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EU Members (eu + member)
Terms modified by EU Members Selected AbstractsHow Pervasive are Euro-Politics?JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 2 2000Effects of EU Membership on a New Member State While the consequences of becoming an EU Member State for national policies are usually the core concern of pre-membership debates and of post-accession assessments, studies of the effects of European integration on the political systems of the Member States have so far been less numerous. Among the new EU members, which are ideal cases for studying domestic accession effects, Austria is a particularly challenging case in terms of top-down impact on the national political system. A number of specific precautions were taken in order to protect typical features of the national political system (notably the traditional roles of parliament, Länder and social partners) from being eroded in the multi-level system. The basic research question of this article is whether or not these measures were actually successful. How ,sticky' is the EU upon closer inspection, i.e. how pervasive are its effects on adverse national structures? Can national measures, even at the constitutional level, outweigh specific consequences of participating in Euro-politics? If not 9as the Austrian case indicates), why not? The conclusions distinguish specific Austrian variables from generalizable ones and discuss the findings in the light of the existing literature. [source] The European Union Constitution on Border Checks, Asylum, and ImmigrationPOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 4 2004Article first published online: 15 DEC 200 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed by the heads of government of the 25 European Union member states and three candidate states on 29 October 2004. The Treaty in effect is the proposed constitution, a long and elaborate document comprising 448 Articles (grouped into four Parts, with additional divisions into Titles, Chapters, and Sections, but numbered consecutively throughout) and 29 Protocols,annexes to the Treaty. Five articles and four protocols are concerned with issues of border control, immigration, and asylum policy. The articles are found in the chapter titled Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Part III of the Treaty (The Policies and Functioning of the Union). These are reproduced below, along with one of the protocols (number 21). (Of the other protocols concerned with migration, one adds to the Treaty the provisions of the Schengen Acquis, the agreement among all EU members except the United Kingdom and Ireland, plus the non-EU states Norway and Iceland, to eliminate border controls at their common frontiers, and requires acceptance of the Acquis by any new member. Two other protocols set out reservations on the part of the UK and Ireland on border control and asylum matters,basically, an "opt-in" stance, allowing their participation in Treaty provisions on a case-by-case basis.) The constitution is highly detailed in scope but often vague in content, merely specifying topics on which policies will be developed or laws enacted. Thus the "common immigration policy" that is signaled in Article III-267 is yet to be shaped, and the Treaty offers few hints of what it may look like. A reluctance on the part of member states to cede sovereignty in the area of immigration is not limited to the British Isles. It is seen also in the retained right of all members to restrict non-EU labor migrants (Article III-267, Para. 5) and to conclude bilateral agreements on border crossing with non-EU states (Protocol 21). It is notable that the Treaty, while stressing that all nationals of member states are citizens of the Union with the right "to move and reside freely" within its territory, does not attempt to harmonize conditions or procedures under which migrants can acquire citizenship: indeed, it says nothing at all on the matter. (A "framework law," mentioned at various points in the text, is a law that prescribes the result to be achieved but leaves to each member state "the choice of form and methods.") Actual adoption of the constitution requires ratification by the governments of all EU members. If this demanding hurdle is passed (requiring parliamentary approval or, in some cases, a referendum), the constitution would come into force on 1 November 2006,or after the final ratification, if later. Under Article IV-443, if the treaty is ratified by four-fifths of members within the two years but is rejected by one or more states, "the matter shall be referred to the European Council",the quarterly summit meeting of heads of government. [source] Fear of Floating and the External Effects of Currency UnionsAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2008Thomas Plümper The introduction of the Euro has considerably affected the de facto monetary policy autonomy,defined as independence from monetary policy in the key currency areas,in countries outside the European Currency Union (ECU). Using a standard open economy framework, we argue that de facto monetary policy autonomy has significantly declined for countries that dominantly trade with the ECU and slightly increased for countries that dominantly trade with the Dollar zone. The predictions of our model find support in the data. We estimate the influence of the Bundesbank's/ECB's and the Fed's monetary policies on various country groups. The de facto monetary policy autonomy of both non-Euro EU members and EFTA countries declined with the introduction of the Euro. This effect was slightly stronger for the EU member countries than for EFTA countries as our theory predicts. At the same time, the de facto monetary policy autonomy of Australia and New Zealand vis-à-vis the US Dollar has (moderately) increased. [source] MANUFACTURING WAGES IN THE ENLARGED EU: THE ROLE OF NEIGHBOUR-COUNTRY EFFECTS*THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 1 2009HELENA MARQUES In this paper a New Economic Geography type wage equation is estimated for the EU-25. The determinants of manufacturing wages are shown to be sector-specific and the role of geography is limited. As a consequence, we show that the improvement of the EU's internal market and the evolution of European geography are likely to favour larger EU members and challenge smaller ones. [source] THE SOCIAL EFFICIENCY OF INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PROMOTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN THE LIBERALISED POWER INDUSTRYANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2006Dominique Finon ABSTRACT,:,This paper compares the social efficiency of the two main regulatory instruments used to promote renewable energy sources in electricity generation (RES-E), taking into consideration their role in promoting the preservation of the climate. They are based on a purchase obligation and act either by price (feed-in tariffs) or by quantity (RES-E quotas). In their reference design, the instruments show different performances in several dimensions: market incentives intensity, control of the cost for consumers, safeguards of RES-E investments, and conformity with the new market regime of the electricity industry. The comparison shows that neither instrument offers an optimal solution in each of these dimensions. In particular, the intrinsic qualities of the quotas instrument that are put forward to mandate its adoption by the EU members are overestimated. A government will thus select an instrument in accordance with the relative importance of its objectives: environmental policy versus cost control by market pressure. [source] |