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European Parliament (european + parliament)
Selected AbstractsMore power to the European Parliament?ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 35 2002Abdul G. Noury SUMMARY Many observers have expressed scepticism about granting more power to the European Parliament. The sceptics believe that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) do not vote in a disciplined way and that they vote more often with their country group than with their European Party. Using a unique database consisting of all roll call votes by each individual MEP between 1989 and 1999 (over 6000 votes by over 1000 different MEPs), we show that the sceptics are wrong. Our data shows clearly that MEPs vote more along party lines than along country lines. Party cohesion is comparable to that of the US Congress and is increasing over time whereas country cohesion is low and declining. In short, politics in the European Parliament generally follows the traditional left,right divide that one finds in all European nations. These findings are valid across issues, even on issues like the structural and cohesion funds where one would expect country rather than party cohesion. In votes where the EP has the most power , those held under the so-called co-decision procedure , MEPs participate more and are more party-cohesive. In our opinion, this unique empirical analysis provides grounds for justifying a generalization of the co-decision procedure. [source] The role of the European Parliament in forest environment issuesENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2002Nikolaos D. Hasanagas This article deals with the potential influence of European parliamentarism on environmental policy in forested areas. It is addressed as much to policy analysts and parliamentary theorists as to those most directly involved therein, for example international lobbyists and policy-makers. The relative powers of the European Parliament, Council of Ministers and Commission and assorted interest groups (forestry and environmental activists) will be considered through the analysis of documents and expert interviews. The gradual extension of the European Parliament's power (co-operation and co-decision procedures) in combination with the parliamentary functions (control, legislation, election, articulation and communication) will be described where relevant to forest environment policy, in particular to competition, harmonization, internal markets, industry, research, land use, energy and development. The optimal lobbying terrains and prospects of environmental interest groups are also examined and the potential influence of the European Parliament on the implementation of such policy is explored. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Thinking locally, acting supranationally: Niche party behaviour in the European ParliamentEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2010CHRISTIAN B. JENSEN Recent research on the European Parliament (EP) has neglected the idiosyncrasies of niche parties. Similarly, analyses of niche parties have not fully engaged the literature on the EP. This article builds on both literatures by analysing niche party behaviour in the EP as a distinct phenomenon. It is argued that niche parties will respond differently to institutional stimuli than parties more generally. To test this argument, Hix, Noury and Roland's work on EP party voting behaviour is replicated concentrating on niche parties only. It is found that participation in national government and institutional changes affect niche party legislators' voting behaviour, whereas they do not for legislators in the EP overall. These results have important implications for understanding both party behaviour in the EP and niche party behaviour more generally. [source] Actor alignments in the European Union before and after enlargementEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 6 2009ROBERT THOMSON What impact has the 2004 enlargement had on legislative decision making in the European Union (EU)? This study answers this question by examining the controversies raised by a broad selection of legislative proposals from before and after the 2004 enlargement. The analyses focus on the alignments of decision-making actors found on those controversies. Member State representatives, the European Commission and the European Parliament vary considerably in the positions they take on controversial issues before and after enlargement. Consistent patterns in actor alignments are found for only a minority of controversial issues. To the extent that consistent patterns are found, the most common involve differences in the positions of Northern and Southern Member States and old and new Member States. The North-South alignment was more common in the EU-15 and reflected Northern Member States' preference for low levels of regulatory intervention. The new-old alignment that has been evident in the post-2004 EU reflects new Member States' preference for higher levels of financial subsidies. This study argues that the persistent diversity in actor alignments contributes to the EU's capacity to cope with enlargement. [source] European Union enlargement: Power distribution implications of the new institutional arrangementsEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002Fuad Aleskerov It is argued that enlargement challenges institutional balances and in particular relative powers of national actors within the European Union (EU). This article concentrates on the impact of future enlargement (with the current negotiating 12 candidates) on power distribution in the Council of Ministers of the European Union and the European Parliament based on the decisions taken at the Nice Summit in December 1800. It uses the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices to evaluate past and emerging power distributions in both the Council and in the Parliament. A brief section on Turkey (the thirteenth, non-negotiating, official candidate) is included to evaluate its possible impact in the case of admission to the Union. [source] Non-governmental Organisation Participation in the EU Law-making Process: The Example of Social Non-governmental Organisations at the Commission, Parliament and CouncilEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 5 2008Israel De Jesús Butler The Commission's current transparency initiative has focused attention on the rules (or lack of) governing access to the Commission as the initiator of legislation. This article examines more broadly, on the basis of interviews, both the formal and informal means of accessing not only the Commission, but also the European Parliament (in particular through intergroups) as well as the Council. By using specific examples of legislation it illustrates the routes by which ,social' non-governmental organisations currently interact with these institutions, offering examples of how their work may impact on the output of the Commission, Council and Parliament. The article avoids an overly legalistic analysis with an original glimpse at the ,hidden' workings of the EU law-making process which has hitherto received little attention among legal academics and practitioners. [source] The Cocoon of Power: Democratic Implications of Interinstitutional AgreementsEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 1 2007Sonja Puntscher Riekmann It starts from the premise that democratic rules as developed in the national context may be used as a yardstick for supranational governance as well. Thus, parliamentarisation of the Union is defined as an increase in democracy, although relating problems such as weak European party systems, low turnouts, and remoteness are not to be neglected. The article evaluates several case studies on IIAs in this vein and asks whether they strengthen the European Parliament or not, and why. It arrives at conclusions that allow for differentiation: empowerment of the European Parliament occurs in particular when authorisation to conclude an IIA stems from the Treaty or from the power that the European Parliament has in crucial fields such as the budget and is willing to use for this purpose. Success is, however, not guaranteed in every case, and is sometimes more symbolic than real. However, a democratic critique must also stress negative consequences of IIAs in terms of responsivity, accountability, and transparency. [source] Sub-Constitutional Engineering: Negotiation, Content, and Legal Value of Interinstitutional Agreements in the EUEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 2 2006Isabella Eiselt Concretely speaking, these roles range from (a) explicitly authorised specifications of Treaty provisions via (b) not explicitly authorised specifications of vague Treaty law to (c) pure political undertaking. Based on the distinction between the constitutional and the operational level of the political game, we challenge the assumption that IIAs usually strengthen the European Parliament. As our case study, the 1993 interrelated package of IIAs on democracy, transparency and subsidiarity, illustrates, the European Parliament is not the only institution that benefits from IIAs, especially if they lack a sufficiently precise Treaty basis. Furthermore, if Treaty provisions underlying IIAs are precise, they also tend to produce precise and thus legally relevant content. Conversely, if IIAs deal primarily with elusive concepts they are likely to be legally ambiguous or even irrelevant at all. [source] The Politics of a European Civil CodeEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 6 2004Martijn W. Hesselink That plan forms an important step towards a European Civil Code. In its Plan, the Commission tries to depoliticise the codification process by asking a group of academic experts to prepare what it calls a ,common frame of reference'. This paper argues that drafting a European Civil Code involves making many choices that are essentially political. It further argues that the technocratic approach which the Commission has adopted in the Action Plan effectively excludes most stakeholders from having their say during the stage when the real choices are made. Therefore, before the drafting of the CFR/ECC starts, the Commission should submit a list of policy questions regarding the main issues of European private law to the European Parliament and the other stakeholders. Such an alternative procedure would repoliticise the process. It would increase the democratic basis for a European Civil Code and thus its legitimacy. [source] ,Mad Cows' and Eurocrats,Community Responses to the BSE CrisisEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 5 2004Keith Vincent Responding to criticisms and recommendations made in the aftermath of the initial crisis, particularly by the European Parliament, the EU has embarked on a process of reforming the administrative landscape in this area. This has included the setting-up of a new regulatory agency, the European Food Safety Agency, and a commitment to the more effective use of scientific information. It is submitted that this could lead to the development of new information-based scientific networks that inform and direct EU governance, networks which should contain the European Food Safety Agency at their centre. [source] European Parliament and Executive Federalism: Approaching a Parliament in a Semi-Parliamentary DemocracyEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 5 2003Philipp Dann This paper proposes an understanding of the European Parliament not along theories about what the EU should become, but what it is and surely will continue to be, that is a very distinct federal structure. The European Parliament is a parliament in an executive federalism,with far-reaching consequences for its form and functions. After outlining the characteristics of this federal structure, these consequences will be demonstrated by analysing the European Parliament in contrast with two ideal types of parliaments: the working parliament, separated from the executive branch and centred around strong committees (like the US Congress), and the debating parliament, characterised by the fusion of parliamentary majority and government as well as plenary debates (like the British House of Commons). Dwelling thus on a comparison to a legislature in a non-parliamentary federal system, like the US Congress, this paper argues that the European Parliament might best be understood as a special case of a working parliament. Finally, it will be proposed to consider the influence of executive federalism not only as fundamentally shaping the European Parliament but also as rendering the EU generally a semi-parliamentary democracy. [source] The Treaty of Nice: The Sharing of Power and the Institutional Balance in the European Union,A Continental PerspectiveEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2001Xenophon A. Yataganas This paper presents an initial response to the conclusions of the Nice Summit and the new EU Treaty which emerged from it. It consists of two parts: in the first I discuss the climate in which the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) took place and the opening positions of the Institutions, the Member States, and the applicant countries. The results achieved at Nice are set out in the second part, with special emphasis on the themes that mark a shift of power within the Community's institutional architecture; i.e. the extension of qualified-majority voting in the Council and the co-decision procedure with the European Parliament, the reweighting of votes and the composition of the Institutions with a view to an enlargement which is both imminent and unprecedented in the history of the EU. I conclude that while the results of the IGC and the new Treaty of Nice fall short of what is needed in an EU with ambitions on a continental scale, they do mark another stage in the process of European integration and the permanent evolution of its constitution. In this sense, the balance of power is likely to be different from what it has been in the past. The Franco-German axis has been severely weakened, the UK and Spain seem to be determined to play a central role, and the smaller countries are seeking to retain some influence over how the process works. New alliances are likely to emerge, particularly after enlargement, with Germany in search of a dominant position, France desperately trying to preserve the status quo, and the UK wanting to influence the direction of moves towards integration from the inside. Nice seems to mark an interim stage in this process. A new IGC has already been scheduled for 2004. There is no doubt that the post-Nice period will be one of transition towards a new distribution of power within the EU, sanctioned by a new, highly constitutional treaty. [source] Appointing and Censuring the European Commission: The Adaptation of Parliamentary Institutions to the Community ContextEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2001Paul Magnette The parliamentary model at the heart of European civic cultures has deeply influenced ,Constitutional reforms' in the European Community. But the EC is not a Parliamentary state and the transplant of national institutions in its own political context gives rise to hybrid practices. This paper examines this process of hybridation, and shows that new practices of appointment and censure are emerging in the Community, mixing classic parliamentary institutions with the crucial features of the EC itself. Focusing on recent tensions between the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament, it shows that they are governed by national divisions, technocratic and legal reasoning rather than by classic majoritarian attitudes. It concludes that, while this new model of accountability might prove efficient in terms of inter-institutional controls, it remains symbolically inefficient, because it does not help citizens understand and accept the Community institutional model. [source] The Fall and Renewal of the Commission: Accountability, Contract and Administrative OrganisationEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 2 2000Paul Craig The fall of the Santer Commission, prompted by the Report of the Committee of Independent Experts, sent shock waves throughout the entire Community. This article seeks to examine the nature of the problems which beset the Commission, to place these within the broader context of decision-making by public bodies, and to consider also the responsibilities of the Council and European Parliament for the delivery of agreed Community policies. The article analyses in detail the Reports of the Committee of Independent Experts, and the subsequent reforms initiated by the Prodi Commission, in order to assess the prospects for improved service delivery in the future. [source] The European Parliament and the Commission Crisis: A New Assertiveness?GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2002David Judge This article examines two claims made about the "Commission crisis" of 1999: first, that the accountability of the Commission to the European Parliament (EP) was significantly increased; and, second, that the model of parliamentary government in the European Union (EU) was advanced by events in 1999. In analyzing the crisis and its consequences, this article focuses upon the powers of dismissal and appointment, and what these powers reveal about the capacity of the EP both to hold the Commission responsible for its collective and individual actions and to influence its policy agenda. If a parliamentary model is to develop in the EU, the negative parliamentary powers of censure and dismissal have to be balanced by the positive powers of appointment and enhanced executive responsiveness. On both counts,dismissal and appointment,the 1999 "Commission crisis" did not point to the clear and unambiguous dawning of a "genuine European parliamentary democracy." [source] Co-decision and Inter-Committee Conflict in the European Parliament Post-Amsterdam1GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 2 2006Charlotte Burns This article makes a two-fold contribution to the European Parliament (EP) literature. First, it challenges the dominant assumption that post-Amsterdam the EP has experienced an increase in its powers. Through analysis of the Socrates case the article shows that the EP is now potentially weaker under the post-Amsterdam co-decision procedure (co-decision II), than it was under the earlier variant, co-decision I. Second, the article uncovers a hitherto overlooked aspect of internal divisions within the parliament, by revealing that there is scope for inter-committee conflict in the EP over budgetary allocations for multi-annual programmes. It is argued that such conflict can weaken the parliament in co-decision negotiations with the council, and that the negotiation of the EU's new multi-annual budgetary framework provides the perfect conditions for such internecine conflict to occur once more. [source] A European Initiative: Irigaray, Marx, and CitizenshipHYPATIA, Issue 3 2004ALISON MARTIN This article presents Irigaray as a philosopher committed to sociopolitical change by discussing her political thought and her engagement with the European Parliament. It traces her recent work with the ex-Communist Party in Italy back to her early critique of Marx and her subsequent attraction to Hegel's civil definition of the person. The failure of her European Parliament initiative suggests that her thinking is in advance of its possible realization. [source] New Parliament, New Cleavages after the Eastern Enlargement?JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 5 2010The Conflict over the Services Directive as an Opposition between the Liberals, the Regulators This article analyses the parliamentary debates and decision-making related to the highly contentious EU directive on services. It is intended as a contribution to the academic debate on political conflict lines in the European Parliament. Our argument is that neither the left,right cleavage nor a territorial one (old versus new Member States) can fully explain conflict at stake on socio-economic issues. Rather, what we can observe is cross-cutting opposition between ,regulators' and ,liberals'. [source] The EU Annual Budgetary Procedure: The Existing Rules and Proposed Reforms of the Convention and Intergovernmental Conference 2002,04,JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2007GIACOMO BENEDETTO This article analyses the proposed reform of the annual budgetary procedure of the European Union (EU) during the 2002,04 Convention and Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). We offer two findings. First, the European Parliament already has the power to reduce agricultural and fisheries spending subject to support from a blocking minority in the Council. Hence, a reduction of the Union's spending on agriculture and other areas of compulsory expenditure is not dependent on a reform of the budgetary procedure. Second, the proposal from the Convention would have increased EP budgetary powers while the procedure adopted by the IGC strengthens the hand of the Council, removing Parliament's right to overrule it. In constitutional bargaining, we see that Parliament gains in a deliberative forum where unanimity is not required, while it loses in a closed IGC. [source] The Great Non-Communicator?JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 5 2004The Mass Communication Deficit of the European Parliament, its Press Directorate This article was prompted by the poor turnout for the 1999 European Parliament elections and the failure of MEPs since to address effectively key causes of electoral apathy. It focuses on the extent to which the Parliament's press and information directorate, DG-III, and to a lesser extent, MEPs, are successful in handling their relationships with the mass media, given that the latter is a crucial means of communicating images of the Parliament to the electorate. Having unearthed serious inadequacies in the communication performance of the Parliament, the article investigates the causes of these and the likelihood of their being addressed. The article largely reflects the situation with regard to press and information policy as far as it could be discerned up and until March 2002 (with the exception of the website and external office updates which were undertaken during 2003). Among other things, it paves the way for further studies of the relationship between the European Parliament and the media which will focus on the recent 2004 elections. [source] The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary AffairsJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2004Pieter Bouwen This article is an attempt to test empirically a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the lobbying behaviour of business interests in the European Parliament. The theoretical framework tries to explain the degree of access of different organizational forms of business interest representation (companies, associations and consultants) to the supranational assembly in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of ,access goods'. On the basis of 14 exploratory and 27 semi-structured interviews, the hypotheses are checked in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament. Surprisingly, European and national associations enjoy a similar degree of access to the Parliament. Individual companies and consultants have a much lower degree of access than the two collective forms of interest representation. In the conclusion, these results are analysed in the light of the existing literature on party cohesion and coalition formation in the European Parliament. [source] The Creation and Empowerment of the European Parliament*JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 2 2003Berthold Rittberger Up until now we have lacked a systematic, theoretically guided explanation of why the European Union, as the only system of international governance, contains a powerful representative institution, the European Parliament, and why it has been successively empowered by national governments over the past half century. It is argued that national governments' decisions to transfer sovereignty to a new supranational level of governance triggers an imbalance between procedural and consequentialist legitimacy which political elites are fully aware of. To repair this imbalance, proposals to empower the European Parliament play a prominent though not exclusive role. Three landmark events are analysed to assess the plausibility of the advanced theory: the creation of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, the acquisition of budgetary powers (Treaty of Luxembourg, 1970) and of legislative powers through the Single European Act (1986). [source] The Legislative Powers and Impact of the European ParliamentJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 2 2003Andreas Maurer This article investigates the impact of the legislative powers of the European Parliament (EP), particularly the co-decision procedure. After explaining the development of the legislative procedures, the article analyses the extent to which the different procedures have been used since their creation. It then considers how growing legislative power has affected the EP's internal development, how far the EP has been able to influence EU legislation, and whether EP involvement in legislation has enhanced or impeded the efficiency of the EU legislative process. The article concludes by considering possible areas for further reform of the EP's role in the EU's legislative system. [source] Democracy through Strong Publics in the European Union?JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2002Erik Oddvar Eriksen This article explores the democratizing role of strong publics, which are institutionalized bodies of deliberation and decision,making. Strong publics are important to modern democracy as they subject decision,making to justificatory debate. This article evaluates selected aspects of the institutional nexus of the EU in order to see if they qualify as strong publics. The focus is on comitology, the European Parliament and the Charter Convention. These bodies vary in their status as strong publics, but to various degrees they all inject the logic of impartial justification and reason,giving into the EU system. [source] Using Nanotechnology for the Substitution of Hazardous Chemical SubstancesJOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY, Issue 3 2008Challenges of Definition, Measurement Summary It is often assumed that nanotechnology (NT) holds the potential to provide a substantial contribution to the solution of various ecological problems, including high consumption of energy and materials and the generation of waste. However, problems surrounding the use and release of hazardous substances remain largely unexplored. For this reason, the Scientific Technical Option Assessment (STOA) Panel of the European Parliament initiated a study on "The Role of Nanotechnology in Chemical Substitution." The subject and aim of the study was an investigation into preexisting and potential applications of NT that could lead to a reduction in hazardous substances by providing substitutes for them. In terms of method, it was based on electronic searches of the literature, expert interviews, and an expert workshop. This article discusses the results of the project. It focuses on the methodological challenges and the principal problems resulting from a combination of the broad and ill-defined concept of NT and the specific concept of hazardous substances. The hazardous substances addressed had to be reduced to a manageable number, and the term substitution was understood according to the characteristics of NT and the way in which the latter could reduce the use of hazardous substances. Although several applications of NT were identified that could lead to a considerable reduction in the use of hazardous substances, ambiguities in both the concept of NT and the concept of substitution in relation to NT prevent a comprehensive assessment of the potential of NT in respect to substitution. [source] Another Side of the Story: A Qualitative Case Study of Voting Behaviour in the European ParliamentPOLITICS, Issue 1 2008Maja Kluger Rasmussen This study re-examines the conclusions drawn from existing research on legislative behaviour in the European Parliament (EP). Using written questionnaires and qualitative interviews with all 14 current Danish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and three former MEPs, existing academic findings on voting behaviour in the EP are compared and contrasted with ground-level experience from the MEPs' point of view. This study lends support to many of the conclusions drawn from previous quantitative research. However, it also shows that some of these findings cannot be fully understood without individual-level information. [source] The Paradox of Integration: Habermas and the Unfinished Project of European UnionPOLITICS, Issue 2 2001Shivdeep Singh Grewal In a recent article Jürgen Habermas (1999) highlighted the potential for the European Union to act as a vehicle for the extension of democratic governance beyond the nation state, a project aimed at limiting the socially corrosive impact of globalisation. Yet this position appears paradoxical as the European Union itself exacerbates a major aspect of globalisation: the emasculation of national parliaments known as the ,democratic deficit'. This paradox can be understood by analysing the dynamics of post-war European integration through the lens of Habermasian social theory: EU evolution can lead either to the colonisation of the lifeworld by market and administrative subsystems (as with the democratic deficit), or to a process of lifeworld rationalisation conducive to pan-European solidarity and democracy. The latter of these tendencies could be encouraged through ,procedural democracy': this would institutionalise the conditions by which independent associations in European civil society, channelling their ,communicative power' through parliament, might reassert control over the two subsystems. In order to retain legitimacy, procedural EU democracy would have to link existing legislatures to the European Parliament, while citizenship would combine national and civic components. Hence the European Union would be more able than the nation-state to combine universal notions of justice with ethical pluralism. [source] POWER LEARNING OR PATH DEPENDENCY?PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2 2010INVESTIGATING THE ROOTS OF THE EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY A key motive for establishing the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was restoring public confidence in the wake of multiplying food scares and the BSE crisis. Scholars, however, have paid little attention to the actual political and institutional logics that shaped this new organization. This article explores the dynamics underpinning the making of EFSA. We examine the way in which learning and power shaped its organizational architecture. It is demonstrated that the lessons drawn from the past and other models converged on the need to delegate authority to an external agency, but diverged on its mandate, concretely whether or not EFSA should assume risk management responsibilities. In this situation of competitive learning, power and procedural politics conditioned the mandate granted to EFSA. The European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council shared a common interest in preventing the delegation of regulatory powers to an independent EU agency in food safety policy. [source] Passivhaus contra bioclimatic designBAUPHYSIK, Issue 6 2008Constructional Complexes Ales, Head of Chair for Buildings, Krainer Prof. Dr. Scient. In recent years, Passivhaus has become religious movement. It steals into various European strategic documents like Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential (2006) and Resolution of European Parliament (2007/2106(INI)). This article deals with the concept of internal environment and compares the passive and the bioclimatic concepts. Passivhaus kontra bioklimatische Planung. In den letzten Jahren hat sich um die Passivhausidee eine Bewegung von religiösem Charakter gebildet. Es hat sich den Weg in diverse strategische EU-Dokumente gebahnt, wie etwa in den "Aktionsplan für Energieeffizienz: Das Potenzial ausschöpfen" (2006) und die Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments dazu (2007/2106(INI)). Dieser Artikel behandelt das Konzept vom Innenraumklima und vergleicht das Konzept des Passivhauses mit bioklimatischen Konzepten. [source] Risk and Crisis Management in the Reformed European Agricultural PolicyCANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2007Carlo Cafiero Currently there is ample discussion among EU Institutions (European Commission, European Parliament, and Member States' governments) on the opportunity for setting up a comprehensive EU-wide framework on risk and crises in agriculture. In the meantime, within the limits of the WTO rules on agriculture, national governments are allowed to intervene through direct compensation to farmers in case of exceptional events that cause damages to farming operations and through subsidies to crop insurance programs. Such schemes are quite expensive for domestic budgets and some Member States are trying to switch some of their cost to the Community's budget, although an expansion of financial resources devoted to agriculture in Europe is rather unlikely. Moving from the recently emanated proposal of the European Commission, this paper discusses the main issues related to public intervention for risk and crises management in agriculture. Actuellement, les institutions européennes (Commission européenne, Parlement européen et gouvernements des pays membres) discutent intensément de l'opportunité d'élaborer un cadre général pour l'ensemble de l'Union européenne sur les crises et les risques dans le secteur agricole. Entre-temps, selon les règles de l'OMC sur l'agriculture, les gouvernements nationaux peuvent intervenir en accordant des compensations financières directes aux agriculteurs en cas de circonstances exceptionnelles causant des dommages aux exploitations agricoles ainsi que des subventions aux programmes d'assurance récolte. Ces interventions amputent considérablement les budgets nationaux, et certains pays membres tentent de transférer une partie de leurs coûts au budget de l'Union européenne, bien qu'il soit peu probable que les ressources financières consacrées à l'agriculture en Europe augmentent. A la lumière de la récente proposition de la Commission européenne, le présent article traite des principaux thèmes liés à l'intervention publique dans la gestion des risques et des crises dans le secteur agricole. [source] | |||||||||||||