Differentiated Products (differentiated + products)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


THE SURVIVAL OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS: AN APPLICATION TO THE UK AUTOMOBILE MARKET, 1971,2002*

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 3 2009
FRANCISCO REQUENA-SILVENTE
We investigate how competition affected the survival of products in the UK automobile market between 1971 and 2002. We find, after using a host of controls to account for product characteristics and changes in market structure, that (i) within and between firm spatial competition significantly reduces the life of a model, (ii) initial product differentiation and variant proliferation obviate competition, and (iii) product innovation significantly extends model survival. [source]


Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 2 2001
Aviv Nevo
The ready-to-eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration, high price-cost margins, large advertising-to-sales ratios, and numerous introductions of new products. Previous researchers have concluded that the ready-to-eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition. This paper empirically examines this conclusion. In particular, I estimate price-cost margins, but more importantly I am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources: (i) that which is due to product differentiation; (ii) that which is due to multi-product firm pricing; and (iii) that due to potential price collusion. The results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal, the first two effects explain most of the observed price-cost margins. I conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior, despite the high price-cost margins. Leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality. It is these two factors that lead to high price-cost margins. [source]


Reach for the Stars: A Strategic Bidding Game

ECONOMICA, Issue 272 2001
Lynne M. Pepall
We examine two,sided competition in a duopoly market for differentiated products. Downstream, the two firms compete in prices. Upstream, they compete in bidding to hire talent input and there is one unique superstar. The outcome depends on the downstream effect of only one firm employing the superstar. When this intensifies downstream competition, both firms are worse off than they would be if no superstar talent were available. When the hiring of the superstar softens downstream competition, both firms benefit, but a ,winner's curse' emerges in which the firm winning the superstar talent earns less profit than its rival. [source]


A Practitioner's Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of Demand

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2000
Aviv Nevo
Estimation of demand is at the heart of many recent studies that examine questions of market power, mergers, innovation, and valuation of new brands in differentiated-products markets. This paper focuses on one of the main methods for estimating demand for differentiated products: random-coefficients logit models. The paper carefully discusses the latest innovations in these methods with the hope of increasing the understanding, and therefore the trust among researchers who have never used them, and reducing the difficulty of their use, thereby aiding in realizing their full potential. [source]


Exchange Rates and Cash Flows in Differentiated Product Industries: A Simulation Approach

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 5 2007
RICHARD FRIBERG
ABSTRACT How do exchange rate changes impact firms' cash flows? We extend a simulation method developed in industrial organization to answer this question. We use prices, quantities, and product characteristics for differentiated products, coupled with a discrete choice framework and an assumption of price competition, to estimate marginal costs for all producers. Using a Monte Carlo approach we generate counterfactual prices and profits for different levels of exchange rates. We illustrate the method using the market for bottled water. Our results stress that even in a relatively simple market such as this one, different brands face very different exchange rate risks. [source]


Properties of scoring auctions

THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2008
John Asker
This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests, and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds. [source]


Demand Diversification Under Uncertainty and Market Power

ASIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 4 2001
John J. Y. Seo
This paper justifies theoretically and empirically the diversification behaviour of an importing firm when it chooses the mixture of potentially differentiated products of its major input under price uncertainty. The paper investigates an equilibrium relationship among three key explanatory variables, which are the expected price, the systematic risk of price, and monopolistic market power of the suppliers in the market. The theoretical section shows that there exists a conflict between the risk,diversification effect and the agent's preference over certain products when the importer chooses the vector of optimal quantity shares. The latter effect may disturb or even dominate the former, which can be represented in an equilibrium relationship similar to the framework of the CAPM. As an empirical application, the Chinese wheat import market is examined and analysed to answer the questions raised by the basic statistics. JEL classification: F12; F14; L22 [source]


Market share, cost-based dumping, and anti-dumping policy

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2000
Thusnelda Tivig
This paper studies the occurrence of dumping and the implications of anti-dumping duties in a deterministic price-setting two-period duopoly model for differentiated products. When current market shares matter for future demand, cost-based dumping can be profitable. Dumping thus arises as a form of investment in market shares. This might trigger the application of anti-dumping law. We further show that correctly anticipated duties do not necessarily hinder firms from selling below costs. The mere existence of anti-dumping law, however, significantly changes the structure of the game, leading to higher first-period prices for both firms. JEL Classification: F12, F13 Parts de marché, dumping défini par les coûts, et politiques anti-dumping. Ce mémoire étudie le phénomène de dumping et les implications des droits compensatoires anti-dumping dans un modèle de duopole de produits différenciés dans un cadre de deux périodes où le processus de définition des prix est déterministe. Quand la nature présente des parts de marché a des cons´equences sur la demande future, le dumping défini par les coûts peut être profitable. Dans ce cas, le dumping émerge en tant que forme d'investissement dans le renforcement des parts de marché. Voilà qui peut déclencher l'application de la loi anti-dumping. On montre que des droits compensatoires correctement anticipés n'empêchent pas nécessairement les entreprises de vendre à des prix plus bas que leurs coûts. Cependant, le seul fait de l'existence de la loi anti-dumping modifie substantiellement la structure du jeu et conduit les deux entreprises àétablir des prix plus élevés dans la première période. [source]