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Agent Relationships (agent + relationships)
Selected AbstractsRent extraction, principal,agent relationships, and pricing strategies: vendor licensing during the 1996 Olympic Games in AtlantaMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 8 2001Ralph C. Allen Two-part pricing, price-discrimination, rent creation and extraction, principal,agent theory, and public choice perspectives on public bureaucracies are used to interpret a vendor-license marketing arrangement and controversy arising out of the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA. Containing features predicted by principal,agency theory, Atlanta's arrangement with its marketing agent was a response to the behavior of public bureaucracies and a low cost method of converting visitors' consumer surplus to rent, which could be extracted by the marketing agent and then by Atlanta. Atlanta's incentive to enforce vendor property rights was influenced by the nature of the game between Atlanta and prospective vendors. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Principal-agent relationships on the stewardship-agency axisNONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 1 2006Ralf Caers This article provides an overview of the literature on nonprofit principal-agent relationships. It depicts the nature of agency theory and stewardship theory, analyzes the origin of their struggle within the nonprofit structure, and marks directions for a conciliatory approach. We open with an introduction to agency theory and discuss the two main components of its mathematical branch. We thereby contrast it with stewardship theory and elaborate on the arguments that can affect the position of nonprofit principal-agent relationships on the stewardship-agency axis. Analysis of the existing literature points to a lack of consensus as to which theory should be applied. We argue that the division of nonprofit principalagent relationships into board-manager and manageremployee interactions may help to clarify the balance between agency theory and stewardship theory and may lead to the establishment of a strongly founded theory on nonprofit principal-agent relationships. We close with a discussion of how this article may prove valuable to nonprofit policymakers and other empirical researchers. [source] Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding PreferencesTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2004Hideshi Itoh The paper aims at obtaining new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal,agent relationships with theories of other-regarding preferences, in particular inequity aversion theory. The principal is in general worse off, as the agent cares more about the wellbeing of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's wellbeing, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract. The approach taken in this paper can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations. [source] Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment IncentivesTHE MILBANK QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2001James C. Robinson Combining the economic literature on principal-agent relationships with examples of marketplace innovations allows analysis of the evolution of methods for paying physicians. Agency theory and the economic principles of performance-based compensation are applied in the context of imperfect information, risk aversion, multiple interrelated tasks, and team production efficiencies. Fee-for-service and capitation are flawed methods of motivating physicians to achieve specific goals. Payment innovations that blend elements of fee-for-service, capitation, and case rates can preserve the advantages and attenuate the disadvantages of each. These innovations include capitation with fee-for-service carve-outs, department budgets with individual fee-for-service or "contact" capitation, and case rates for defined episodes of illness. The context within which payment incentives are embedded, includes such nonprice mechanisms as screening and monitoring and such organizational relationships as employment and ownership. The analysis has implications for health services research and public policy with respect to physician payment incentives. [source] | ||||||||||