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Ethical Concepts (ethical + concept)
Selected AbstractsStem Cell Research as Innovation: Expanding the Ethical and Policy ConversationTHE JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS, Issue 2 2010Rebecca Dresser Research using human embryonic stem cells raises an array of complex ethical issues, including, but by no means limited to, the moral status of developing human life. Unfortunately much of the public discussion fails to take into account this complexity. Advocacy for liberal and conservative positions on human embryonic stem cell research can be simplistic and misleading. Ethical concepts such as truth-telling, scientific integrity, and social justice should be part of the debate over federal support for human embryonic stem cell research. Moreover, the debate should be conducted in accord with principles of deliberative democracy, including respect for people holding competing views. [source] Dangerous and severe personality disorder: an ethical concept?NURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2005Sally Glen phd ma rn Abstract Most clinicians and mental health practitioners are reluctant to work with people with dangerous and severe personality disorders because they believe there is nothing that mental health services can offer. Dangerous and severe personality disorder also signals a diagnosis which is problematic morally. Moral philosophy has not found an adequate way of dealing with personality disorders. This paper explores the question: What makes a person morally responsible for his actions and what is a legitimate mitigating factor? How do psychiatric nurses working with this client group understand the awful things some clients do? What concepts do they need, if they are to know how to explain and how to react? It is suggested that dangerous and severe personality disorder is best regarded as a moral category, framed in terms of goodness, badness, obligation and other ethical concepts. It seems plausible that in important ways the dangerous and severe personality disordered client does not understand morality or understands it differently. The peculiar position of the dangerous and severe personality disordered individual in our system of moral responsibility stems from his apparent inability to see the importance of the interests of others. It might be more helpful to regard personality disordered clients as we do children: partially but not fully reasonable for their actions. We might regard the dangerous and severe personality disordered client responsible for those actions which he most clearly understands, such as causing others physical pain, but not for those with which he is only superficially engaged, such as causing emotional pain. The paper concludes by suggesting that the dangerous and severe personality disordered individual does not fit easily into any conventional moral category, be it criminal, patient, animal or child, and thus an assessment of his moral accountability must take into consideration his special circumstances. [source] Seeing What is the Kind Thing to Do: Perception and Emotion in MoralityDIALECTICA, Issue 3 2007Peter Goldie I argue that it is possible, in the right circumstances, to see what the kind thing is to do: in the right circumstances, we can, literally, see deontic facts, as well as facts about others' emotional states, and evaluative facts. In arguing for this, I will deploy a notion of non-inferential perceptual belief or judgement according to which the belief or judgement is arrived at non-inferentially in the phenomenological sense (in the sense of involving no conscious reasoning on the subject's part) and yet is inferential in the epistemic sense (in the sense of being justifiable by the subject after the belief or judgement has been arrived at). The ability to arrive at these kinds of beliefs and judgements is part of virtue, and is also part of what it is to grasp thick ethical concepts in an engaged way. When we come to thinner evaluative and deontic facts and thinner ethical concepts, however, the requirements for non-inferential perceptual belief and judgement are less easily met. Seeing what is the kind thing to do is one matter; seeing what is the right thing to do is another. [source] Overview of research addressing ethical dimensions of participation in traumatic stress studies: Autonomy and beneficenceJOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS, Issue 6 2009Elana Newman One element of the design of human research studies is ethically informed decision-making. Key issues include the safety, costs, and benefits of participation. Historically, much of this decision-making was based on opinion rather than formal evidence. Recently, however, investigators in the traumatic stress field have begun to collect data that are relevant to these decisions. In this article, the authors focus on issues emanating from the ethical concepts of autonomy and respect for persons and beneficence and nonmaleficence, and then summarize relevant evidence from studies with trauma-exposed individuals. Discussion addresses implications of this evidence for research practice and policy, and identifies some potentially informative data collections opportunities for future trauma studies. [source] On the Difference Between Designing Children and Raising Them: Ethics and the Use of Educationally Oriented BiotechnologyMIND, BRAIN, AND EDUCATION, Issue 2 2010Zachary Stein The use of educationally oriented biotechnology has grown drastically in recent decades and is likely to continue to grow. Advances in both the neurosciences and genetics have opened up important areas of application and industry, from psychopharmacology to gene-chip technologies. This article reviews the current state of educationally oriented biological technologies, eventually focusing on the use of psychiatric drugs with children and adolescents to improve their academic performance. Distinguishing between "good" and "bad" uses of biological technologies is complicated by conflicting theoretical views about human development, the etiology of disability, and the diagnostic categories that structure treatments. To address these issues I introduce a set of ethical concepts, which are based on a biopsychosocial approach to human development. The difference between designing children and raising children marks an ethically salient difference between approaches that focus on only part of the child (e.g., her brain) and approaches that focus on the full biopsychosocial complexity of the developing child in context. This clarifies the importance of the child's right to both autonomy and care. Implications for policy and practice are offered. [source] Dangerous and severe personality disorder: an ethical concept?NURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2005Sally Glen phd ma rn Abstract Most clinicians and mental health practitioners are reluctant to work with people with dangerous and severe personality disorders because they believe there is nothing that mental health services can offer. Dangerous and severe personality disorder also signals a diagnosis which is problematic morally. Moral philosophy has not found an adequate way of dealing with personality disorders. This paper explores the question: What makes a person morally responsible for his actions and what is a legitimate mitigating factor? How do psychiatric nurses working with this client group understand the awful things some clients do? What concepts do they need, if they are to know how to explain and how to react? It is suggested that dangerous and severe personality disorder is best regarded as a moral category, framed in terms of goodness, badness, obligation and other ethical concepts. It seems plausible that in important ways the dangerous and severe personality disordered client does not understand morality or understands it differently. The peculiar position of the dangerous and severe personality disordered individual in our system of moral responsibility stems from his apparent inability to see the importance of the interests of others. It might be more helpful to regard personality disordered clients as we do children: partially but not fully reasonable for their actions. We might regard the dangerous and severe personality disordered client responsible for those actions which he most clearly understands, such as causing others physical pain, but not for those with which he is only superficially engaged, such as causing emotional pain. The paper concludes by suggesting that the dangerous and severe personality disordered individual does not fit easily into any conventional moral category, be it criminal, patient, animal or child, and thus an assessment of his moral accountability must take into consideration his special circumstances. [source] | ||||||||||