Earnings Surprises (earning + surprise)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Distribution within Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting

Kinds of Earnings Surprises

  • negative earning surprise


  • Selected Abstracts


    A Temporal Analysis of Earnings Surprises: Profits versus Losses

    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2001
    Lawrence D. Brown
    I show that median earnings surprise has shifted rightward from small negative (miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet analyst estimates exactly) to small positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) during the 16 years, 1984 to 1999. I show that a rightward temporal shift in median surprise from negative to positive describes earnings, but neither profits nor losses. Median profit surprise shifts within the positive quadrant, from zero to one cent per share. Median loss surprise shifts within the negative quadrant from extreme negative (about -33 cents per share) to zero. I show that the median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses in every year. I document significant positive temporal trends in both meet and beat analyst estimates for both profits and losses, but I find a greater frequency of profits that either meet or beat analyst estimates in every year. I find a significant positive temporal trend in positive profits that are "a little bit of good news," and a significant negative temporal trend in managers who report losses that are an "extreme amount of bad news." My results are robust to the four internal validity threats I consider,namely temporal changes in: (1) analyst forecast accuracy, (2) the mix of earnings of one sign preceded by earnings of another sign four quarters ago, (3) the timeliness of the most recent analyst forecast, and (4) the I/B/E/S definition of actual earnings. I find that managers of growth firms are relatively more likely than managers of value firms to report good news profits. I show that when they do report positive profit surprises, managers of growth firms are more likely to report "a little bit of good news" in every year. [source]


    On the Market Reaction to Revenue and Earnings Surprises

    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2009
    Itay Kama
    Abstract:, This study extends Ertimur et al. (2003) and Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006a) by providing a contextual framework for the information content of revenue and earnings surprises. I find that the influence of earnings surprises (revenue surprises) on stock returns is lower (higher) in R&D intensive companies. Also, market reaction to earnings surprises is lower in the fourth quarter, and to revenue surprises it is higher in industries with oligopolistic competition. A comprehensive analysis indicates that, in contrast to previous studies for the full sample, in several contexts market reaction to earnings surprises is not higher than to revenue surprises. [source]


    Market Reactions to Warnings of Negative Earnings Surprises: Further Evidence

    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 7-8 2008
    Weihong Xu
    Abstract:, This study examines two plausible explanations for Kasznik and Lev's (1995) counterintuitive finding that warning firms are subject to more negative market returns than no-warning firms. Namely, are the more negative market reactions to warning firms due to their poorer future earnings performance or due to investor overreaction? I find that, compared with no-warning firms, warning firms experience more severe one-year-ahead earnings declines and these earnings declines can explain the stronger market returns to warning firms. However, my results do not support an investor overreaction explanation. The tests of subsequent abnormal returns of warning firms over various windows do not detect stock return reversals due to correction for overreaction. In addition, the greater revisions in analysts' forecasts for warning firms are found to enhance analyst accuracy rather than increase analyst pessimism. Collectively, my results suggest that the more negative market reactions to warning firms reflect investors' rational anticipation of more severe declines in future earnings for warning firms rather than investor overreaction. [source]


    The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Conference Calls: The Case of Earnings Surprises,

    ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 6 2009
    Bok Baik
    Abstract While conference calls have been widely used as a communication tool between firms and investors, little research has examined the effect of this voluntary disclosure metric on analyst forecasts. In this paper, we examine whether firms use conference calls to guide down analysts' earnings forecasts, thereby avoiding negative earnings surprises before and after Regulation FD. Our findings show that firms hosting conference calls are more likely to guide analysts' forecasts downward and, as a result, they tend to successfully avoid negative earnings surprises in the pre Reg FD period. However, we do not find such relations in the post Reg FD period. We also find that the market reacts positively to firms hosting conference calls only in the post Reg FD period, consistent with the view that the market rewards a reduction in managers' opportunistic guidance to meet the analysts' earnings estimate. [source]


    Market Response to Earnings Surprises Conditional on Reasons for an Auditor Change,

    CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2002
    Karl E. Hackenbrack
    Abstract Our interest in this study is the relative informativeness of earnings announcements reported before and after Form 8-K disclosures of the reason for an auditor change. We appeal to several models that predict that the market's response to an earnings surprise is positively related to the perceived precision of the earnings report. We predict that the Form 8-K reason disclosures aid investors in updating their expectations of earnings precision by providing useful information about the financial reporting process that produces the earnings report. For 802 auditor changes from late 1991 through late 1997, the average price response per unit of earnings surprise is lower subsequent to an auditor change for companies that switched for disagreement-related or fee-related reasons and higher for those that switched for service-related reasons. This paper provides further evidence on the effects of differential earnings quality on differences in the returns-earnings relation across companies and over time as well as the efficacy of Form 8-K disclosures of reasons for auditor changes. [source]


    The Extreme Future Stock Returns Following I/B/E/S Earnings Surprises

    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2006
    JEFFREY T. DOYLE
    ABSTRACT We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time-series model of expected earnings, we document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown in previous studies. We show that our results hold after controlling for risk and previously documented anomalies, and are positive for every quarter between 1988 and 2000. Finally, we explore the financial results and information environment of firms with extreme earnings surprises and find that they tend to be "neglected" stocks with relatively high book-to-market ratios, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion. In the three subsequent years, firms with extreme positive earnings surprises tend to have persistent earnings surprises in the same direction, strong growth in cash flows and earnings, and large increases in analyst coverage, relative to firms with extreme negative earnings surprises. We also show that the returns to the earnings surprise strategy are highest in the quartile of firms where transaction costs are highest and institutional investor interest is lowest, consistent with the idea that market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large, sophisticated investors to exploit the inefficiencies. [source]


    A Temporal Analysis of Earnings Surprises: Profits versus Losses

    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2001
    Lawrence D. Brown
    I show that median earnings surprise has shifted rightward from small negative (miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet analyst estimates exactly) to small positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) during the 16 years, 1984 to 1999. I show that a rightward temporal shift in median surprise from negative to positive describes earnings, but neither profits nor losses. Median profit surprise shifts within the positive quadrant, from zero to one cent per share. Median loss surprise shifts within the negative quadrant from extreme negative (about -33 cents per share) to zero. I show that the median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses in every year. I document significant positive temporal trends in both meet and beat analyst estimates for both profits and losses, but I find a greater frequency of profits that either meet or beat analyst estimates in every year. I find a significant positive temporal trend in positive profits that are "a little bit of good news," and a significant negative temporal trend in managers who report losses that are an "extreme amount of bad news." My results are robust to the four internal validity threats I consider,namely temporal changes in: (1) analyst forecast accuracy, (2) the mix of earnings of one sign preceded by earnings of another sign four quarters ago, (3) the timeliness of the most recent analyst forecast, and (4) the I/B/E/S definition of actual earnings. I find that managers of growth firms are relatively more likely than managers of value firms to report good news profits. I show that when they do report positive profit surprises, managers of growth firms are more likely to report "a little bit of good news" in every year. [source]


    Driven to Distraction: Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earnings News

    THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 5 2009
    DAVID HIRSHLEIFER
    ABSTRACT Recent studies propose that limited investor attention causes market underreactions. This paper directly tests this explanation by measuring the information load faced by investors. The,investor distraction hypothesis,holds that extraneous news inhibits market reactions to relevant news. We find that the immediate price and volume reaction to a firm's earnings surprise is much weaker, and post-announcement drift much stronger, when a greater number of same-day earnings announcements are made by other firms. We evaluate the economic importance of distraction effects through a trading strategy, which yields substantial alphas. Industry-unrelated news and large earnings surprises have a stronger distracting effect. [source]


    To What Extent Does the Financial Reporting Process Curb Earnings Surprise Games?

    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2007
    LAWRENCE D. BROWN
    ABSTRACT Managers play earnings surprise games to avoid negative earnings surprises by managing earnings upward or by managing analysts' earnings expectations downward. We investigate the effectiveness of the financial reporting process at restraining earnings surprise games. Because the annual reporting process is subject to an independent audit and more rigorous expense recognition rules than interim reporting, it provides managers with fewer opportunities to manage earnings upward. We document that, relative to interim reporting, annual reporting reduces the likelihood of income-increasing earnings management and, to a lesser extent, of negative surprise avoidance, but increases the magnitude of downward expectations management. Our findings suggest that regulatory attempts to monitor corporations' internal checks and balances are likely to be more effective at curbing upward earnings management than at mitigating negative surprise avoidance. [source]


    The Extreme Future Stock Returns Following I/B/E/S Earnings Surprises

    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2006
    JEFFREY T. DOYLE
    ABSTRACT We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time-series model of expected earnings, we document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown in previous studies. We show that our results hold after controlling for risk and previously documented anomalies, and are positive for every quarter between 1988 and 2000. Finally, we explore the financial results and information environment of firms with extreme earnings surprises and find that they tend to be "neglected" stocks with relatively high book-to-market ratios, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion. In the three subsequent years, firms with extreme positive earnings surprises tend to have persistent earnings surprises in the same direction, strong growth in cash flows and earnings, and large increases in analyst coverage, relative to firms with extreme negative earnings surprises. We also show that the returns to the earnings surprise strategy are highest in the quartile of firms where transaction costs are highest and institutional investor interest is lowest, consistent with the idea that market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large, sophisticated investors to exploit the inefficiencies. [source]


    On the Market Reaction to Revenue and Earnings Surprises

    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2009
    Itay Kama
    Abstract:, This study extends Ertimur et al. (2003) and Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006a) by providing a contextual framework for the information content of revenue and earnings surprises. I find that the influence of earnings surprises (revenue surprises) on stock returns is lower (higher) in R&D intensive companies. Also, market reaction to earnings surprises is lower in the fourth quarter, and to revenue surprises it is higher in industries with oligopolistic competition. A comprehensive analysis indicates that, in contrast to previous studies for the full sample, in several contexts market reaction to earnings surprises is not higher than to revenue surprises. [source]


    Driven to Distraction: Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earnings News

    THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 5 2009
    DAVID HIRSHLEIFER
    ABSTRACT Recent studies propose that limited investor attention causes market underreactions. This paper directly tests this explanation by measuring the information load faced by investors. The,investor distraction hypothesis,holds that extraneous news inhibits market reactions to relevant news. We find that the immediate price and volume reaction to a firm's earnings surprise is much weaker, and post-announcement drift much stronger, when a greater number of same-day earnings announcements are made by other firms. We evaluate the economic importance of distraction effects through a trading strategy, which yields substantial alphas. Industry-unrelated news and large earnings surprises have a stronger distracting effect. [source]


    Capital Gains Tax Overhang and Price Pressure

    THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2006
    LI JIN
    ABSTRACT I study whether the capital gains tax is an impediment to selling by some investors and if so, to what degree associated delayed selling affects stock prices. I find that selling decisions by institutions serving tax-sensitive clients are sensitive to cumulative capital gains, a pattern not observed for institutions with predominantly tax-exempt clients. Moreover, tax-related underselling impacts stock prices during large earnings surprises for stocks held primarily by tax-sensitive investors. The corresponding price reactions are less negative (more positive) with higher cumulative capital gains. This price pressure pattern is more severe when arbitrage is more costly. [source]


    Information Uncertainty Risk and Seasonality in International Stock Markets

    ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2010
    Dongcheol Kim
    G14; G12 Abstract A parsimonious two-factor model containing the market risk factor and a risk factor related to earnings information uncertainty has been developed to explain the seasonal regularity of January in international stock markets. This two-factor model shows apparently stronger power in explaining time-series behavior of stock returns and the cross-section of average stock returns in all major developed countries than do the competing models. Furthermore, the arbitrage residual return in January, which is the difference in the average residual returns between the smallest and largest size portfolios, is statistically insignificant in all the countries. These results indicate that the risk factor related to earnings information uncertainty plays a special role in explaining the seasonal pattern of stock returns in January, and that January might be a month that potentially tends to differentially reward stocks having uncertain earnings information. It could be argued, therefore, that large returns in January might be a risk premium for taking information uncertainty risk concerning earnings and unexpected earnings surprises faced at the earnings announcement, and that the previously reported strong January seasonality in stock returns might result from the use of misspecified models in adjusting for risk. [source]


    The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Conference Calls: The Case of Earnings Surprises,

    ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 6 2009
    Bok Baik
    Abstract While conference calls have been widely used as a communication tool between firms and investors, little research has examined the effect of this voluntary disclosure metric on analyst forecasts. In this paper, we examine whether firms use conference calls to guide down analysts' earnings forecasts, thereby avoiding negative earnings surprises before and after Regulation FD. Our findings show that firms hosting conference calls are more likely to guide analysts' forecasts downward and, as a result, they tend to successfully avoid negative earnings surprises in the pre Reg FD period. However, we do not find such relations in the post Reg FD period. We also find that the market reacts positively to firms hosting conference calls only in the post Reg FD period, consistent with the view that the market rewards a reduction in managers' opportunistic guidance to meet the analysts' earnings estimate. [source]