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Entry Regulations (entry + regulation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Casino regulations and economic welfare

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2010
Juin-Jen Chang
Abstract This paper studies the entry and tax regulation of oligopolistically competitive privately run casinos and government-run casinos in a jurisdiction. We highlight three important external effects from casino-style gambling: non-casino income creation, social disorder costs, and cross-border gambling. The laissez-faire equilibrium need not be overcrowding compared with regulated or government-run regimes. Entry regulation may lead to higher jurisdiction welfare than tax regulation. Government-run casinos always operate on a larger scale and achieve higher welfare than other regimes, given the same number of casinos. With an endogenous fraction of external gamblers, a dispersed casino configuration yields higher welfare than a centralized one. Ce texte étudie les réglementations à l'entrée et de nature fiscale dans un monde oligopolistique concurrentiel où coexistent des casinos opérés par les secteurs privé et gouvernemental. On souligne trois effets externes importants des jeux d'argent de style casino : la création de revenu de type non-casino, les coûts du désordre social engendré, et le fait que ces jeux d'argent transgressent les frontières. L'équilibre de laissez-faire n'engendre pas nécessairement sur-encombrement par rapport à des régimes réglementés ou opérés strictement par le gouvernement. Les régulations de l'entrée peuvent engendrer des effets de bien-être plus grands pour la juridiction que la réglementation fiscale. Les casinos opérés par le gouvernement opèrent toujours sur une plus haute échelle et engendrent des effets de bien-être plus grands que les autres régimes pour un nombre donné de casinos. Compte tenu qu'il existe une fraction endogène de joueurs externes, une configuration dispersée de casinos donnent des effets de bien-être plus grands qu'une configuration centralisée. [source]

EXCESS-ENTRY THEOREM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF LICENSING*

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 6 2008
ARIJIT MUKHERJEE
We show that, in the presence of technology licensing, entry in an industry with Cournot competition may lead to a socially insufficient, number of firms. Insufficient entry occurs if the own marginal cost of the entrant is sufficiently high. Hence, the justification for anticompetitive entry regulation due to the standard excess-entry result may not be justified in the presence of licensing. However, if the own marginal cost of the entrant is very low, licensing may create excessive entry for those entry costs where entry does not occur without licensing; thus licensing reduces social welfare though it increases competition. [source]

Institutional Quality and the Gains from Trade

KYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 3 2006
Axel Borrmann
SUMMARY While theoretical models suggest that trade is likely to increase productivity and income levels, the empirical evidence is rather mixed. For some countries, trade has a strong impact on growth, whereas for other countries there is no or even a negative linkage. We examine one likely prerequisite for a welfare increasing impact of trade, that is, the role of institutional quality. Using several model specifications, including an instrumental variable approach, we identify those aspects of institutional quality that matter most for the positive linkage between trade and growth. We find that, above all, labour market regulation is the key to reducing trade-related adjustment costs. Market entry regulations, the efficiency of the tax system, the rule of law and government effectiveness do play a role too. In essence, the results demonstrate that countries with low-quality institutions do not benefit from trade. [source]

Free entry and social efficiency under vertical oligopoly

THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2007
Arghya Ghosh
We analyze a successive vertical oligopoly model that incorporates vertical relationships between industries and demonstrate that free entry in an industry that produces a homogeneous product can lead to a socially insufficient number of firms. This is in contrast with the proevious findings that, under Cournot oligopoloy with fixed set-up costs, level of entry in the free-entry equilibrium is socially excessive. It has often been argued that this result can provide a justification for apparently anticompetitive entry regulations. Our finding yields an important policy implication that such a justification is not necessarily valid when vertical relationships ar taken into account. [source]