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European Constitution (european + constitution)
Selected AbstractsA European Constitution in a Multinational Europe or a Multinational Constitution for Europe?EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2006Vito Breda How can we transcend our divisions without marginalising those who believe in them? This article critically analyses the theoretical bases of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and tries to explain why its ratification is so problematic. Authors such as Habermas have argued that a new European model of social cohesion is needed, and Habermas suggests that the sense of ,community' in a democratic Europe should be founded exclusively on the acceptance of a patriotic constitution. However, this view is criticised by authors such as Weiler and MacCormick. In this article, I explain the limits of these theoretical analyses. I will argue that a European constitutional project can be more than formally legal only if two normative conditions are satisfied: it is the result of public debate and the European Constitution includes the procedures for the recognition of European national diversity. I suggest that a theory of constitutional multinationalism, similar to the one proposed by Tully, might provide an attractive model for a European social integration. The article is divided in two parts. In the first, I explain why Habermas' constitutional patriotism or MacCormick's states based Europe cannot provide a convincing theoretical model for a socially and constitutionally integrated Europe. In the second part, I will give an outline of Tully's idea of multinational democracy as a model for a European constitutional integration. [source] Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union?EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 6 2005Procedures, Simplification of Legal Instruments There is however a clear suggestion of such hierarchy in the sequence in which the newly created legal instruments are listed in Article I-33(1) and in the organisation of the subsequent Articles I-34 to I-37 of the European Constitution. In this contribution, the (lost) logic behind the Union's current set of legal instruments is analysed, followed by an examination of the reform of the system of legal instruments carried out in the European Constitution. Lastly, an attempt is made to answer the question as to whether this reform amounts to the establishment of a genuine hierarchy of legal acts in the Union. [source] Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European UnionEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 2 2001Paul Craig The institutional reforms of the EU, coupled with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, have fuelled the debate about a European Constitution. This paper begins by examining the nature of constitutions and constitutionalism. The focus then turns to the EU itself. It is argued that the Community has indeed been transformed into a constitutional legal order, and that the arguments to the contrary are not convincing. This does not however mean that the EU has, or should have, a European Constitution cognisable as such which draws together the constitutional articles of the Treaties, together with the constitutional principles articulated by the European Court of Justice. The difficulties with this strategy are examined in detail, and the conclusion is that we should not at present pursue this course. It would be better to draw on the valuable work done by the European University Institute in its recent study in order to simplify and consolidate the Treaties. [source] The Importance of Actor Cleavages in Negotiating the European ConstitutionINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2010Madeleine O. Hosli This paper aims to explore government preferences and cleavages in the bargaining process on the European Constitution, across the range of 25 EU member states. The study focuses on preferences concerning socioeconomic policymaking and explores whether divisions can be discerned between preferences held by actors according to locations on the left-right policy scale, actors in older as compared to newer EU states, net EU budget positions, domestic rates of support for European integration, and smaller as compared to larger states. The analysis also controls for possible external effects, such as recent domestic macroeconomic developments. Negotiations on the European Constitution are found to be determined less by general transnational left-right divisions, but cleavages according to the length of EU membership and the size of EU member states. [source] Does Italy's plight threaten European Monetary Union?ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, Issue 3 2005Article first published online: 27 JUL 200 The Italian economy is in a mess. GDP is expected to contract by 0.6% this year and the budget deficit is heading towards 4% of GDP , it is hard to see a way out of the mire. And after the rejection of the European constitution in France and the Netherlands, questions are being asked about the very future of the European project. With Italy fundamentally uncompetitive across a whole range of both price and non-prices measures, and with an industrial structure ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of globalisation, Italy's long-term membership of the Euro is being debated. This article by Keith Church sets out Italy's problems and argues that, if the economy stagnates for a prolonged period, pressure to leave EMU will become irresistible. This can be avoided if the government finally implements structural reforms instead of continually ,muddling through'. At the same time, the ECB needs to realise the urgency of the current situation and start to show greater flexibility. [source] Security, Social Control, Democracy and Migration within the ,Constitution' of the EUEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 1 2005Dario Melossi Such conditions, and the theory thereof, first developed in North America, and then increasingly in Europe after World War II and especially since the 1970s. From such a comparative-historical perspective, the paper then tries to shed light on the debate that was ignited by Dieter Grimm on the very possibility of a ,democratic constitutionalisation' of Europe. The connections between language, social control, and a (democratic) European constitution are then discussed, and specific attention is given to the nexus that has been constructed in today's Europe between migration, criminalisation and security, as a sort of test bench of those connections. [source] Die eigentümliche Diskussion um Zentralisierung und Dezentralisierung in der EuropapolitikPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2004Thomas Apolte It is argued that large parts of this discussion rest on a flawed analogy of the liberal concept of normative individualism on the one hand and the concept of political decentralization in federal multi-layer systems on the other. Based on this flawed analogy an unusual and partly misleading notion of decentralization has widely been used in the discussion of European Integration. As a result, there are a number of misjudgements in some central topics of European Integration. These topics are the question of institutional competition among governments, the effects of fiscal competition on the tax burden of citizens and a future European constitution. [source] | ||||||||||