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Efficiency Argument (efficiency + argument)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	50%

Selected Abstracts

BETTER GUN ENFORCEMENT, LESS CRIME,

CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY, Issue 4 2005
JENS LUDWIG
Research Summary: Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), which for the past several years has been the major federal initiative to combat gun violence, includes several elements (such as gun locks and other efforts to reduce gun availability) that research suggests are likely to have at best modest effects on gun crime. In general, enforcement activities targeted at the "demand side" of the underground gun market currently enjoy stronger empirical support. However much of PSN's budget has been devoted to increasing the severity of punishment, such as by federaliz-ing gun cases, which seems to be less effective than targeted street-level enforcement designed to increase the probability of punishment for gun carrying or use in crime. Policy Implications: PSN and other enforcement activities could be made more effective by redirecting resources toward activities such as targeted patrols against illegal gun carrying. Given the substantial social costs of gun violence, an efficiency argument can also be made for increasing funding beyond previous levels. [source]

Gerechtigkeit und Marktwirtschaft , das Problem der Arbeitslosigkeit

PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 4 2008
Malte Faber
Conventionally, it is argued that involuntary unemployment causes a deadweight loss in social welfare, because it involves the under-use of a productive resource. We explore this efficiency argument with a public choice approach, employing the notion of homo oeconomicus. We contrast this with a perspective using the concept of homo politicus, which stresses social justice. We apply our findings to the special case of German social reform, especially Hartz IV, and show that some of its policy recommendations are in accordance with our analysis. [source]

When consensus choice dominates individualism: Jensen's inequality and collective decisions under uncertainty

QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2010
Charles F. Manski
D7; D81; H42 Research on collective provision of private goods has focused on distributional considerations. This paper studies a class of problems of decision under uncertainty in which an efficiency argument for collective choice emerges from the mathematics of aggregating individual payoffs. Consider decision making when each member of a population has the same objective function, which depends on an unknown state of nature. If agents knew the state of nature, they would make the same decision. However, they may have different beliefs or may use different decision criteria to cope with their incomplete knowledge. Hence, they may choose different actions even though they share the same objective. Let the set of feasible actions be convex and the objective function be concave in actions, for all states of nature. Then Jensen's inequality implies that consensus choice of the mean privately chosen action yields a larger mean payoff than does individualistic decision making, in all states of nature. If payoffs are transferable, the mean payoff from consensus choice may be allocated to Pareto dominate individualistic decision making. I develop these ideas. I also use Jensen's inequality to show that a planner with the power to assign actions to the members of the population should not diversify. Finally, I give a version of the collective-choice result that holds with consensus choice of the median rather than mean action. [source]

Liberal Nationalism and Territorial Rights

JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2003
Tamar Meisels
It asks what type of justifications could be morally acceptable to "liberal nationalism" for the acquisition and holding of territory. To this end, the paper takes a brief look at five central arguments for territorial entitlement which have become predominant in political debates. These are: so called "historical rights" to territory; demands for territorial restitution; efficiency arguments; claims of entitlement to territories settled by co-nationals; and lastly, territorial demands based on claims of equal entitlement to the earth's natural resources. These popular arguments point towards several potential criteria for the arbitration of territorial conflicts. The paper attempts to outline the morally relevant guidelines for thinking about territorial issues that flow from, or are at least consistent with, applying liberal values to the national phenomenon. It places the territorial aspect of nationalism at the head of the liberal nationalist agenda and offers an initial common ground for discussion (including disagreement) among liberals, and for the mediation of claims between nations. [source]