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Enforcement
Kinds of Enforcement Terms modified by Enforcement Selected AbstractsBETTER GUN ENFORCEMENT, LESS CRIME,CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY, Issue 4 2005JENS LUDWIG Research Summary: Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), which for the past several years has been the major federal initiative to combat gun violence, includes several elements (such as gun locks and other efforts to reduce gun availability) that research suggests are likely to have at best modest effects on gun crime. In general, enforcement activities targeted at the "demand side" of the underground gun market currently enjoy stronger empirical support. However much of PSN's budget has been devoted to increasing the severity of punishment, such as by federaliz-ing gun cases, which seems to be less effective than targeted street-level enforcement designed to increase the probability of punishment for gun carrying or use in crime. Policy Implications: PSN and other enforcement activities could be made more effective by redirecting resources toward activities such as targeted patrols against illegal gun carrying. Given the substantial social costs of gun violence, an efficiency argument can also be made for increasing funding beyond previous levels. [source] CREDIBLE RESEARCH PRACTICES TO INFORM DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENTCRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY, Issue 3 2003CHARLES F. MANSKI Chairing the recent National Research Council Committee on Data and Research for Policy on Illegal Drugs, I learned that our nation has invested little in research on drug law enforcement and that the limited available research does not provide a credible basis for formation of drug control policy. This commentary conjectures reasons for the distressing status quo and recommends changes in research practices that may improve matters. [source] LIFE INSURANCE: REGULATION AS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT,ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2004Alan D. MorrisonArticle first published online: 28 JUN 200 Debating the minutiae of insurance regulation without a clear understanding of why insurance companies are regulated is futile. In this article I discuss the economic rationale for insurance business regulation and conclude that the appropriate role of the regulator is to enforce contracts which might otherwise be broken. I argue that if this is the case, regulation should be optional, and that it need not be a monopoly activity. [source] CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADEECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2007PRIYA RANJAN This paper derives estimating equations from a model where individuals consume two classes of goods, and the degree of contract enforcement affects the transaction cost of trade in the two classes of goods differentially. Empirically, using Rauch's classification, internationally traded goods are classified into differentiated goods and those possessing a reference price, with the presumption that contract enforcement issues are more important for the former. It is verified that the measures of contract enforcement affect the volume of trade in both types of goods, but the impact is larger for differentiated goods. [source] THE ENFORCEMENT OF COOPERATION BY POLICINGEVOLUTION, Issue 7 2010Claire El Mouden Policing is regarded as an important mechanism for maintaining cooperation in human and animal social groups. A simple model providing a theoretical overview of the coevolution of policing and cooperation has been analyzed by Frank (1995, 1996b, 2003, 2009), and this suggests that policing will evolve to fully suppress cheating within social groups when relatedness is low. Here, we relax some of the assumptions made by Frank, and investigate the consequences for policing and cooperation. First, we address the implicit assumption that the individual cost of investment into policing is reduced when selfishness dominates. We find that relaxing this assumption leads to policing being favored only at intermediate relatedness. Second, we address the assumption that policing fully recovers the loss of fitness incurred by the group owing to selfishness. We find that relaxing this assumption prohibits the evolution of full policing. Finally, we consider the impact of demography on the coevolution of policing and cooperation, in particular the role for kin competition to disfavor the evolution of policing, using both a heuristic "open" model and a "closed" island model. We find that large groups and increased kin competition disfavor policing, and that policing is maintained more readily than it invades. Policing may be harder to evolve than previously thought. [source] IMPROVING THE ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRAINING ORDERS AFTER CASTLE ROCK V. GONZALES*FAMILY COURT REVIEW, Issue 2 2007Mandeep Talwar After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Castle Rock, reliance on domestic violence restraining orders does not offer the solution in and of itself. Our legal system needs to provide greater protection for victims of domestic violence. This note explores ways to use risk assessment tools to augment restraining orders, in addition to examining integrated domestic violence courts that take a proactive approach to aiding victims of abuse. [source] ON OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND ENFORCEMENT: INFORMATION, MONITORING AND EFFICIENCYNATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 1 2001CARLOS MARIO GÓMEZ GÓMEZ ABSTRACT. The purpose of the paper is to contribute to the narrowing of the distance between formal theory and practical environmental policy design. We formulate a general and comprehensive theoretical model in order to take into account the different informational and technological problems which characterize the definition and implementation of environmental taxes in a second best world where there also are distortionary taxes. Having formalized these problems, we present a general model which allows us to discuss the existence of efficient and implementable environmental quality objectives and policy instruments, and to analyze many particular cases. [source] DIVISIONS OF LABOUR, SPECIALIZATION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF A SYSTEM OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSISPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2004Li Ke The model suggests that fiscal competition between states facilitates important circular effects, which propel improvements in economic welfare and promote economic growth. In particular, improvements in institutional efficiency expand the demand for transactions, which in turn increases the need for further third-party protection of property rights. We illustrate our results using the growth of the state system in Western Europe. [source] PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF PRE-TRIAL BARGAINING,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009SYLVAIN BOURJADE We study the effect of encouraging private actions for breaches of competition law. We develop a model of litigation and settlement with asymmetric information. We show that screening liable from non-liable defendants requires the Court to restrict the rules governing admissible evidence. We study how to design the rules so as to enhance the role of private litigation in antitrust enforcement and prove that increasing damages is better than reducing costs of initiating suits. We also find large benefits from introducing a system of compensation for defendants found non-liable, paid by unsuccessful plaintiffs. [source] Community Resilience and Volcano Hazard: The Eruption of Tungurahua and Evacuation of the Faldas in EcuadorDISASTERS, Issue 1 2002Graham A. Tobin Official response to explosive volcano hazards usually involves evacuation of local inhabitants to safe shelters. Enforcement is often difficult and problems can be exacerbated when major eruptions do not ensue. Families are deprived of livelihoods and pressure to return to hazardous areas builds. Concomitantly, prevailing socioeconomic and political conditions limit activities and can influence vulnerability. This paper addresses these issues, examining an ongoing volcano hazard (Tungurahua) in Ecuador where contextual realities significantly constrain responses. Fieldwork involved interviewing government officials, selecting focus groups and conducting surveys of evacuees in four locations: a temporary shelter, a permanent resettlement, with returnees and with a control group. Differences in perceptions of risk and health conditions, and in the potential for economic recovery were found among groups with different evacuation experiences. The long-term goal is to develop a model of community resilience in long-term stress environments. [source] Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A ReplyECONOMETRICA, Issue 1 2003Stefan Krasa No abstract is available for this article. [source] Discretion in Tax EnforcementECONOMICA, Issue 283 2004Luigi Alberto Franzoni This paper deals with the issue of whether the Revenue Service (RS) should be allowed, or even encouraged, to negotiate settlement agreements with taxpayers subject to examination. We consider the case in which the RS enjoys discretion at the settlement stage, its stance being guided by officers' professional judgment. We show that discretionary settlements serve a desirable function, as they allow the RS to better exploit taxpayer-specific information and to take advantage of the bargaining power it can wield at the negotiation stage. [source] Enforcement of environmental charges: some economic aspects and evidence from the German Waste Water ChargeENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2001Professor Dr Erik Gawel Enforcement problems are usually analysed with respect to command-and-control measures of environmental regulation. The recognition that any environmental policy instrument entails an enforcement problem in principle is basic to a comparative analysis of enforcement effects. This paper deals with the comparative enforcement effects of charges: How does enforcement of a charge function? Which problems occur particularly in the enforcement of charges? Could enforcement be facilitated by a specific construction of charge laws? Are economic concepts of charge enforceable at all, and if so, under what conditions? Are charges more readily enforceable than other instruments? Therefore, some economic theory assessments of enforcement processes are presented first. In a third part, the paper sheds light on the practical experience made with the enforcement of the German Waste Water Charge. It is argued that the well worn thesis of an enforcement-friendly ,self-control' of market instruments is based on unrealistic assumptions. Whether against this background enforcement of environmental policy can be facilitated by an increased application use of charges must be viewed sceptically in an overall assessment of the problematic. Moreover, the transition from allocative control tasks to fiscal environmental charges may well be a symptom of rather than a contribution to the solution of the political and administrative crisis of enforcement. Especially for charges, the crucial question seems to be the political implementation rather than concrete enforcement by local authorities. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment [source] Engaged Elites Citizen Action and Institutional Attitudes in Commission EnforcementEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 1 2000Richard Rawlings The subject of this article is a classic one in European law and administration: the general powers of the Commission to take infringement proceedings against the Member States. The topic merits a basic reconsideration by reason of contemporary developments that put in question the role and nature of the process. Emphasis is laid on the challenges to an e´lite model of regulatory bargaining, in the form both of demands for citizen ,voice' and pressures for a firmer and more formal approach to Commission enforcement. The dynamic character of the process is seen in part to reflect different institutional attitudes, with particular attention being paid to the stance of the European Ombudsman. Practical proposals include a re-balancing of Commission procedures to improve the position of complainants, a central role for the principle of complementarity in terms of public and private legal action, and a creative application to the Commission of the disciplines of the New Public Management. A further aim of the article is to demonstrate the utility of socio-legal studies in European administrative law: for many years a retarded, insufficiently theorised discipline, with too narrow a court-oriented focus. [source] TURNING OFFENDERS INTO RESPONSIBLE PARENTS AND CHILD SUPPORT PAYERS,FAMILY COURT REVIEW, Issue 3 2005Esther Ann Griswold This article describes four demonstration projects that strive to promote responsible behavior with respect to parenting, child support payment, and employment among incarcerated and paroled parents with child support obligations. These projects, conducted in Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Texas, with support from the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement and evaluated by the Center for Policy Research, led to a number of common outcomes and lessons. The projects revealed that inmates want help with child support, parenting, and employment and that prisons can be effective settings in which to conduct such interventions. Family reintegration programs were popular with inmates and may have helped to avoid the rupture of parent,child relationships commonly associated with incarceration. Although employment is the key to child support payment following release, rates of postrelease employment and earnings at all project sites were low and the employment programs were of limited utility in helping released offenders find jobs. Agencies dealing with child support, employment, and criminal justice need to adopt more effective policies with incarcerated parents including transitional job programs that guarantee immediate, subsidized employment upon release, child support guidelines that adjust for low earnings, and better training and education opportunities during incarceration. [source] Explaining the Enforcement of Democracy by Regional Organizations: Comparing EU, Mercosur and SADCJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2010ANNA VAN DER VLEUTEN Regional organizations sometimes intervene to preserve democracy in one of their Member States. When a regional organization has developed a democratic identity, non-intervention in case of violation of democratic principles would damage its credibility domestically and internationally. Nonetheless, violations of democratic principles sometimes go unsanctioned. Building on case studies of (non-)interventions by the EU, Mercosur and SADC, we show that the ideational costs of pressure by third parties and the interests of the regional leading powers can explain the enforcement of democracy by regional organizations. Third party pressure remains ineffective, however, when there is a clash between regional identities. [source] Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans , By B.C. RathbunJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 1 2007JACKIE GOWER No abstract is available for this article. [source] Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy: An International StudyJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2003Ole-Kristian Hope Using a sample from 22 countries, I investigate the relations between the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts and the level of annual report disclosure, and between forecast accuracy and the degree of enforcement of accounting standards. I document that firm-level disclosures are positively related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that such disclosures provide useful information to analysts. I construct a comprehensive measure of enforcement and find that strong enforcement is associated with higher forecast accuracy. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that enforcement encourages managers to follow prescribed accounting rules, which, in turn, reduces analysts' uncertainty about future earnings. I also find evidence consistent with disclosures being more important when analyst following is low and with enforcement being more important when more choice among accounting methods is allowed. [source] Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United StatesJOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2009John Armour It is often assumed that strong securities markets require good legal protection of minority shareholders. This implies both "good" law,principally, corporate and securities law,and enforcement, yet there has been little empirical analysis of enforcement. We study private enforcement of corporate law in two common-law jurisdictions with highly developed stock markets, the United Kingdom and the United States, examining how often directors of publicly traded companies are sued, and the nature and outcomes of those suits. We find, based a comprehensive search for filings over 2004,2006, that lawsuits against directors of public companies alleging breach of duty are nearly nonexistent in the United Kingdom. The United States is more litigious, but we still find, based on a nationwide search of court decisions between 2000,2007, that only a small percentage of public companies face a lawsuit against directors alleging a breach of duty that is sufficiently contentious to result in a reported judicial opinion, and a substantial fraction of these cases are dismissed. We examine possible substitutes in the United Kingdom for formal private enforcement of corporate law and find some evidence of substitutes, especially for takeover litigation. Nonetheless, our results suggest that formal private enforcement of corporate law is less central to strong securities markets than might be anticipated. [source] How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral Perceptions and Civic EnforcementJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2009Yuval Feldman This paper examines how different legal instruments affect people's moral intuitions and willingness to engage in social enforcement in the field of environmental law. These instruments vary in terms of their governance technique, the process through which they were enacted, and their allocation of enforcement responsibilities. Their effect on citizens' moral evaluation and emotional reaction to corporate polluting behaviour are examined, based on an experimental survey of a representative sample of 1400 individuals in Israel. Our findings demonstrate that their design influences people's level of moral and emotional resentment when faced by environmentally problematic behaviour, as well as their motivation to engage in private enforcement. The design of the regulatory instrument could thus generate biases in social reactions to polluting behaviour, irrespective of its actual ecological adverse effect. We analyse the moral and psychological mechanisms which underlie these effects and explore their various policy implications. [source] Fragile Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China's Industrial Pollution LawLAW & POLICY, Issue 1 2010BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ Official statistics and independent survey data show that in the last decade China has witnessed a remarkable change in its enforcement of environmental pollution violations, moving toward more formalistic and coercive law enforcement with more enforcement cases as well as higher fines. The data also show that there is considerable regional variation with coastal areas having more and higher punishments than those inland. This article explores these findings, seeking to understand the explanation and meaning of these temporal and regional variation patterns. The study shows how enforcement varies when there is a convergence of governmental, social, and economic institutional forces. The article argues that the basis for such convergence has been fragile, as national pressures have lacked consistency and local community and government support evaporates when dominant sources of income are at stake. [source] Reconsidering Styles of Regulatory Enforcement: Patterns in Danish Agro-Environmental InspectionLAW & POLICY, Issue 2 2000Peter May This study addresses enforcement styles of regulatory inspectors, based on an examination of the municipal enforcement of agro-environmental policies in Denmark. Our findings make three contributions to the regulatory literature. One contribution is to add empirical support for theorizing about inspectors' enforcement styles as consisting of multiple components, rather than a single continuum. We show that inspectors' enforcement styles comprise the degree of formalism and the degree of coercion that they exercise when carrying out inspections. A second contribution is in showing the relationship of different types of enforcement styles to the two underlying dimensions of the concept. A third contribution is an examination of the ways in which inspectors' enforcement styles relate to their enforcement actions. The consistency of our findings with those of other studies suggests that the dimensions and types of inspectors' enforcement styles that we observed in Denmark can be generalized to other settings. [source] Enforcement, risk and discretion: the case of dangerous consumer productsLEGAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2006Peter Cartwright This paper considers the effectiveness of the enforcement provisions of consumer product safety law by examining the new legislation in this area (the General Product Safety Regulations 2005), and the broader context in which it operates. The paper suggests that to understand the likely effectiveness of the Regulations, it is necessary to examine what the author refers to as the internal and external dimensions of enforcement. The paper is divided into three parts: part one sets out the enforcement provisions of the Regulations; part two examines the internal elements of enforcement; part three examines the external elements of enforcement. The internal elements are those provisions found in the statute that direct enforcement authorities in the action they can take. The external elements are those pressures outside the statute that inevitably impinge upon the ability of the enforcement authority to make a decision. It will be argued that while recent developments make some important strides forward in protecting consumers from dangerous products, there is a risk that the law will not be enforced satisfactorily. [source] Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced Legislative ResponseAMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2010Shelley McGill First page of article [source] "The Google Challenge": Enforcement of Noncompete and Trade Secret Agreements for Employees Working in ChinaAMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2007Marisa Anne Pagnattaro First page of article [source] How Do Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Practices Affect the Mental Health of Children?AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, Issue 1 2010Jill D. McLeigh First page of article [source] Test substance characterization for the EPA: what you've always wanted to know but were afraid to ask,QUALITY ASSURANCE JOURNAL, Issue 3-4 2007William Barta Abstract The Society of Quality Assurance (SQA) GLP Specialty Section, a member of the SQA Regulatory Forum, is a group of participants from the regulated community which provides insight and guidance to our membership and the regulated community. The Specialty Section has encountered several participants who want to know what types of information and data are needed during an inspection by the US EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA). The OECA is responsible for monitoring studies submitted to the Office of Pesticide Programs in support of pesticide registrations as defined under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). All submitted studies are to be conducted according to the FIFRA US Good Laboratory Practice Standards (GLPS). The GLPS contain specific language concerning the characterization of test, control and reference substances used in these studies. This article clarifies those requirements and provides perspective on the EPA expectations on meeting those requirements. The topics of discussion include: regulatory requirements responsibilities of the testing facility management, study director, Quality Assurance Unit and the sponsor preparing for an inspection overview of data to be made available at the time of inspection composition of a Certificate of Analysis. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 536 2009Ernst Fehr We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterised by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by increasing contract efficiency substantially. This effect is, however, associated with a considerable bilateralisation of market interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price rigidities arising from social preferences. Thus, in markets characterised by moral hazard, reputational incentives unambiguously increase mutually beneficial exchanges, reduce rents, and render markets more responsive to supply and demand shocks. [source] Generalising the Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, With an Application to Vehicle Searches in Wichita,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 515 2006Nicola Persico This article considers the use of outcomes-based tests for detecting racial bias in the context of police searches of motor vehicles. We characterise the police and motorist decision problems in a game theoretic framework, where police encounter motorists and decide whether to search them and motorists decide whether to carry contraband. Our modelling framework generalises that of Knowles et al. (2001). We apply the tests to data on police searches of motor vehicles gathered by the Wichita police department. The empirical findings are consistent with the notion that police in Wichita choose their search strategies to maximise successful searches. [source] The Color of Credit: Mortgage Discrimination, Research Methodology, and Fair-Lending EnforcementTHE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 499 2004Ronel Elul First page of article [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||