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Earnings Test (earning + test)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

How Did the Elimination of the US Earnings Test above the Normal Retirement Age Affect Labour Supply Expectations?,

FISCAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2008
Pierre-Carl Michaud
H55; J22 Abstract We look at the effect of the 2000 repeal of the earnings test above the normal retirement age (NRA) on the self-reported probabilities of working full-time after ages 65 and 62 of male workers in the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Using administrative records on social security benefit entitlements linked to the HRS survey data, we can distinguish groups of respondents according to the predicted effect of the earnings test before its repeal on their marginal wage rate after the NRA. We use panel data models with fixed and random effects to investigate the effect of the repeal. We find that male workers whose predicted marginal wage rate increased because the earnings test was repealed had the largest increase in the subjective probability of working full-time after age 65. We find no significant effects of the repeal on the subjective probability of working full-time past age 62. [source]

Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008
Helmuth Cremer
Earnings tests; social security; age-related taxation; retirement age Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two ,endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before. [source]

How Did the Elimination of the US Earnings Test above the Normal Retirement Age Affect Labour Supply Expectations?,

FISCAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2008
Pierre-Carl Michaud
H55; J22 Abstract We look at the effect of the 2000 repeal of the earnings test above the normal retirement age (NRA) on the self-reported probabilities of working full-time after ages 65 and 62 of male workers in the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Using administrative records on social security benefit entitlements linked to the HRS survey data, we can distinguish groups of respondents according to the predicted effect of the earnings test before its repeal on their marginal wage rate after the NRA. We use panel data models with fixed and random effects to investigate the effect of the repeal. We find that male workers whose predicted marginal wage rate increased because the earnings test was repealed had the largest increase in the subjective probability of working full-time after age 65. We find no significant effects of the repeal on the subjective probability of working full-time past age 62. [source]

Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008
Helmuth Cremer
Earnings tests; social security; age-related taxation; retirement age Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two ,endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before. [source]