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Selected AbstractsUnderstanding the costs of an environmentally ,friendly' common agricultural policy for the European Union1,ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2001Pamela M. Barnes Part of the bedrock of the European Union's (EU's) Environmental Policy is the principle that those who pollute the environment should pay for the cost of remedying the damage they cause (the polluter pays principle) (Article 174 para. 2 TEC ex Article 130r TEC). In addition environmental objectives must be integrated into all the sectoral policies of the European Union (Article 6 TEC ex Article 3c TEC). The Common Agricultural Policy's (CAP's) role at the centre of the EU's sectoral policies would appear to make it an ideal focus for implementing Article 6 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). If integration of environmental protection can be achieved in this central area of the EU's activities then a major source of environmental degradation could be overcome. However, if these requirements are applied to European agriculture the sector will face a budgetary and financial crisis of even greater magnitude than at the present time. Recent reforms of the CAP have been designed with the objective of achieving an agricultural sector that is moving towards sustainability. As this article argues the political, social and economic significance of the agriculture sector is such that national governments of the EU have repeatedly shied away from adopting the measures, which could significantly reduce the pollution from the sector. The proposals for reform made by the Agricultural Commissioner, Franz Fischler, were amended by the meeting of the European Council that took place in Berlin on 24/25 March 1999. These amendments substantially weakened the ambitions of the strategy for development of the EU, the ,Agenda 2000' adopted in 1997, for a number of reasons (CEC, 1997). This article examines the reasons for the disappointments with the amended reforms and speculates on the possible future path that may be taken to improve matters. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Delivering on the Potential of the New CAPEUROCHOICES, Issue 2 2005Mariann Fischer Boel Recent discussions on the CAP have focused on the budget. However, in the public debate the policy itself is often still a caricature of the old CAP that existed until the early 1990s. The CAP has changed fundamentally over the past decade. The recent direction of the CAP , markets and rural development , was set by the European Council in Göteborg and Lisbon. Strong economic performance must go hand in hand with the sustainable use of natural resources. The key elements of the new CAP are a market policy where intervention is a safety net, income stabilisation is delivered through decoupled aids subject to cross-compliance, and a reinforced rural development policy that focuses on jobs, growth and sustainability. We must use the new CAP to unlock the potential for growth, jobs and innovation and put good ideas into practice. We need to work in partnership with farmers, foresters, the agrifood business, NGOs, the population of rural areas, the research community and of course public authorities. But to achieve all of this we need a stable budgetary environment, in which farmers and businesses can plan. In short, we need the resources to deliver on the potential of the new CAP. Les discussions sur la PAC, récemment, se sont focalisées sur le budget. En même temps, le contenu politique de la réforme, tel qu'il est vu dans le débat public, n'est rien d'autre que la caricature de l'ancienne PAC telle qu'elle existait avant les années 90. Or, au cours de la dernière décennie, la PAC a radicalement changé. Son nouveau cours , axé sur les marchés et le développement rural , a été défini lors des conseils européens de Göteborg et de Lisbonne. Les bonnes performances économiques doivent aller de concert avec l'utilisation durable des ressources naturelles. Une politique de marché, pour laquelle l'intervention n'est qu'un filet de sécurité, une stabilisation des revenus qui prend la forme d'aides découplées sous réserve d'application de normes, un développement rural renforcé, enfin, centré sur les emplois, la croissance et la durabilité, voilà les clés de la nouvelle PAC. Celle-ci doit être utilisée pour déchaîner les possibilités en matière de croissance d'emplois, d'innovation et de durabilité. Il faut pour cela s'appuyer sur les agriculteurs, les forestiers, les industries agroalimentaires, les organisations non gouvernementales, les populations des zones rurales, les chercheurs, et bien sûr les autorités publiques. Mais pour réaliser tout cela, il faut encore un environnement budgétaire stable, permettant aux agriculteurs et aux industriels de planifi er leurs actions. En d'autres termes, il faut des ressources pour que la nouvelle PAC tienne ses promesses. Die jüngsten Diskussionen über die GAP konzentrierten sich auf den Haushalt. In der öffentlichen Debatte ist die Politik selbst jedoch häufig noch ein Zerrbild der alten GAP, wie diese sich bis in die frühen 1990er Jahre darstellte. In den letzten zehn Jahren hat sich die GAP von Grund auf verändert. Die jüngste Richtung der GAP , Märkte und die Entwicklung des ländlichen Raums , wurde vom Europäischen Rat in Göteborg und Lissabon vorgegeben. Eine hohe wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit muss mit der nachhaltigen Nutzung der natürlichen Ressourcen Hand in Hand gehen. Die Schlüsselelemente der neuen GAP sind eine Marktpolitik, in der die Intervention als Sicherheitsnetz dient und eine Einkommensstabilisierung mittels entkoppelter Beihilfen erfolgt, für die Cross Compliance gilt; sowie eine gestärkte Politik zur Entwicklung des ländlichen Raums, welche sich auf Arbeitsplätze, Wachstum sowie Nachhaltigkeit konzentriert. Wir müssen die neue GAP dazu verwenden, das Potenzial für Wachstum, Arbeitsplätze und Innovationen frei zu setzen, und gute Ideen in die Tat umsetzen. Wir müssen partnerschaftlich mit den Landwirten, Förstern, Unternehmen der Agrar- und Ernährungswirtschaft, Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen (NRG), der Landbevölkerung, der Forschungsgemeinschaft und natürlich der öffentlichen Verwaltung zusammen arbeiten. Dafür benötigen wir jedoch eine stabile Haushaltssituation, die es den Landwirten und Unternehmen ermöglicht zu planen. Kurzum: Wir benötigen die Ressourcen, um das Potenzial der GAP auszuschöpfen. [source] EU Enlargement to Turkey?EUROCHOICES, Issue 1 2005Rural Areas: EU Erweiterung um die Türkei?, The Challenges Anead for Agriculture Summary EU Enlargement to Turkey? The Challenges Ahead for Agriculture and Rural Areas In December 2004 the European Council agreed that accession negotiations with Turkey could begin in October 2005. Although the Copenhagen political criteria have been decisive so far, the criteria relating to the functioning of markets and ability to implement EU legislation will weigh heavily in the negotiations. Despite recent policy reforms, Turkey's agriculture still enjoys levels of protection similar or higher than those of the EU, but its gross value added per worker is relatively very low. One third of Turkey's employment is in agriculture, where most farms are small. The animal health situation is far below the standard achieved in the EU. Food supply chains are fragmented and inefficient. To survive and compete within the single market of the EU, the agricultural and food sectors must undergo deep structural change, which will have far-reaching economic and social repercussions. Projections according to current policy trends show that Turkey could take over one-third of the total cohesion budget allocation. However, the scalingdown or delaying of budget transfers would be short-sighted. If the EU accepts Turkey as a member, it would be in the interest of the EU as a whole that Turkey's economy - and especially its backward rural economy - should embark on a sustainable growth path as soon as possible. Elargir l'UE à la Turquie ? Les défis en perspective pour l'agriculture et les zones rurales. En decembre 2004, le Conseil de l'Union europ6enne a decide douvrir des negociations d'adhesion avec la Turquie en octobre 2005. A la difference de ce qui s'est passe jusqu'ici, le fonctionnement des marches et la capacite a mettre en vigueur l'acquis communautaire seront les crittres principaux, a la place des crittres politiques de Copenhague. Malgrk des reformes politiques recentes, l'agriculture turque profite toujours d'un taw de protection extkrieure analogue a celui de I'UE ou plus Clevi Cependant, sa valeur ajoutee brute par actifest relativement trks basse. Le tiers des emplois en Turquie se trouve dans le secteur agricole, oi,la plupart des exploitations sont de peute taille. La situation sanitaire du cheptel se situe bien au-dessous du niveau de I'UE. Les filieres agro-alimentaires sont fragmentees et peu efficaces. Pour être en mesure de faire face a la concurrence du Marche unique europken, les secteurs agricoles et alimentaires en Turquie devront subir une restructuration profonde, laquelle aura des consequences economiques et sociales de grande envergure. Des projections basees sur les tendances politiques actuelles montrent que la Turquie pourrait bkneficier de plus du tiers des fonds de cohesion de I'UE. Ceci dit, une decision de diminuer ou de dfikrer les transferts budgetaires serait faire preuve d'un manque de prevoyance. Si I'UE accepte la Turquie comme membre, il serait dans I'intkr8t de l'ensemble de 1'Union que I'Cconomie turque - et surtout son economie rurale arrierke - s'engage aussitbt que possible sur un sentier de croissance rapide et durable. EU Erweiterung um die Tükei? Herausforderungen für die Landwirtschaft und ländliche Räume Im Dezember 2004 hat der Europasche Rat beschlossen, dass im Oktober 2005 die Beitnttsverhandlungen mit der Turkei beginnen konnen Auch wenn die Kopenhagener politischen Kriterien bisher entscheidend waren, werden die Kriterien hinsichtlich der Funktionsfhhigkeit der Markte und die Fahigkeit, die EU Gesetzgebung lmplementieren zu konnen, besonderes Gewicht haben. Trotz der letzten Politikreformen 1st die Agrarprotektion in der Turkei gleich hoch oder hoher als in der EU, aber die turkische Bruttowertschopfung le Arbeitskraft ist relativ sehr klein Ein Dnttel der turklschen Arbeitskrafte sind in der Landmrtschaft beschaftigt und die meisten Betriebe sind klein Die Gesundheit der Tiere 1st weit unter den Niveau der EU Die Nahrungsmittel-Zuheferungskette 1st klem struktunert und ineffizient Der Agrar- und Ernahrungssektor kann im Gemeinsamen Markt nur dann uberleben und wettbewerbsfahig sein, wenn em intensiver Strukturwandel mit weit reichenden okonomischen und sozialen Wirkungen einsetzt. Projektionen der gegenwartigen Politikentwicklungen zeigen, dass die Turkei uber ein Dnttel der Mittel des Kohasionsfonds erhalten wurde. Doch wurde die Kurzung oder Veaogerung der Finanzhilfen kurzsichtig sen Wenn dre EU die Turkei als Mitglied akzeptiert, 1st es im Interesse der EU insgesamt, dass die Turkei und insbesondere ihre ruckstandige Agramirtschaft so schnell wie moglich auf einen stabden Wachstumspfad kommt. [source] Constitutionalism and Dissonances: Has Europe Paid Off Its Debt to Functionalism?EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2009Marco Dani This impression seems confirmed by the recent Presidency Conclusions of the European Council which, although salvaging many important solutions contained in the Constitutional Treaty, explicitly sanction that ,the constitutional concept . . . is abandoned'. In the light of this context, what role could the constitutional scholarship play? How to make sense of a polity in which the claims of constitutionalism as a form of power are politically unappealing though legally plausible? This article tries to respond to these questions by reaffirming functionalism as a valid analytical and normative perspective in facing the current constitutional reality of European integration. The analytical value associated with functionalism is evidenced by testing against the current context of the EU legal framework the accounts for EU constitutionalism which postulate functional equivalence between the EU and the Member States. The normative potential of functionalism, then, is discussed by arguing that there may be a value worth preserving in a degree of functional discrepancy between the EU and state constitutionalism and, notably, that the transformative and civilising dividend inherent in functionalism could still be exploited, at least in certain areas of EU policy making. Finally, the article suggests that the difficulties in accounting for EU constitutionalism in the light of state-centred constitutional theory could be regarded as symptoms of European integration marking a moment in the theoretical evolution of constitutionalism. [source] Reforming Europe's Common Foreign and Security PolicyEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 1 2004Daniel Thym To the great surprise of many observers the much lamented absence of a common European response to the war in Iraq did not prevent the Convention from agreeing upon an ambitious reform package in the foreign-policy field. This article explores the legal implications of the new institutional balance for European foreign policy envisaged by the Convention against the background of the achievements and deficiencies of Europe's existing foreign policy regime. Thereby, we shall see in how far the Convention has met the original goal set by the Laeken European Council to consider reform steps to strengthen the Union's ability to ,shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation.'1 [source] The General Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European UnionEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2002R. Alonso García The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides the Union with a ,more evident' (as the European Council of Cologne asked for) framework of protection of the individuals before the public authorities within the European context, after more than thirty years (since the Stauder Case) of full confidence in the leading role played by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. This new normative catalogue of fundamental rights (included the so called ,aspirational fundamental rights') implies one more instrument of protection which has to find its own place with regard to the protection afforded by the national Constitutions and the international agreements on human rights, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights, which are already a privileged source of inspiration for Court of Justice of the European Communities. It is the main objective of the General Provisions of the Charter to clarify which is that place and the relationship with those other levels of protection as managed by their supreme interpreters (i.e., the Constitutional,or Supreme,Courts of the Member States of the Union and the European Court of Human Rights). [source] Stimulating Simulations: Making the European Union a Classroom RealityINTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 2 2000Gretchen J. Van Dyke This article examines the organization and development of the Mid-Atlantic European Union Simulation Consortium (MEUSC), with special emphasis on linking theory to practice within its simulation program. The MEUSC program, initiated in 1993, brings fifteen colleges and universities to Washington, D.C., each December for an intercollegiate experiential learning exercise on the European Union. During the simulation, students meet with professional diplomats from both the United States and Europe, and they engage in consensus-building activities that mirror the decision-making processes of the EU Commission, Parliament, Council of Ministers, and the European Council. As a result, participants are able to refine and enhance a range of academic and practical skills that are keys for success in today's political and business worlds. The authors of this article make special use of a survey that was undertaken to gauge the impact of the simulation on its participants and, thus, its success as an educational venture. [source] A President for the European Union: A New Actor in Town?,JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 2 2007SPYROS BLAVOUKOS In the post-Constitution EU, the rotating Presidency would be replaced by a hybrid system combining a rotating component with the establishment of a permanent President for the European Council. Using a principal-agent framework, we look at the supply and demand for formal leadership in the new system, accounting for the substantial institutional change in the format of the Presidency. We then examine the President's effectiveness and efficiency and discuss whether the President, as a new institutional actor, has the potential to evolve into an autonomous political actor in the EU. Our analysis suggests a discernible though by no means unconditional strengthening of the President's potential for an autonomous political role in the new EU institutional architecture. [source] Is Europe Becoming the Most Dynamic Knowledge Economy in the World?JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2005DANIELE ARCHIBUGI The article discusses the condition and perspective of the European Union in the knowledge economy and the feasibility of the goal given by the European Council at the summits held in Lisbon (March 2000) and Barcelona (March 2002), that is, to increase European R&D expenditure to 3 per cent of GDP by 2010. The article focuses on two aspects: comparative performance with its direct counterparts, in particular the USA; and intra-European distribution of resources and capabilities. A set of technological indicators is presented to show that Europe is still consistently behind when compared to Japan and the US, especially in R&D investment and the generation of innovations. A small convergence occurs in the diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICTs), the sector most directly linked to the concept of the,new economy'. In the field of knowledge collaboration, Europe takes opposing paths in the business and academic worlds. Within Europe, the level of investment in scientific and technological activities is so diverse across countries that it does not merge into a single continental innovation system. [source] Explaining the Emergence of Different European Union Crisis and Emergency Management StructuresJOURNAL OF CONTINGENCIES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2010Cécile Wendling Two European Union (EU) tools were adopted to enhance cooperation among Member States in the case of crises and emergencies (natural, industrial or man-made) occurring both inside and outside the EU borders: first, the EU has developed a new tool in the field of civil protection that has been managed by the Directorate General Environment of the European Commission under the label of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism since 2001. Second, the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA), under the responsibility of the European Council, have been developed since 2005. Using a sociological neo-institutionalist approach based on the concept of ,divergent isomorphism', the paper explains who and what the sources of EU integration process were leading to the coexistence of these two structures. Two case studies are presented using process tracing to demonstrate that two different pre-existing organizational models were copied to create the EU structures of crisis and emergency management: that of the Community Marine pollution framework for the Community Civil Protection Mechanism and that of NATO for the CCA. [source] The European Union Constitution on Border Checks, Asylum, and ImmigrationPOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 4 2004Article first published online: 15 DEC 200 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed by the heads of government of the 25 European Union member states and three candidate states on 29 October 2004. The Treaty in effect is the proposed constitution, a long and elaborate document comprising 448 Articles (grouped into four Parts, with additional divisions into Titles, Chapters, and Sections, but numbered consecutively throughout) and 29 Protocols,annexes to the Treaty. Five articles and four protocols are concerned with issues of border control, immigration, and asylum policy. The articles are found in the chapter titled Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Part III of the Treaty (The Policies and Functioning of the Union). These are reproduced below, along with one of the protocols (number 21). (Of the other protocols concerned with migration, one adds to the Treaty the provisions of the Schengen Acquis, the agreement among all EU members except the United Kingdom and Ireland, plus the non-EU states Norway and Iceland, to eliminate border controls at their common frontiers, and requires acceptance of the Acquis by any new member. Two other protocols set out reservations on the part of the UK and Ireland on border control and asylum matters,basically, an "opt-in" stance, allowing their participation in Treaty provisions on a case-by-case basis.) The constitution is highly detailed in scope but often vague in content, merely specifying topics on which policies will be developed or laws enacted. Thus the "common immigration policy" that is signaled in Article III-267 is yet to be shaped, and the Treaty offers few hints of what it may look like. A reluctance on the part of member states to cede sovereignty in the area of immigration is not limited to the British Isles. It is seen also in the retained right of all members to restrict non-EU labor migrants (Article III-267, Para. 5) and to conclude bilateral agreements on border crossing with non-EU states (Protocol 21). It is notable that the Treaty, while stressing that all nationals of member states are citizens of the Union with the right "to move and reside freely" within its territory, does not attempt to harmonize conditions or procedures under which migrants can acquire citizenship: indeed, it says nothing at all on the matter. (A "framework law," mentioned at various points in the text, is a law that prescribes the result to be achieved but leaves to each member state "the choice of form and methods.") Actual adoption of the constitution requires ratification by the governments of all EU members. If this demanding hurdle is passed (requiring parliamentary approval or, in some cases, a referendum), the constitution would come into force on 1 November 2006,or after the final ratification, if later. Under Article IV-443, if the treaty is ratified by four-fifths of members within the two years but is rejected by one or more states, "the matter shall be referred to the European Council",the quarterly summit meeting of heads of government. [source] POWER LEARNING OR PATH DEPENDENCY?PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2 2010INVESTIGATING THE ROOTS OF THE EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY A key motive for establishing the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was restoring public confidence in the wake of multiplying food scares and the BSE crisis. Scholars, however, have paid little attention to the actual political and institutional logics that shaped this new organization. This article explores the dynamics underpinning the making of EFSA. We examine the way in which learning and power shaped its organizational architecture. It is demonstrated that the lessons drawn from the past and other models converged on the need to delegate authority to an external agency, but diverged on its mandate, concretely whether or not EFSA should assume risk management responsibilities. In this situation of competitive learning, power and procedural politics conditioned the mandate granted to EFSA. The European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council shared a common interest in preventing the delegation of regulatory powers to an independent EU agency in food safety policy. [source] |