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Duopoly Market (duopoly + market)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Reach for the Stars: A Strategic Bidding Game

ECONOMICA, Issue 272 2001
Lynne M. Pepall
We examine two,sided competition in a duopoly market for differentiated products. Downstream, the two firms compete in prices. Upstream, they compete in bidding to hire talent input and there is one unique superstar. The outcome depends on the downstream effect of only one firm employing the superstar. When this intensifies downstream competition, both firms are worse off than they would be if no superstar talent were available. When the hiring of the superstar softens downstream competition, both firms benefit, but a ,winner's curse' emerges in which the firm winning the superstar talent earns less profit than its rival. [source]

Dynamic Competition with Experience Goods

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 1 2006
J. Miguel Villas-Boas
This paper considers dynamic competition in the case in which consumers are only able to learn about their preferences for a certain product after experiencing it. After trying a product a consumer has more information about that product than about untried products. When competing in such a market firms with more sales in the past have an informational advantage because more consumers know their products. If products provide a better-than-expected fit with greater likelihood, taking advantage of that informational advantage may lead to an informational disadvantage in the future. This paper considers this competition with an infinite horizon model in a duopoly market with overlapping generations of consumers. Two effects are identified: On one hand marginal forward-looking consumers realize that by purchasing a product in the current period will be charged a higher expected price in the future. This effect results in reduced price sensitivity and higher equilibrium prices. On the other hand, forward-looking firms realize that they gain in the future from having a greater market share in the current period and compete more aggressively in prices. For similar discount factors for consumers and firms, the former effect is more important, and prices are higher the greater the informational advantages. The paper also characterizes oscillating market share dynamics, and comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect to consumer and firm patience, and the importance of the experience in the ex post valuation of the product. [source]

Partial Ownership For The Public Firm And Competition

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2003
Sang-Ho Lee
This paper investigates the issue of partial ownership (partial privatization) of a state-owned public enterprise. We elaborate on the framework of Matsumura (1998) by allowing for managerial inefficiency, and show that under moderate conditions partial ownership is a reasonable choice of government in a monopoly market as well as in a mixed duopoly market, where a public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm. We also provide some economic rationale on the result that neither full privatization nor full nation-alization is optimum. [source]

The Impact of a Marginal Cost Increase on Price and Quality: Theory and Evidence from Airline Market Strikes

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2002
Pamela M. Schmitt
This paper examines the impact of a marginal cost increase for one firm on price and quality in a duopoly market. The results are derived theoretically and then tested empirically. The marginal cost increase is interpreted as an increase in the wage one firm pays its workers. The predictions are tested with two United States airline strikes during the 1990's. Quality is proxied in three ways: (1) the number of flights per day, (2) the percentage of flights cancelled, and (3) the percentage of flights arriving late. The results show that the strike coefficients for the effects on quality are most consistent with theoretical predictions when quality is measured as the number of flights per day. These results are encouraging because of the three measures of quality, it seems that number of flights per day is the measure of quality that is most controllable by the .rm. The strike coefficients for the direct effect on price are most consistent with theoretical predictions when quality rankings are determined by the percentage of flights cancelled. The strike coefficients for the total effect on price are most consistent with theoretical predictions when quality rankings are determined by the percentage of flights arriving late. [source]