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Earning Potential (earning + potential)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting50%

Selected Abstracts

COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ON THE INDIGENOUS ESTATE: A PROFIT-RELATED INVESTMENT PROPOSAL

ECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 3 2005
Jon Altman
This article assesses the state of commercial development and resource management on Indigenous land in remote Australia. Indigenous landowners control significant assets,over one million square kilometres of land,often with substantial resource rights and income earning potential. The inactivity and missed opportunities on the Indigenous estate are of such magnitude as to represent a major risk both for Indigenous landowning communities, in terms of their future economic and social well-being, and for national and international interests in terms of ecological vulnerability. The article explores the role of government as risk manager in such circumstances and outlines the principles that might underpin any intervention program targeted to the commercial development of Indigenous land. Using the analytical framework for profit-related loans and elements of an existing venture capital support programme, the Innovation Investment Fund Program, we outline the hypothetical skeleton of a new investment scheme to assist development and natural resource management on the Indigenous estate. Our proposal can be conceptualised as a profit-related loan scheme or as a form of capped public investment. It seeks to address key elements of the market failure that exists in relation to financing development on remote Indigenous land, provides incentives for greater private sector investment, and ensures that commercial and social risks are shared equitably between government, private sector investors and Indigenous-owned corporations to avoid problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. [source]

THE IMPERFECT MARKET FOR PLAYERS

ECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 4 2004
Braham Dabscheck
Professional team sports have developed a series of monopsonistic labour market rules that have severely limited the economic rights and income earning potential of players. These rules have been linked to the peculiar economics of professional team sports-the need of competitors to combine to produce a product (games). The paper identifies such rules. It also provides information on individual challenges by players to these rules before common law courts and collective action by players who formed player associations. The paper also outlines the trajectory of collective-bargaining negotiations in Australian rules football, soccer, rugby union, and cricket. [source]

On optimal income taxation with heterogeneous work preferences

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2007
Ritva Tarkiainen
C63; H21; H24 This paper considers the problem of optimal income taxation when individuals are assumed to differ with respect to their earnings potential and work preferences. A numerical method for solving this two-dimensional problem has been developed. We assume an additive utility function, and utilitarian social objectives. Rather than solve the first order conditions associated with the problem, we directly compute the best tax function, which can be written in terms of a second order B-spline function. Our findings show that marginal tax rates are higher than might be anticipated, and that very little bunching occurs at the optimum. Our simulation results show that the correlation between taste for work and productivity has a crucial role in determining the extent of redistribution in our model. [source]

Return Migration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK

BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 2 2007
Christian Dustmann
In this article, we discuss forms of migration that are non-permanent. We focus on temporary migrations where the decision to return is taken by the immigrant. These migrations are likely to be frequent, and we provide some evidence for the UK. We then develop a simple model that rationalizes the decision of a migrant to return to his/her home country, despite a persistently higher wage in the host country. We consider three motives for a temporary migration: (i) differences in relative prices between host and home country, (ii) complementarities between consumption and the location where consumption takes place, and (iii) the possibility of accumulating human capital abroad, which enhances the immigrant's earnings potential back home. For the last return motive, we discuss extensions that allow for immigrant heterogeneity, and develop implications for selective in- and out-migration. [source]