Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Employment Protection (employment + protection)
Terms modified by Employment Protection Selected AbstractsUnemployment and Employment Protection in a Unionized Economy with Search FrictionsLABOUR, Issue 2 2008Nikolai Stähler Higher employment protection reduces job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal. [source] Employment Protection and the Incidence of Unemployment: A Theoretical FrameworkLABOUR, Issue 1 2004Anita Guelfi To this end, a standard matching model with employment protection has been extended to allow for the existence of two types of workers differing from each other only in the probability of becoming less productive while holding a job. In working out the model it turns out that in equilibrium workers with a relatively higher probability of becoming less productive face both a higher turnover and a longer duration of unemployment. Therefore, employment protection here raises the unemployment rate of this worker category, a result which looks consistent with consolidated evidence but contrasts with standard theoretical results. [source] Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity?THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 521 2007Evidence From US States Theory predicts that mandated employment protection may reduce productivity by distorting production choices. We use the adoption of wrongful-discharge protection by state courts in the US from 1970 to 1999 to evaluate the empirical link between dismissal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment-level data from the Census Bureau, our estimates suggest that wrongful-discharge protection reduces employment flows and firm entry rates. Moreover, plants engage in capital deepening and experience a decline in total factor productivity, indicative of altered production techniques. Evidence of strong contemporaneous growth in employment, however, leads us to view our findings as suggestive but tentative. [source] Why is Employment Protection Stricter in Europe than in the United States?ECONOMICA, Issue 295 2007MICHÈLE BELOT I argue that the reason why the United States prefers a lower level of employment protection than the European countries lies in the differences in gains and costs from geographical mobility. I present a model in which labour migration and employment protection are both determined endogenously. The labour market is modelled within a matching framework, where the employment protection reduces both the job finding and job firing rates. Countries with low migration costs and high economic heterogeneity may prefer no employment protection so that workers can move quickly to better horizons rather than being maintained in low productive activities. [source] EMU and the Shift in the European Labour Law Agenda: From ,Social Policy' to ,Employment Policy'EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2001Diamond Ashiagbor This article examines the interaction between EMU and the European Union (EU) employment strategy and its implications for law. It focuses on the importance of EMU as a catalyst in the development of the EU's social and employment policy in the years following the Treaty on European Union in 1992, up to the inauguration of a new employment policy in the Treaty of Amsterdam. In analysing the EU's discourse on labour market regulation, it is arguable that a shift has occurred in the EU's position on the ,labour market flexibility' debate: that the EU institutions are more readily accepting of the orthodoxy that labour market regulation and labour market institutions are a major cause of unemployment within EU countries and that a deregulatory approach, which emphasises greater ,flexibility' in labour markets, is the key to solving Europe's unemployment ills, along with macroeconomic stability, restrictive fiscal policy and wage restraint. As the EU's employment strategy has matured, this increased emphasis on employment policy has come to displace discourses around social policy. This change in emphasis has important implications for EMU since it signals a re-orientation from an approach to labour market regulation which had as its core a strong concept of employment protection and high labour standards, to an approach which prioritises employment creation, and minimises the role of social policy, since social policy is seen as potentially increasing the regulatory burden. [source] The Business of Caring: Women's Self-Employment and the Marketization of CareGENDER, WORK & ORGANISATION, Issue 4 2010Nickela Anderson Our goal in this article is to contribute to a differentiated analysis of paid caring work by considering whether and how women's experiences of such work is shaped by their employment status (for example, self-employed versus employee) and the nature of care provided (direct or indirect). Self-employed care workers have not been widely studied compared with other types of care workers, such as employees providing domestic or childcare in private firms or private homes. Yet their experiences may be quite distinct. Existing research suggests that self-employed workers earn less than employees and are often excluded from employment protection. Nonetheless, they often report greater autonomy and job satisfaction in their day-to-day work. Understanding more about the experiences of self-employed caregivers is thus important for enriching existing theory, research and policy on the marketization of care. Addressing this gap, our article explores the working conditions, pay and levels of satisfaction of care workers who are self-employed. We draw on interviews from a small-scale study of Canadian women engaged in providing direct care (for example, childcare) and indirect care (for example, cleaning). [source] Unemployment and Employment Protection in a Unionized Economy with Search FrictionsLABOUR, Issue 2 2008Nikolai Stähler Higher employment protection reduces job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal. [source] Employment Protection and the Incidence of Unemployment: A Theoretical FrameworkLABOUR, Issue 1 2004Anita Guelfi To this end, a standard matching model with employment protection has been extended to allow for the existence of two types of workers differing from each other only in the probability of becoming less productive while holding a job. In working out the model it turns out that in equilibrium workers with a relatively higher probability of becoming less productive face both a higher turnover and a longer duration of unemployment. Therefore, employment protection here raises the unemployment rate of this worker category, a result which looks consistent with consolidated evidence but contrasts with standard theoretical results. [source] Severance Payments and Firm,specific Human CapitalLABOUR, Issue 1 2003Jens Suedekum What effect does employment protection through severance payments have on the behaviour of employed workers? We analyse this issue within a stochastic two,period framework where workers decide on human capital investments and find two competing effects: severance payments imply higher job security that fosters human capital formation. At the same time, a lay,off is perceived by the workers to be a weaker penalty if severance payments are provided. This incentive lowers their optimal amount of firm,specific investments. Which effect prevails on balance depends on the distribution of investment returns among firm and workers. For strong positive reactions, employment protection is also in the interests of the firm. [source] Time Consistency and Bureaucratic Budget Competition,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 525 2008Kai A. Konrad High employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions' output employ excess labour, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary inputs in the future. Restrictions on hiring decisions in the public sector can be regarded as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. We also provide evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high employment protection. The results confirm that decision makers are aware of the strategic effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation. [source] Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity?THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 521 2007Evidence From US States Theory predicts that mandated employment protection may reduce productivity by distorting production choices. We use the adoption of wrongful-discharge protection by state courts in the US from 1970 to 1999 to evaluate the empirical link between dismissal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment-level data from the Census Bureau, our estimates suggest that wrongful-discharge protection reduces employment flows and firm entry rates. Moreover, plants engage in capital deepening and experience a decline in total factor productivity, indicative of altered production techniques. Evidence of strong contemporaneous growth in employment, however, leads us to view our findings as suggestive but tentative. [source] How important is employment protection legislation for Foreign Direct Investment flows in Central and Eastern European countries?1THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 2 2009Markus Leibrecht Foreign Direct Investment; Central and Eastern Europe; labour market; employment protection Abstract In this article we investigate empirically the importance of labour market conditions and in particular the role of employment protection legislation as determinants of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). We find that FDI flows are significantly higher in countries with relatively low unit labour costs. We also find that employment protection legislation does not exert a statistically significant impact on FDI flows. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that transition economies attract FDI via low production costs whereas indirect costs related to the rigidity of the labour market are less relevant. [source] Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great BritainBRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 2 2010David Marsden Using data from large-scale establishment surveys in Britain and France, we show that incentive pay for non-managers is more widespread in France than in Britain. We explain this finding in terms of the ,beneficial constraint' arising from stronger employment protection in France, which provides an impulse to develop incentive pay; employer networking activities in France, which facilitate joint learning about its development and operation; and government fiscal incentives for profit-sharing, which reduce the cost of its operation. [source] Progressive labour policy, ageing Marxism and unrepentant early capitalism in the Chinese industrial revolutionBUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW, Issue 2 2001Orlan Lee The institutional guarantees of modern labour law, that provide the keystone of progressive liberalism, are often only reactionary to the entrenched concepts of socialist law. Adoption of institutions of "workers rights", and employment protection based upon contract, inevitably nullify the ideological promise of the inalienable "right to work". China, among the last bastions of theoretical Marxist socialism, and among the first socialist countries ready to accept that it has been in desperate need of reforming uneconomical state enterprises, seems willing to sacrifice ideological purity for economic development. Yet, if economic turnaround requires enterprise rationalisation in a market economy, it is understandable that Chinese labour requires the same kinds of protection against unbridled capitalism as progressive labour movements elsewhere. Doubtless, for those who have enjoyed no such institutional guarantees in the past, official commitment to improvement of labour conditions is better than no acknowledgment of need for reform of social policy whatever. Yet, the real question for students of social change is "Are these legislated reforms effective policy guides for local administration and the courts?""|Or are they merely regulations for licensing compliance , primarily for foreign invested enterprises?". In brief, "... to what extent are the new ,workers' rights' realistically attainable sources of judicial remedies for individual workers?" [source] | ||||||||||