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EU Institutions (eu + institution)
Selected AbstractsRisk and Crisis Management in the Reformed European Agricultural PolicyCANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2007Carlo Cafiero Currently there is ample discussion among EU Institutions (European Commission, European Parliament, and Member States' governments) on the opportunity for setting up a comprehensive EU-wide framework on risk and crises in agriculture. In the meantime, within the limits of the WTO rules on agriculture, national governments are allowed to intervene through direct compensation to farmers in case of exceptional events that cause damages to farming operations and through subsidies to crop insurance programs. Such schemes are quite expensive for domestic budgets and some Member States are trying to switch some of their cost to the Community's budget, although an expansion of financial resources devoted to agriculture in Europe is rather unlikely. Moving from the recently emanated proposal of the European Commission, this paper discusses the main issues related to public intervention for risk and crises management in agriculture. Actuellement, les institutions européennes (Commission européenne, Parlement européen et gouvernements des pays membres) discutent intensément de l'opportunité d'élaborer un cadre général pour l'ensemble de l'Union européenne sur les crises et les risques dans le secteur agricole. Entre-temps, selon les règles de l'OMC sur l'agriculture, les gouvernements nationaux peuvent intervenir en accordant des compensations financières directes aux agriculteurs en cas de circonstances exceptionnelles causant des dommages aux exploitations agricoles ainsi que des subventions aux programmes d'assurance récolte. Ces interventions amputent considérablement les budgets nationaux, et certains pays membres tentent de transférer une partie de leurs coûts au budget de l'Union européenne, bien qu'il soit peu probable que les ressources financières consacrées à l'agriculture en Europe augmentent. A la lumière de la récente proposition de la Commission européenne, le présent article traite des principaux thèmes liés à l'intervention publique dans la gestion des risques et des crises dans le secteur agricole. [source] An organisational approach to European integration: Outline of a complementary perspectiveEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2004Morten Egeberg Intergovernmentalists usually preclude any profound impact of European Union (EU) institutions and organisations. Institutionalists (other than rational-choice institutionalists), on the other hand, claim that EU institutions are able to shape and reshape individual actors' preferences and sense of belonging. Seen from an organisational perspective, however, institutionalists often fail to specify (and theorise) the organisational components that institutions may contain. This ,unpacking' of institutions is necessary in order to clarify the conditions under which transformation of actors and policy processes might occur. This article tries to illustrate what an organisational approach has to offer in fields like committee governance and Commission decision making. In addition, organisational theory provides a yardstick for assessing the degree of overall system integration. [source] Legislation, Delegation and Implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets RealityEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2009Herwig Hofmann This reform, the first since the Treaty of Rome, will have an impact on some of the most contested topics of EU law, touching several central questions of a constitutional nature. This article critically analyses which potential effects and consequences the reform will have. It looks, inter alia, at the aspects of the shifting relation between EU institutions, the distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States, as well as the future of rule-making and implementation structures such as comitology and agencies. [source] European Democracy, the ,Permissive Consensus' and the Collapse of the EU ConstitutionEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2007Achim Hurrelmann Its failure demonstrates the need to pay greater attention to the nature of public support for the EU, and to the ways in which this support is related to the democratic quality of EU institutions. Contrary to what is often assumed, EU support can still be quite adequately described by the figure of a ,permissive consensus'. For better or worse, attempts to democratise EU institutions might undermine this form of support. [source] EMU and the Shift in the European Labour Law Agenda: From ,Social Policy' to ,Employment Policy'EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2001Diamond Ashiagbor This article examines the interaction between EMU and the European Union (EU) employment strategy and its implications for law. It focuses on the importance of EMU as a catalyst in the development of the EU's social and employment policy in the years following the Treaty on European Union in 1992, up to the inauguration of a new employment policy in the Treaty of Amsterdam. In analysing the EU's discourse on labour market regulation, it is arguable that a shift has occurred in the EU's position on the ,labour market flexibility' debate: that the EU institutions are more readily accepting of the orthodoxy that labour market regulation and labour market institutions are a major cause of unemployment within EU countries and that a deregulatory approach, which emphasises greater ,flexibility' in labour markets, is the key to solving Europe's unemployment ills, along with macroeconomic stability, restrictive fiscal policy and wage restraint. As the EU's employment strategy has matured, this increased emphasis on employment policy has come to displace discourses around social policy. This change in emphasis has important implications for EMU since it signals a re-orientation from an approach to labour market regulation which had as its core a strong concept of employment protection and high labour standards, to an approach which prioritises employment creation, and minimises the role of social policy, since social policy is seen as potentially increasing the regulatory burden. [source] Language conflicts in the European UnionINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS, Issue 3 2006On finding a politically acceptable, practicable solution for EU institutions that satisfies diverging interests Europäische Union; institutionelle Arbeitssprachen; Sprachinteressen; Sprachkonflikte For EU institutions, having a single internal working language , for which English is the only candidate , would be the most efficient solution and, to all appearances, in the best interests of each member state and language community whose language is excluded as a working language. However, for member states from the large non-anglophone language communities, such a solution seems barely acceptable and, in addition, would not correspond to the EU's official language policy on the preservation of language diversity. This is because "English only" is expected to inevitably transcend the borders of internal institutions and further limit the function of the remaining widely-spoken languages, especially as a lingua franca and in foreign language teaching. This contribution presents the conflict of interests between the smaller and the larger language communities in having only one or several institutional working languages for the EU and sketches out a possible solution which would serve both political and communicative demands. Für die EU-Institutionen w,re eine einzige interne Arbeitssprache, für die nur Englisch in Frage k,me, am effizientesten, und sie läge allem Anschein nach auch im Interesse derjenigen Mitgliedstaaten und Sprachgemeinschaften, deren Sprachen von den Arbeitssprachen ohnehin ausgeschlossen sind. Für die Mitgliedstaaten der großen Sprachgemeinschaften (außer Englisch) erscheint eine solche Lösung aber kaum akzeptabel, und sie entspräche auch nicht der offiziellen EU-Sprachenpolitik des Erhalts der Sprachenvielfalt. Es ist nämlich damit zu rechnen, dass "English only" unvermeidlich über die internen Institutionen hinaus wirken und die übrigen großen Sprachen funktional weiter einschränken würde, vor allem als Lingua franca und im Fremdsprachenunterricht. Der Beitrag stellt die Interessenskonflikte zwischen den kleineren und den größeren Sprachgemeinschaften der EU bezüglich nur einer oder aber mehrerer institutioneller Arbeitssprachen dar und skizziert eine mögliche Lösung, die sowohl politischen als auch kommunikativen Erfordernissen gerecht wird. [source] Explaining Europe's Monetary Union: A Survey of the LiteratureINTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 2 2009Tal Sadeh This article offers a survey of the literature on European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), in particular works that deal with the question why EMU happened and, based on this literature, what one might be able to conclude about its sustainability. It reviews the literature by dividing up the analyses into four categories: those that explain EMU at the global and at the European Union (EU) levels of analysis, explanations at the national level, and explanations at the domestic level of analysis. The review suggests that EMU was a particular European response to global developments, which was possible because of existing EU institutions. EMU was causally motivated by a Franco-German deal, balancing national interests. Domestic motives reflect essentially opportunistic motives, and thus, cannot explain EMU. In our judgment the review suggests that Europe's single currency will remain sustainable as long as the Franco-German political deal sticks, the belief in the "sound money" idea remains hegemonic in Europe, and the losers from EMU are underrepresented in national and EU institutions. While opportunistic domestic motives cannot explain embarking on a long-term project, they can definitely be sufficient to derail such a project. [source] European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue ShoppingJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 2 2000Virginie Guiraudon Since the beginning of the 1980s, migration and asylum policy in Europe has increasingly been elaborated in supranational forums and implemented by transnational actors. I argue that a venue-shopping framework is best suited to account for the timing, form and content of European co-operation in this area. The venues less amenable to restrictive migration control policy are national high courts, other ministries and migrant-aid organizations. Building upon pre-existing policy settings and developing new policy frames, governments have circumvented national constraints on migration control by creating transnational co-operation mechanisms dominated by law and order officials, with EU institutions playing a minor role. European transgovernmental working groups have avoided judicial scrutiny, eliminated other national adversaries and enlisted the help of transnational actors such as transit countries and carriers. [source] Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC), Its Meanings and InterpretationsEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2010The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership. Research that has been conducted over the last decades shows that neither the scope of application nor the exact meaning of Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC) is clear from its wording. This article seeks to clarify its meaning through analysis of the drafting of the Article as well as the use of it by the EU's institutions and by the Member States. Article 345 TFEU, formerly Article 295 EC and, before that, Article 222 EEC, is an Article that limits, but not prevents, the application of the TFEU Treaty as a whole to the way in which rules of a Member State deal with the right of ownership of undertakings. The conclusion can be drawn that Article 345 TFEU only concerns the private or public ownership of undertakings, with which the Community shall not concern itself and which can thus be regulated by the Member States themselves. Most importantly, the Article does not concern the content of the right of ownership, nor the objects of a right of ownership. It does therefore not form an obstacle to the development of a European property law. [source] |