Administration Policy (administration + policy)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Selected Abstracts

Abuse, Torture, Frames, and the Washington Post

Douglas V. Porpora
W. Bennett, R. Lawrence, and S. Livingston (2006, 2007) argue that the press,and the Washington Post in particular,acquiesced to Bush administration framing of the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. The administration, they say, framed the events as the isolated abuse of prisoners by "a few bad apples" unreflective of higher responsibility or administration policy. Absent,or near absent, Bennett et al. maintain, was a Post counterframe of the mistreatment as a systematic effect of high level policy, better captured by the word torture. Such pattern of framing, Bennett et al. conclude, supports the Indexing model of U.S. press behavior. This article shows that Bennett et al. understate the strength and consistency of Post counterframing. When articles in the Post are searched not for individual words but for more extended frames, it becomes clear that the Post did in fact engage in considerable counterframing even in the absence of elite political opposition. This case, it is therefore concluded, does not in fact support the Indexing model as Bennett et al. maintain but is rather the kind of case described by R. M. Entman (2004) in which the press exercises greater independence of elite political opinion than the Indexing model admits. W. Bennett, R. Lawrence et S. Livingston (2006, 2007) soutiennent que la presse , et en particulier le Washington Post, ont accepté le cadrage qu'a offert l'administration Bush des mauvais traitements infligés aux prisonniers d'Abou Ghraib. L'administration, disent-ils, a cadré les événements comme étant des actes isolés d'abus de prisonniers par quelques « pommes pourries », sans engager la responsabilité d'instances plus élevées ou de politiques administratives. Ce qui était absent (ou presque absent) des reportages, soutiennent Bennett et al., était un contre-cadrage par le Post des mauvais traitements comme étant plutôt un effet systématique des politiques de haut niveau, ce qui se reflète mieux dans le terme « torture ». Un tel cadrage, concluent Bennett et al., soutient le modèle d'indexation du comportement de la presse américaine. Cet article montre que Bennett et al. sous-estiment la force et la cohérence du contre-cadrage du Post. Lorsque l'on cherche, dans les articles du Post, des cadres plus étendus que des mots individuels, il devient clair que le Post a en fait réalisé un contre-cadrage considérable, même en l'absence d'opposition de la part de l'élite politique. Nous concluons donc que ce cas ne soutient pas le modèle d'indexation, comme Bennett et al. l'affirment, mais qu'il est plutôt du type de cas décrit par R. M. Entman (2004), un cas où la presse exerce une plus grande indépendance par rapport à l'opinion de l'élite politique que ne l'admet le modèle d'indexation. W. Bennett, R. Lawrence und S. Livingston (2006, 2007) argumentieren, dass die Presse , und insbesondere die Washington Post , das Framing der Bush-Regierung bezüglich der Misshandlung von Gefangenen in Abu Ghraib duldete. Die Regierung, so die Autoren, framte die Ereignisse als den isolierten Missbrauch von Gefangenen durch einige wenige und reflektierte dabei eben nicht die übergeordneten Verantwortlichkeiten oder die Verwaltungspolitik. Gänzlich oder fast gefehlt hat laut Bennett et al. ein Gegenframe der Post zum Missbrauch als ein systematischer Effekt übergeordneter Politik, welcher besser mit dem Wort Folter gefasst wäre. Derartige Framing-Muster, so Bennett et al., stützen das Indexing-Modell des Verhaltens der amerikanischen Presse. Vorliegender Artikel zeigt, dass Bennett et al. das Ausmaß und die Kontinuität des Gegenframings durch die Post unterbewerten. Durchsucht man die Artikel der Post nicht nur nach Einzelwörtern sondern nach erweiterten Frames, zeigt sich deutlich, dass die Post sehr wohl Counterframing betrieben hat, und das obwohl eine politische Elite-Opposition gefehlt hat. Dieser Fall stützt also das Indexing-Modell wie Bennett et al. es darstellen gerade nicht, sondern ist eher ein Fall wie R.M. Entman (2004) ihn beschreibt, in dem die Presse größere Unabhängigkeit von der politischen Elitemeinung äußert als das Indexing-Modell zulässt. Resumen W. Bennett, R. Lawrence, y S. Livingston (2006, 2007) sostienen que la prensa,y el Washington Post en particular,acordaron con la administración de Bush en el encuadre sobre el maltrato de los prisioneros de Abu Ghraib. La administración, dicen, encuadró los eventos como abusos aislados de los prisioneros por parte de ,,un par de manzanas podridas" acríticos de la responsabilidad superior o de las políticas de la administración. La ausencia,o casi ausencia, Bennett et al. sostienen, fue el contra-encuadre del Post sobre el maltrato como un efecto sistemático de las políticas de alto nivel, mejor capturado por la palabra tortura. Esa pauta de encuadre, Bennett et al. concluyen, apoya al modelo de Indexación del comportamiento de la prensa de los EE.UU. Este artículo muestra que Bennett et al. subestimaron la fuerza y la consistencia del contra-encuadre del Post. Cuando los artículos en el Post son buscados no por las palabras individuales sino por los encuadres más extendidos, resulta claro que el Post en realidad participa en contra-encuadres considerables aún en la ausencia de la oposición política de elite. Este caso, por lo tanto se concluye, que en realidad no apoya al modelo de Indexación que Bennett et al. sostienen pero es el tipo de caso descrito por R.M. Entman (2004) en el cual la prensa ejercita una gran independencia de la opinión política de elite que lo que admite el modelo de la Indexación. [source]

Admiralty Law and Neutrality Policy in the 1790s: An Example of Judicial, Legislative, and Executive Cooperation

Elliott Ashkenazi
The subject of admiralty law may have lost much of its luster over the years, but during the first decades of the nation's existence this branch of the law provided a vehicle for establishing foreign policy principles that helped protect the new nation. The admiralty cases that reached the U.S. Supreme Court in the mid-1790s were important to administration policy in the realm of foreign affairs and to the Court's own development as an independent arm of the national government. [source]

The Rift: Explaining Europe's Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of the American-Led War on Iraq

America's plan to attack Iraq split Europe down the middle. Why did European countries take such different stances toward the Bush administration's policy? This article examines three different approaches, each rooted in one of international relations (IRs) prominent schools of thought, with regard to their explanatory power in this specific puzzle. Firstly, it shows that public opinion (utilitarian,liberal approach) cannot account for whether a state joined the "coalition of the willing" or not. Secondly, it demonstrates that in Eastern Europe systemic forces of power relations (neorealist approach) are suitable for explaining state behavior, but not in Western Europe. Thirdly, it shows that the ideological orientations of governments (liberal,constructivist approach) were the decisive factor in determining whether a state supported the United States in Western Europe, but not in Eastern Europe. These results offer some interesting insights for the theoretical debate in IRs theory and foreign policy analysis, which are discussed in the final section of the article. In regard to foreign policy analysis, for example, the results of this study propose to "bring political parties in." [source]

G.W. Bush and North Korea: A Levels of Analysis View

PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 1 2007
Curtis H. Martin
This study describes and evaluates, from the perspective of pertinent system, state, and individual level theory, the unfolding of the Bush administration's strategy for addressing the North Korea nuclear issue up to the February 2007 Beijing agreement on first steps toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. It will explore whether that policy has been "effective harmony of different goals," as the administration has claimed, or something far less coherent and effective. At its inception, the administration's policy was grounded in a strong, though by no means universally held,preference for "asphyxiation" rather than "oxygen," for pressure and isolation rather than for rewards. However, this default policy was constrained at almost every turn by system and state level realities that drove the United States to eschew forceful unilateral action and to pursue its objectives through multilateral regional diplomacy. And yet throughout the years of six-party talks, the strong preference of core decision makers for isolation continued,pending what they hoped would be a more propitious environment to pursue a forward leaning policy,to rein in U.S. negotiators. As a result, U.S. policy often appeared to exhibit characteristics of "temporary appeasement,""hawk engagement" and "malign neglect" in which negotiations assume a primarily tactical role rather than a wholehearted effort to engage the DPRK. The apparent success of financial sanctions, coupled with the international shock wave that followed North Korea's missile and nuclear tests, might have been expected to give administration hawks the long-awaited opportunity to pursue their default policy. Despite the successes enjoyed by new financial sanctions, however, U.S. policy remained as constrained as ever by the grave deterioration of the United States' position in the Middle East and the unanticipated shift of power in congress. These constraints may in part explain the dramatic about-face in the administration's position that led ultimately to the February 13, 2007 agreement to offer the DPRK an "early harvest" in exchange for initial steps toward denuclearization. [source]

The U.S. Policy and Strategy toward DPRK: Comparison and Evalution of the Clinton and Bush Administrations

PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2002
Hun Kyung Lee
This article focuses on studying and evaluating the Clinton and Bush administrations' policies and strategies toward North Korea. The Clinton administration's policy toward North Korea was a continuation of the abandonment of containment and confrontation strategies of the Cold War era. That policy was based on a strategic transfer of power for the purpose of preventing a war, through a combination of aid and deterrence in the Korean peninsula by its engagement policy. The Administration believed that additional food aid and easing of economic sanctions would make a contribution to North Korean survival, and hence, a reduction in its bellicose disposition. Providing that this policy continued, it would be possible not merely to lead North Korea's change, but also to help it enter into international society by breaking down its self-imposed isolation. To the contrary, the Bush administration points out that the Clinton administration's engagement policy did not lead to North Korea's change, and even left the wrong precedent in nuclear and missile negotiations. Focusing on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction with an emphasis of transparency, monitoring, and verification, the Bush administration has claimed a broad agenda. This includes an improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities, verifiable control over North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports, and a less threatening conventional military posture. With the different views of these two administrations as a background, this article explores the U.S. efforts for achieving such policy goals as freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program and halting its missile development and sales, together with looking at North Korea's response. American efforts for supporting the necessities for life, easing of some economic sanctions toward DPRK are also described. At the same time, the U.S. policy toward DPRK is evaluated on the whole in considering U.S. policy limits for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of effort by North Korea for peacemaking and survival, and inconsistency on U.S. assistance. Lastly, this article suggests a way for an alternative solution by thinking about some dilemmas for the U.S. and the DPRK. [source]