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EU Commission (eu + commission)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting75%

Selected Abstracts

GMO Food Labelling in the EU: Tracing ,the Seeds of Dispute'

EUROCHOICES, Issue 1 2003
Maria L. Loureiro
Summary GMO Food Labelling in the EU: Tracinq ,the Seeds of Dispute' Genetically modified (GM) food labelling has become a critical issue in the international trade arena. Policymakers and consumers in the European Union (EU) seem to agree on the need to control the use of biotechnology in the food industry. As a consequence, recently the EU Commission approved a measure that establishes strict rules on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), but which lifts the moratorium on GMO production and marketing. This new Directive deals with mandatory labelling of GM foods and their traceability along the food chain. In spite of the substantial effort made to reconcile the different opinions in the escalating debate about biotechnology, the new GMO regulation seems to be unsatisfactory for too many interest groups. A system of total traceability from ,farm to fork' and mandatory labelling for genetically modified products may be considered too complex and too expensive to implement, particularly by those countries or industries that have produced GMO foods for many years. Yet, giving European consumers the freedom to choose GMOs may be the only option that there is until Europeans restore their confidence in the food system and food regulators. A market or consumer-driven solution may eventually terminate the GMO dispute between the two transatlantic trading blocks. , Assurance , Revenud a ns , Agriculture Européenne ,étiquetage des aliments contenant des organismes génétiquement modifyés (OGM) est devenu une question cruciale sur la scène du commerce international. Tant les décideurs politiques que les citoyens de , Union européenne semblent s'accorder sur la nécessité de soumettre à contrôle , utilisation des biotechnologies dans , industrie alimentaire. En conséquence, la Commission européenne a récemment approuvé une mesure qui établit des règies strictes sur les OGM, mais qui lève le moratoire sur leur production et leur commercialisation. Cette nouvelle directive concerne ,étiquetage obligatoire des aliments contenant des OGM et la façon ? en assurer le suivi dans les filières alimentaires. Ce nouveau règlement OGM, en dépit des efforts réels effectués pour réconcilier les différents points de vue dans la montée du débat sur les biotechnologies, semble inconciliable avec trop de groupes ? intérêts pour être satisfaisant. Un système assurant une traçabilité totale, ,du champ à la fourchette' et un étiquetage obligatoire pour tout produit contenant des OGM, paraît bien trop complexe et coûteux à mettre en ,uvre, en particulier pour les pays ou les industries qui produisent des aliments génétiquement modifyés depuis des années. Et pourtant, il se pourrait bien que la seule façpn de restaurer la confiance perdue des Européens dans le système alimentaire et ses institutions soit justement de leur donner le droit de choisir. La fin de la querelle des OGM entre les blocs commerciaux des deux rives de , Atlantique peut venir de solutions apportées par le marché et issues des consommateurs. Einkommenversicherung in der Europäischen Landwirtschaft Die Kennzeichnung von genetisch veränderten Lebensmitteln ist zu einer der bedeutendsten Streitfragen auf dem Gebiet des internationalen Handels geworden. Politische Entscheidungsträger und Verbraucher in der Europäischen Union scheinen dahingehend überein zu stimmen, dass der Einsatz von Biotechnologie in der Nahrungsmittel-industrie kontrolliert werden sollte. Als Reaktion darauf hat die EU-Kommission kürzlich einer Maßnahme zugestimmt, welche ein strenges Regelwerk für genetisch veränderte Organismen (GVO) festschreibt, mit der aber gleichzeitig das Moratorium für die Produktion und Vermarktung von GVO aufgehoben wird. Die neue Richtlinie beschäftigt sich mit der Pflichtkennzeichnung von genetisch veränderten Nahrungsmitteln und mit ihrer Rückverfolgbarkeit entlang der Nahrungsmittelkette. Trotz der erheblichen Anstrengungen, die verschiedenen Standpunkte in der eskalierenden Debatte um Biotechnologie zu berücksichtigen, scheint die neue GVO Richtlinie in den Augen (zu) vieler Interessengruppen unbefriedigend zu sein. Ein System der vollständigen Rückverfolgbarkeit vom Stall bis zum Teller und die Pflichtkennzeichnung von genetisch veränderten Nahrungsmitteln mag in der Umsetzung als zu komplex und zu teuer betrachtet werden, insbesondere von den Ländern oder Industriezweigen, welche seit vielen Jahren GVO-Nahrungsmittel hergestellt haben. Dennoch könnte der Ansatz, den europäischen Verbrauchern die freie Wahl für oder gegen GVO zu gewähren, der einzig gangbare Weg sein, bis die Europäer ihr Vertrauen in das Produktions- und Kontrollsystem für Nahrungsmittel zurückgewonnen haben. Eine markt- oder verbraucherorientierte Lösung könnte letztlich den Streit um GVO zwischen den beiden transatlantischen Handelsblöcken beenden. [source]

Stimulating Simulations: Making the European Union a Classroom Reality

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 2 2000
Gretchen J. Van Dyke
This article examines the organization and development of the Mid-Atlantic European Union Simulation Consortium (MEUSC), with special emphasis on linking theory to practice within its simulation program. The MEUSC program, initiated in 1993, brings fifteen colleges and universities to Washington, D.C., each December for an intercollegiate experiential learning exercise on the European Union. During the simulation, students meet with professional diplomats from both the United States and Europe, and they engage in consensus-building activities that mirror the decision-making processes of the EU Commission, Parliament, Council of Ministers, and the European Council. As a result, participants are able to refine and enhance a range of academic and practical skills that are keys for success in today's political and business worlds. The authors of this article make special use of a survey that was undertaken to gauge the impact of the simulation on its participants and, thus, its success as an educational venture. [source]

Der EU-Emissionshandel im Zielkonflikt zwischen Effizienz, Kompensation und Wettbewerbsneutralität

PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2005
Christoph Böhringer
We show how institutional features set by the EU Commission and the required subsidiary decisions by the respective Member States are potentially in conflict with the objectives of efficiency, compensation and competition neutrality. Inefficiencies can emerge from the decisions on the number of emission allowances and the way in which they are allocated. These problems are intensified by pressure from political interest groups. We argue that costs from recurring political debates and decisions on the National Allocation Plans could be avoided by using truly lump-sum-free allocation rules or moving towards auctioning off emission allowances. [source]

ON OPTIMAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR COMPETITION POLICY: A GENERAL WELFARE-BASED ANALYSIS,

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009
YANNIS KATSOULACOS
We present a new welfare-based framework for optimally choosing legal standards (decision rules). We formalise the decision-theoretic considerations widely discussed in the existing literature by capturing the quality of the underlying analysis and information available to a regulatory authority, and we obtain a precise necessary and sufficient set of conditions for determining when an Economics or Effects-Based approach would be able to discriminate effectively between benign and harmful actions and consequently dominate per se as a decision-making procedure. We then show that in a full welfare-based approach, the choice between legal standards must additionally take into account, (i) indirect (deterrence) effects of the choice of standard on the behaviour of all firms when deciding whether or not to adopt a particular practice; and (ii) procedural effects of certain features of the administrative process in particular delays in reaching decisions; and the investigation of only a fraction of the actions taking place. We therefore derive necessary and sufficient conditions for adopting Discriminating Rules, as advocated by the Effects-Based approach. We also examine what type of Discriminating rule will be optimal under different conditions that characterise different business practices. We apply our framework to two recent landmark decisions , Microsoft vs. EU Commission (2007) and Leegin vs. PSKS (2007) , in which a change in legal standards has been proposed, and show that it can powerfully clarify and enhance the arguments deployed in these cases. [source]