviate more from their economic predictions (lower market efficiency) in the inconsistent settings relative to the no-disclosure and consistent settings. Thus, disclosures of fees for nonaudit services could reduce the efficiency of capital markets if such disclosures result in investors forming inaccurate beliefs of auditor independence in fact - that is, auditors appear independent but they are not independent in fact, or vice versa. The latter is the maintained position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which argued against the new rule. Further research is needed to assess the degree of correspondence between independence in fact and independence in appearance. [source]

How beliefs influence the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain

JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING, Issue 4 2010
Barbara A. Mellers
Abstract Loss aversion is an economic assumption about utility,people value giving up a good more than they value getting it. It also has hedonic meaning,the pain of a loss is greater in magnitude than the pleasure of a comparable gain. But value and pleasure are not necessarily identical. We test the hedonic interpretation of loss aversion in experimental markets. With hedonic forecasts, sellers imagine the pain of losing their endowment, and buyers imagine the pleasure of being endowed. With hedonic experiences, sellers rate the pleasure of having the endowment, and buyers rate the pain of being without it. Contrary to loss aversion, predicted pleasure is greater in magnitude than predicted pain, and experienced pleasure surpasses experienced pain. We show that the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain depends on beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes, as well as utilities. Surprise makes gains more pleasurable and losses more painful. With surprising gains and expected losses, pleasure can surpass pain. But when gains and losses are equally likely (or losses are surprising and gains are expected), the opposite pattern can occur. Finally, within-group and between-group prices are significantly correlated with hedonic experiences. Sellers who feel better with their endowments assign higher selling prices, and buyers who feel worse about the absence of endowment assign higher buying prices. Despite the fact that hedonic experiences deviate from loss aversion, these emotions predict the endowment effect. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]