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Executive Stock Options (executive + stock_option)
Selected AbstractsCancellation of Executive Stock Options: Tax and Accounting Income Considerations,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2003Amin Mawani Abstract Canadian firms face a trade-off between reporting higher accounting income and paying lower taxes that arises from their ability to cancel in-the-money executive stock options and making a substitute cash payment to the executive instead of issuing shares. Firms' trade-off hypotheses are operationalized in a multilateral framework and empirically tested using insider-trading data. The multilateral approach is designed to control for the incentive effects of alternative compensation schemes and to determine the cancellation payment that keeps the executive indifferent between receiving cash or shares. The results show that firms consider both taxes and financial reporting costs in determining their option cancellation behavior. [source] Executive Stock Options: To Expense or Not?FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2006Sanjay Deshmukh In analyzing the decision to expense stock options, we find a greater likelihood of options expensing for firms with greater transparency and a closer alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. These results provide indirect evidence that expensing is more likely in firms that practice good corporate governance. We show that firms are less likely to expense when option usage is higher and that this negative relation is stronger for firms that are smaller, have high growth, and are less profitable. We also find that the announcement period returns are not significantly different from zero. [source] The Role of Executive Stock Options in On-Market Share Buybacks,INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2010ASJEET S. LAMBA ABSTRACT The increasing use of on-market buyback programs in Australia may not be fully explained by the typical motivations of information signaling and free cash flows offered by previous researchers. For some firms at least, management may believe the shares are overvalued. It is in this context that we examine whether managers of firms with high levels of executive stock options have an incentive to initiate buyback programs. It has been argued that managers may be motivated to undertake on-market buyback programs in order to neutralize the dilution of earnings per share caused by their stock options, rather than for signaling purposes. Our findings are consistent with this argument because we find that the higher the proportion of executive stock options outstanding the more likely it is for firms to undertake larger on-market buyback programs. Overall our results indicate that the existence of executive stock options influences managers' decision to implement on-market buyback programs but that it is not the only factor that managers take into consideration. [source] Accounting for Executive Stock Options: A Case Study in Avoiding Tough DecisionsAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 26 2002Jeff Coulton We review the development of accounting requirements for executive stock options (ESOs) and find that the standard-setting process has been susceptible to pressure groups including the corporate sector, politicians and even the accounting profession itself. The failure of Australian and overseas accounting regulators to take tough decisions may have created a systematic bias towards the use of ESOs which can result in grossly inefficient compensation structures motivated by a desire to maximise reported profits rather than to create optimal managerial incentives. We conclude that most of the arguments against recognition of stock option expense can be dismissed as blatant self-interest at worst, or remarkably muddled thinking at best. [source] Cancellation of Executive Stock Options: Tax and Accounting Income Considerations,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2003Amin Mawani Abstract Canadian firms face a trade-off between reporting higher accounting income and paying lower taxes that arises from their ability to cancel in-the-money executive stock options and making a substitute cash payment to the executive instead of issuing shares. Firms' trade-off hypotheses are operationalized in a multilateral framework and empirically tested using insider-trading data. The multilateral approach is designed to control for the incentive effects of alternative compensation schemes and to determine the cancellation payment that keeps the executive indifferent between receiving cash or shares. The results show that firms consider both taxes and financial reporting costs in determining their option cancellation behavior. [source] Are Debt and Incentive Compensation Substitutes in Controlling the Free Cash Flow Agency Problem?FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2009Yilei Zhang This paper investigates the governance implications of a firm's capital structure and managerial incentive compensation in controlling the free cash flow agency problem. The results suggest: debt and executive stock options act as substitutes in attenuating a firm's free cash flow problem; failure to incorporate the substitutability and endogeneity leads to underestimates of the magnitude and economic implication of the disciplinary role of both mechanisms; firm characteristics differ across the prevalence of debt usage versus option usage, suggesting the heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of the monitoring devices; and all the above effects are more pronounced in firms that tend to have more severe agency problem. [source] Valuing executive stock options: performance hurdles, early exercise and stochastic volatilityACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2008Philip Brown G13 Abstract Accounting standards require companies to assess the fair value of any stock options granted to executives and employees. We develop a model for accurately valuing executive and employee stock options, focusing on performance hurdles, early exercise and uncertain volatility. We apply the model in two case studies and show that properly computed fair values can be significantly lower than traditional Black,Scholes values. We then explore the implications for pay-for-performance sensitivity and the design of effective share-based incentive schemes. We find that performance hurdles can require a much greater fraction of total compensation to be a fixed salary, if pre-existing incentive levels are to be maintained. [source] Risk-taking incentives of executive stock options and the asset substitution problemACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2005Gerald T. Garvey G32; D23; J33 Abstract Various theoretical models show that managerial compensation schemes can reduce the distortionary effects of financial leverage. There is mixed evidence as to whether highly levered firms offer less stock-based compensation, a common prediction of such models. Both the theoretical and empirical research, however, have overlooked the leverage provided by executive stock options. In principle, adjusting the exercise prices of executive stock options can mitigate the risk incentive effects of financial leverage. We show that the near-universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage. In a large cross-sectional sample of Canadian option-granting firms, we find evidence that executives' incentives to take equity risk are negatively rather than positively related to the leverage of their employers. [source] The Role of Executive Stock Options in On-Market Share Buybacks,INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2010ASJEET S. LAMBA ABSTRACT The increasing use of on-market buyback programs in Australia may not be fully explained by the typical motivations of information signaling and free cash flows offered by previous researchers. For some firms at least, management may believe the shares are overvalued. It is in this context that we examine whether managers of firms with high levels of executive stock options have an incentive to initiate buyback programs. It has been argued that managers may be motivated to undertake on-market buyback programs in order to neutralize the dilution of earnings per share caused by their stock options, rather than for signaling purposes. Our findings are consistent with this argument because we find that the higher the proportion of executive stock options outstanding the more likely it is for firms to undertake larger on-market buyback programs. Overall our results indicate that the existence of executive stock options influences managers' decision to implement on-market buyback programs but that it is not the only factor that managers take into consideration. [source] SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAYJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2003Brian J. Hall The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the equitybased pay of U.S. corporate executives, an increase that has been driven almost entirely by the explosion of stock option grants. When properly designed, equity-based pay can raise corporate productivity and shareholder value by helping companies attract, motivate, and retain talented managers. But there are good reasons to question whether the current forms of U.S. equity pay are optimal. In many cases, substantial stock and option payoffs to top executives,particularly those who cashed out much of their holdings near the top of the market,appear to have come at the expense of their shareholders, generating considerable skepticism about not just executive pay practices, but the overall quality of U.S. corporate governance. At the same time, many companies that have experienced sharp stock price declines are now struggling with the problem of retaining employees holding lots of deep-underwater options. This article discusses the design of equity-based pay plans that aim to motivate sustainable, or long-run, value creation. As a first step, the author recommends the use of longer vesting periods and other requirements on executive stock and option holdings, both to limit managers' ability to "time" the market and to reduce their incentives to take shortsighted actions that increase near-term earnings at the expense of longer-term cash flow. Besides requiring "more permanent" holdings, the author also proposes a change in how stock options are issued. In place of popular "fixed value" plans that adjust the number of options awarded each year to reflect changes in the share price (and that effectively reward management for poor performance by granting more options when the price falls, and fewer when it rises), the author recommends the use of "fixed number" plans that avoid this unintended distortion of incentives. As the author also notes, there is considerable confusion about the real economic cost of options relative to stock. Part of the confusion stems, of course, from current GAAP accounting, which allows companies to report the issuance of at-the-money options as costless and so creates a bias against stock and other forms of compensation. But, coming on top of the "opportunity cost" of executive stock options to the company's shareholders, there is another, potentially significant cost of options (and, to a lesser extent, stock) that arises from the propensity of executives and employees to place a lower value on company stock and options than well-diversified outside investors. The author's conclusion is that grants of (slow-vesting) stock are likely to have at least three significant advantages over employee stock options: ,they are more highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of cost to shareholders); ,they continue to provide reasonably strong ownership incentives and retention power, regardless of whether the stock price rises or falls, because they don't go underwater; and ,the value of such grants is much more transparent to stockholders, employees, and the press. [source] GOLF TOURNAMENTS AND CEO PAY,UNRAVELING THE MYSTERIES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2001John Martin Leading financial economists and activist institutional investors have long argued that the proper alignment of manager and shareholder interests requires the use of performance based compensation. Partly in response to these pressures, and in combination with a change in the tax code that encourages performance-based pay, corporate boards have dramatically increased their use of stock grants and executive stock options. Combine this development with the longest bull market in U.S. financial history, and the result is unprecedented levels of CEO pay at the close of the 20th century. This review of executive compensation reveals that the economic theory of tournaments may provide a rationale for the pattern, if not the level, of executive pay. Specifically it finds that the total compensation of the five highestpaid executives in a cross-section of new and old-economy firms is very similar to the pattern of payouts to players in a golf tournament. The author also reports that recent studies show a significant increase in the pay-for-performance correlation throughout the 1990s. But whether that correlation is as high as it should be, and whether current levels of CEO pay are socially "optimal," are questions that remain unanswered. [source] The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock RepurchasesREAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2010Chinmoy Ghosh This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we examine how executive and employee stock option holdings influence the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a stock repurchase. Using a sample of REIT repurchase announcements, we find that the market reacts more favorably to announcements by firms where executives have larger option holdings and the chief executive officer is not entrenched. Our results with respect to the roles of stock option holdings of executives and nonexecutives differ from those reported for a cross-section of non-REIT firms. While we find evidence supporting the importance of executive stock options in aligning the incentives of management and reinforcing the positive signaling associated with a repurchase announcement, we find little evidence that the market views REIT repurchases as being used primarily to fund option exercise. We attribute these findings to greater dependence by REIT investors on internal governance mechanisms (such as stock option programs) as a result of regulatory restrictions that limit external monitoring such as hostile takeovers. [source] Trend derivatives: Pricing, hedging, and application to executive stock optionsTHE JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS, Issue 2 2007Markus Leippold Both institutional and private investors often have only limited flexibility in timing their investment decision. They look for investments that will ideally be independent of the timing decision. In this article, a new class of derivative products whose payoff is linked to the trend of the underlying instrument is introduced. By linking the trend to the payoff, the timing of the decision becomes less important. Therefore, trend derivatives offer some time-diversification benefits. How trend derivatives are designed and priced is shown. Due to their peculiar features, trend derivatives offer some interesting applications such as executive stock option plans. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 27:151,186, 2007 [source] Accounting for Executive Stock Options: A Case Study in Avoiding Tough DecisionsAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 26 2002Jeff Coulton We review the development of accounting requirements for executive stock options (ESOs) and find that the standard-setting process has been susceptible to pressure groups including the corporate sector, politicians and even the accounting profession itself. The failure of Australian and overseas accounting regulators to take tough decisions may have created a systematic bias towards the use of ESOs which can result in grossly inefficient compensation structures motivated by a desire to maximise reported profits rather than to create optimal managerial incentives. We conclude that most of the arguments against recognition of stock option expense can be dismissed as blatant self-interest at worst, or remarkably muddled thinking at best. [source] How Might Companies Value ESOs?AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 26 2002Ross A. Maller There has been a steady growth in the use of employee equity compensation plans, and in the use of executive stock options (ESOs) in particular, along with a rise in shareholder and public perceptions that the values of compensation plans are not always fully disclosed. The IFSA of Australia recently called for separate reporting in financial statements of numbers and values of ESOs. Companies, when negotiating employment contracts, frequently agree to compensate an executive if a share option plan is subsequently not approved by shareholders. These facts suggest that reporting the value of an ESO plan is a useful and important exercise. We outline a model for the valuation of ESOs typically issued by Australian listed companies and illustrate the application of the model with a case study. [source] Option Awards for Australian CEOs: The Who, What and WhyAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 26 2002Jeff Coulton The compensation structure for Australian CEOs, and especially the extent to which they receive executive stock options, is explored. Evidence suggests that the award of executive stock options is common in Australia, but not in as systematic a manner as has been documented for US CEOs. Where ESOs are awarded, they form a significant component of total compensation, even allowing for limitations in the way we approximate their value. Modelling the use of ESOs shows relatively few empirical regularities, other than a positive association between firm size and ESO use. This is consistent with a view that ESOs are a form of "rent extraction" by CEOs, but it may also reflect a bias towards their use created by accounting rules. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||