Ethical Deliberation (ethical + deliberation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Heuristic Methods for Computer Ethics

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2002
Walter Maner
The domain of "procedural ethics" is the set of reflective and deliberative methods that maximize the reliability of moral judgment. While no general algorithmic method exists that will guarantee the validity of ethical deliberation, non-algorithmic "heuristic" methods can guide and inform the process, making it significantly more robust and dependable. This essay examines various representative heuristic procedures commonly recommended for use in applied ethics, maps them into a uniform set of twelve stages, identifies common faults, then shows how the resulting stage-by-stage decision-making model could be adapted for general use and for use in computer ethics. [source]


ELECTIVE TWIN REDUCTIONS: EVIDENCE AND ETHICS

BIOETHICS, Issue 6 2010
LEAH MCCLIMANS
ABSTRACT Twelve years ago the British media got wind of a London gynecologist who performed an elective reduction on a twin pregnancy reducing it to a singleton. Perhaps not surprisingly, opinion on the moral status of twin reductions was divided. But in the last few years new evidence regarding the medical risks of twin pregnancies has emerged, suggesting that twin reductions are relevantly similar to the reductions performed on high-end multi-fetal pregnancies. This evidence has appeared to resolve the moral debate. In this paper I look at the role of clinical evidence in medical ethics. In particular I examine the role of clinical evidence in determining what counts as a significant harm or risk. First, I challenge the extent to which these empirical claims are descriptive, suggesting instead that the evidence is to some degree normative in character. Second, I question whether such empirical claims should count as evidence for what are essentially difficult ethical decisions , a role they appear to play in the case of elective reductions. I will argue that they should not, primarily because the value-laden nature of this evidence conceals much of what is ethically at stake. It is important to recognize that empirical evidence cannot be a substitute for ethical deliberation. [source]


Think globally, act locally: collective consent and the ethics of knowledge production

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, Issue 195 2009
Maui Hudson
Ethical review is an integral part of the process of developing research and considering issues associated with the production of knowledge. It is part of a system that primarily legitimises western traditions of inquiry and reinforces western assumptions about knowledge and its benefit to society. Around the world the process of colonisation has excluded indigenous understandings. In New Zealand, M,ori (indigenous) knowledge has been similarly marginalised; this pattern is also reflected within ethical review. M,ori values, while acknowledged, are not yet considered to have equal weight in ethical deliberations. The notion of collective rights and the possibility of developing processes to allow collective consent to be recognised and mandated by ethics committees have been raised by communities but largely ignored by the ethical review system. While kaupapa M,ori researchers espouse the benefits of closer community involvement, policy makers and ethics committees have focused on "consultation" as the mechanism which confirms proof of engagement, the establishment of community support, and the relevance of the project. This article highlights the potential of the concept of collective consent in negotiations between researchers and communities. [source]


Philosophy of Education and the Gigantic Affront of Universalism

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 1 2009
PENNY ENSLIN
Universalism in philosophy, argue Penny Enslin and Mary Tjiattas, tends to be regarded as an affront to particular affiliations, an act of injustice by misrecognition. While agreeing with criticisms of some expressions of universalism, they take the view that anti-universalism has become an orthodoxy that deflects attention from pressing issues of global injustice in education. In different ways, recent reformulations of universalism accommodate particularity and claims for recognition. Defending a qualified universalism, they argue, through a discussion of the Education for All campaign, that the present focus on recognition should be widened to address redistribution and representation as elements of global justice in education. In her response to Enslin and Tjiattas, Sharon Todd expresses sympathy for their aspiration towards a ,qualified universalism', but she seeks to go beyond the dichotomy of universalism versus anti-universalism by way of a discussion of aspects of the work of Judith Butler. Butler's emphasis on cultural translation offers a way, it is claimed, to think about the universal that transcends the oppositional relation between culture and commitment to universals. In the light of this she advocates an approach that involves neither universalism nor anti-universalism but ,critique of universality'. Thus, the task of translation, on Butler's account, prevents universality from being a standard or home-base from which we can judge the world and turns it instead into an ongoing struggle for intelligibility. In their rejoinder, Enslin and Tjiattas reject any charge that their own account has fallen into a simple dichotomisation of universalism and anti-universalism, and reaffirm their commitment to a form of universalism in which (a) partial or contextual considerations count in ethical deliberations, and (b) values and principles are subject to reflexive renegotiation in democratic deliberations, which provides the means of their justification and the source of their legitimacy. This yields, they claim, a non-standard form of contractualism that is both culturally sensitive and open-ended. They suggest in conclusion that the debate between themselves and Todd raises questions about whether the analytical and continental traditions can concede one another's place in the philosophy of education. [source]