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Disclosure Policies (disclosure + policy)
Selected AbstractsThe Psychological Attraction Approach to Accounting and Disclosure Policy,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2009David Hirshleifer First page of article [source] The Disclosure of UK Boardroom Pay: the March 2001 DTI proposalsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2001Martin J. Conyon In March 2001 the government announced that new disclosure rules relating to UK boardroom pay would be introduced. This paper critically evaluates these proposals. The new proposals emerged from the government's Directors Remuneration consultative document issued in July 1999. The current paper makes the following contributions to the governance literature. First, the new disclosure proposals are reviewed. I suggest that they are incomplete both in their detail and scope. I also suggest that the government has conceded that more US style executive compensation disclosure is required. Second, I describe US executive compensation disclosure practices. If convergence in disclosure practice is potentially desirable then a more systematic comparison and analysis of current disclosure policies in the two economies is warranted. [source] Disclosure of reserve quantum in the extractive industriesACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1-2 2001Malik Mirza We explore why some firms in the extractive industries disclose mineral reserve quantum in their annual reports and others do not. We propose that the firms' reserve disclosure policies are a function of the extent of information asymmetries, as well as information production, litigation and proprietary costs. More specifically, we propose that a firm's decisions to disclose reserves in the annual report are a function of the stage of the firm's operations, use of project financing, and the cost of measuring reserves. Empirical tests are confirmatory. [source] Voluntary Disclosure by State-owned Enterprises Listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong KongJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 2 2002Michael J. Ferguson This study examines the impact of international capital market pressures on the voluntary disclosure of three types of information (strategic, financial, and non-financial) in the annual reports of former wholly state-owned People's Republic of China (PRC) enterprises, listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). Consistent with a costbenefit framework, we find that PRC H-Share firms disclose significantly more strategic and financial information than other SEHK firms. Additional analysis of disclosures in their home listings on the PRC exchanges, however, suggests an alternative explanation. The fact that these firms have been selected for "showcasing" in international capital markets may also play a role in our findings. While H-Share firm disclosures in the PRC also appear sensitive to management's assessment of the associated costs, the magnitude of differences across listing locations suggests that disclosure practices on the SEHK may also reflect the effects of state-encouraged disclosure policies. Our findings contribute to the understanding of disclosure behavior among former wholly state-owned enterprises and to the emerging literature on the efficacy of the privatization process. [source] Multilateral development banks, transparency and corporate clients: ,public,private partnerships' and public access to informationPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 3 2003Paul J. Nelson The multilateral development banks (MDB) recognise and promote transparency as a principle of good governance. Public release of information about policies and projects is a central aspect of this transparency, and the five MDBs studied here each adopted new policies during the 1990s to increase the accessibility of such information. The flow of information to local communities is important to the effectiveness of MDBs' social and environmental safeguards and to securing public support. But MDBs also embrace a second strategy, which sometimes conflicts with transparency: each MDB (or an affiliate) lends to private corporations as well as to member states and each bank modifies its information disclosure rules, giving corporate clients greater discretion than member governments. Environmental and social safeguards apply to corporate borrowers as well as to governments and there is a relatively high level of controversy over corporate projects' environmental and social impact. When subjected to a qualitative review of their disclosure standards, emphasising fullness of disclosure, accessibility of information, timeliness of information and availability of recourse, the disclosure policies of all five MDBs are clearly found to accommodate corporate confidentiality while compromising public demands for information. Copyright � 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Transparency of Risk and Reward in U.K. Public,Private PartnershipsPUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE, Issue 4 2006JOHN HOOD Public,Private Partnerships (PPPs) are an increasingly common mechanism for the renewal of public sector infrastructure, although in the United Kingdom, these have been criticized as representing poor value for money. An inherent assumption of much of this criticism is that a corollary of detriment for the public sector is benefit for the private sector. This paper highlights the difficulty of objectively verifying the many criticisms and assumptions regarding risk and reward associated with PPPs. Public and private sector disclosure policies and systems are analyzed and we conclude that neither sector practices openness and transparency. This results in a democratic accountability deficit in the public sector and a lack of meaningful data being made available to stakeholders in private companies. [source] Voluntary Disclosure of Good and Bad Earnings News in a Low Litigation Setting,ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVES, Issue 4 2008Philip T. Sinnadurai ABSTRACT This study uses a historical setting in which expected litigation costs were low (i.e., Australia, from 1993 to 1996) to investigate whether companies with good news were more likely to preempt annual earnings than their counterparts with bad news. Empirical tests compare the probability of preemption conditional on having good news with the probability of preemption conditional on having bad news. The models control for other potential determinants of disclosure policy that have been documented in the literature. The results do not support the research hypothesis that companies with good news were more likely to preempt annual earnings than companies with bad news. This finding suggests that there may be other factors driving disclosure of bad news, in addition to those acknowledged in the extant literature. The evidence also indicates that in Australia during the investigation period, the probability of preemption was positively associated with firm size and analyst following and differed as a function of industry membership. [source] Making Financial Goals and Reporting Policies ServeJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2004Corporate Strategy: The Case of Progressive Insurance The main. nancial goal of Progressive Insurance, the third largest underwriter of auto insurance in the U.S., has remained the same since the late 1960s. Expressed in three words, "96 and grow," the goal tells the company's managers to pursue all growth opportunities while maintaining a "combined ratio" no higher than 96, or what amounts to a minimum 4% spread between revenues (premiums) and costs (including expected losses). Thanks in part to the clarity of mission provided by this goal, the company has produced an average 15% rate of growth in revenues and earnings, along with a remarkably stable 15% return for its shareholders, since going public in 1971. Progressive's simplicity and clarity of mission is also partly responsible for another of the company's distinctive policies: product pricing that, while disciplined, is aggressive and highly decentralized. Having invested some $500 million per year developing statistical models for pricing individual customer risks and acquisition costs, the company was among the. rst in its industry to underwrite "non-standard" risks. And aided by sophisticated pricing models, each of Progressive's 100 or so local product managers are charged with adapting those models to come up with premiums for their own regions. To go along with its strategic and organizational innovations, Progressive also has an innovative disclosure policy. Apart from SEC reports, the company's communications seldom mention earnings or earnings per share, and the company has never provided earnings guidance. With the passage of Reg. FD in late 2000, the company brie. y considered offering guidance. But in the spring of 2001, the board decided instead to provide monthly releases of its realized combined ratio. Since adoption of this new disclosure policy, Progressive has seen a 50% drop in the volatility of its stock price. [source] Regulatory Disclosure of Offending Companies in the Dutch Financial Market: Consumer Protection or Enforcement Publicity?LAW & POLICY, Issue 4 2010JUDITH VAN ERP Regulatory disclosure of names of offending companies is increasingly popular as an alternative to traditional command and control regulation. The goals and intended effects of disclosure are not always clear, however. Do regulators wish to increase their transparency, or do they intend to name and shame? This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the underlying working mechanism of regulatory disclosure of offenders' names through a case study of the Dutch Authority for Financial Markets' disclosure policy. It distinguishes two types of disclosure strategies: consumer oriented and firm oriented. The case study shows that although informing consumers was the primary purpose of disclosure as intended by the Dutch legislature, the purpose in practice has shifted to informing companies about the regulators' enforcement policy. The nature of the disclosed information makes it unlikely that disclosure adequately prevents financial risk taking by consumers. Instead of empowering consumers, disclosure has been incorporated in a traditional deterrence logic, turning out not to be an example of new governance but instead a modern version of command and control enforcement publicity. [source] Formal Policies and Special Informed Consent Are Associated with Higher Provider Utilization of CDC High-Risk Donor OrgansAMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION, Issue 3 2009L. M. Kucirka A new United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) policy mandates special informed consent (SIC) before transplanting organs from donors classified by the Public Health Service/Center for Disease Control (PHS/CDC) as high-risk donors (HRDs); however, concerns remain that this policy may cause suboptimal organ utilization. Currently, consent and disclosure policy is determined by individual centers or surgeons; as such, little is known about current practices. The goals of this study were to quantify consent and disclosure practices for HRDs in the United States, identify factors associated with SIC use and analyze associations between SIC use and HRD organ utilization. We surveyed 422 transplant surgeons about their use of HRD organs and their associated consent and disclosure practices. In total, 52.7% of surgeons use SIC, but there is a high variation in use within centers, between centers and by donor behavior. A defined HRD policy at a transplant center is strongly associated with SIC use at that center (OR = 4.68, p < 0.001 by multivariate hierarchical logistic regression). SIC use is associated with higher utilization of HRD livers (OR 3.37), and a trend toward higher utilization of HRD kidneys (OR 1.74) and pancreata (OR 1.28). We believe our findings support a formalized national policy and suggest that this policy will not result in decreased utilization. [source] | ||||||||||