Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Deterrence
Kinds of Deterrence Selected AbstractsTHE SHORT-TERM EFFECTS OF EXECUTIONS ON HOMICIDES: DETERRENCE, DISPLACEMENT, OR BOTH?,CRIMINOLOGY, Issue 4 2009KENNETH C. LAND Does the death penalty save lives? In recent years, a new round of research has been using annual time-series panel data from the 50 U.S. states for 25 or so years from the 1970s to the late 1990s that claims to find many lives saved through reductions in subsequent homicide rates after executions. This research, in turn, has produced a round of critiques, which concludes that these findings are not robust enough to model even small changes in specifications that yield dramatically different results. A principal reason for this sensitivity of the findings is that few state-years exist (about 1 percent of all state-years) in which six or more executions have occurred. To provide a different perspective, we focus on Texas, a state that has used the death penalty with sufficient frequency to make possible relatively stable estimates of the homicide response to executions. In addition, we narrow the observation intervals for recording executions and homicides from the annual calendar year to monthly intervals. Based on time-series analyses and independent-validation tests, our best-fitting model shows that, from January 1994 through December 2005, evidence exists of modest, short-term reductions in homicides in Texas in the first and fourth months that follow an execution,about 2.5 fewer homicides total. Another model suggests, however, that in addition to homicide reductions, some displacement of homicides may be possible from one month to another in the months after an execution, which reduces the total reduction in homicides after an execution to about .5 during a 12-month period. Implications for additional research and the need for future analysis and replication are discussed. [source] THE IMPACT OF BRITISH COUNTERTERRORIST STRATEGIES ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: COMPARING DETERRENCE AND BACKLASH MODELS,CRIMINOLOGY, Issue 1 2009GARY LAFREE Since philosophers Beccaria and Bentham, criminologists have been concerned with predicting how governmental attempts to maintain lawful behavior affect subsequent rates of criminal violence. In this article, we build on prior research to argue that governmental responses to a specific form of criminal violence,terrorism,may produce both a positive deterrence effect (i.e., reducing future incidence of prohibited behavior) and a negative backlash effect (i.e., increasing future incidence of prohibited behavior). Deterrence-based models have long dominated both criminal justice and counterterrorist policies on responding to violence. The models maintain that an individual's prohibited behavior can be altered by the threat and imposition of punishment. Backlash models are more theoretically scattered but receive mixed support from several sources, which include research on counterterrorism; the criminology literature on labeling, legitimacy, and defiance; and the psychological literature on social power and decision making. In this article, we identify six major British strategies aimed at reducing political violence in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1992 and then use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the impact of these interventions on the risk of new attacks. In general, we find the strongest support for backlash models. The only support for deterrence models was a military surge called Operation Motorman, which was followed by significant declines in the risk of new attacks. The results underscore the importance of considering the possibility that antiterrorist interventions might both increase and decrease subsequent violence. [source] SELF-CONTROL, CRIMINAL MOTIVATION AND DETERRENCE: AN INVESTIGATION USING RUSSIAN RESPONDENTSCRIMINOLOGY, Issue 2 2005CHARLES R. TITTLE With data from respondents in Nizhni Novgorod, Russia, we address the generality of self-control theory. We also assess two hypotheses. The first focuses on the attractiveness of criminal acts, that is, motivation toward crime. The second concerns the contention that the mediating link between self-control and criminal conduct is the failure of those with less self-control to anticipate the long-term costs of misbehavior. Although the magnitude of associations between self-control and indicators of criminal behavior is about the same in this study as it is in others, which suggests that the theory is not culturally bound, those associations are largely overshadowed by criminal attraction. Consistent with that, failure to anticipate costly long-term consequences does not appear to be the mediating link between self-control and criminal behavior: the evidence shows no tendency for sanction fear to be greater among those with greater self-control. In fact, sanction fear is modestly and significantly related to the crime measures independent of self-control, though sanction fear also appears to be influenced by criminal attraction. The results suggest that in the production of criminal behavior, motivation may be more important than controls inhibiting criminal impulses. [source] INTEGRATING CELERITY, IMPULSIVITY, AND EXTRALEGAL SANCTION THREATS INTO A MODEL OF GENERAL DETERRENCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE,CRIMINOLOGY, Issue 4 2001DANIEL S. NAGIN We propose a model that integrates the extralegal consequences from conviction and impulsivity into the traditional deterrence framework. The model was tested with 252 college students, who completed a survey concerning drinking and driving. Key findings include the following: (1) Although variation in sanction certainty and severity predicted offending, variation in celerity did not; (2) the extralegal consequences from conviction appear to be at least as great a deterrent as the legal consequences; (3) the influence of sanction severity diminished with an individual's "present-orientation"; and (4) the certainty of punishment was far more robust a deterrent to offending than was the severity of punishment. [source] DETERRENCE, CONTEXT, AND CRIME DECISION MAKINGCRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY, Issue 1 2008GREG POGARSKY First page of article [source] DETERRENCE: CREDIBILITY AND PROPORTIONALITYECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2009DANIEL G. ARCE This paper extends the analysis of deterrence to examine terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and rogue nations. Such situations are characterized by differential pre-emptive and response capacity, in contrast to the traditional deterrence literature on nuclear superpowers, where such factors are absent. We focus on the credibility of deterrence responses to pre-emption and show that credible (subgame-perfect) responses are rarely proportional. The analysis is also extended to asymmetric deterrence scenarios whereby credibility and proportionality depend on the potential aggressor's access to conflict technology and the responder's preferences for indirect conflict vs. the status quo. [source] EFFORT SUBSIDIES AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIESNATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 3 2001JOHN QUINN ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes a two-stage game, based on the Gordon-Schaefer model of the fishery, to examine the strategic entry-deterring role for effort subsidies in noncooper-ative transboundary fisheries. The game reveals that a country, whose domestic fleet has an effort cost advantage over a rival foreign fleet, may choose to subsidize domestic effort to the point that foreign entry in the fishery becomes unprofitable. Whether the outcome of the game is characterized by foreign entry deterrence or accommodation, and whether it is also characterized by a domestic effort subsidy or a tax, depends on domestic and foreign effort costs and the number of firms in each fleet. The various outcomes of the game analyzed here help to explain the persistence of subsidies in some world fisheries. [source] FAILING FIRM DEFENCE WITH ENTRY DETERRENCEBULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 4 2010Alessandro Fedele K21; L13; L41 ABSTRACT Under the principle of the failing firm defence a merger that would be blocked due to its harmful effect on competition could be nevertheless allowed when (i) the acquired firm is actually failing, (ii) there is no less anticompetitive alternative offer of purchase, (iii) absent the merger, the assets to be acquired would exit the market. We focus on potential anticompetitive effects of a myopic application of the requirement (iii) by studying consequences of a horizontal merger on entry in a Cournot oligopoly with a failing firm. Entry is deterred if the merger is cleared and, when the industry is highly concentrated, consumer welfare is higher under a prohibition because long-run gains due to augmented competition exceed short-run losses due to shortage of output. [source] THE IMPACT OF BRITISH COUNTERTERRORIST STRATEGIES ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: COMPARING DETERRENCE AND BACKLASH MODELS,CRIMINOLOGY, Issue 1 2009GARY LAFREE Since philosophers Beccaria and Bentham, criminologists have been concerned with predicting how governmental attempts to maintain lawful behavior affect subsequent rates of criminal violence. In this article, we build on prior research to argue that governmental responses to a specific form of criminal violence,terrorism,may produce both a positive deterrence effect (i.e., reducing future incidence of prohibited behavior) and a negative backlash effect (i.e., increasing future incidence of prohibited behavior). Deterrence-based models have long dominated both criminal justice and counterterrorist policies on responding to violence. The models maintain that an individual's prohibited behavior can be altered by the threat and imposition of punishment. Backlash models are more theoretically scattered but receive mixed support from several sources, which include research on counterterrorism; the criminology literature on labeling, legitimacy, and defiance; and the psychological literature on social power and decision making. In this article, we identify six major British strategies aimed at reducing political violence in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1992 and then use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the impact of these interventions on the risk of new attacks. In general, we find the strongest support for backlash models. The only support for deterrence models was a military surge called Operation Motorman, which was followed by significant declines in the risk of new attacks. The results underscore the importance of considering the possibility that antiterrorist interventions might both increase and decrease subsequent violence. [source] Campaign War Chests, Entry Deterrence, and Voter RationalityECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2002Dhammika Dharmapala It is often claimed that the accumulation of "war chests" by incumbents deters entry by high,quality challengers in Congressional elections. This paper presents a game,theoretic analysis of the interaction between an incumbent, potential challengers, an interest group, and a representative (rational) voter, where the incumbent's "quality" (or "legislative effectiveness") is known to the interest group, but not to the voter or to potential challengers. Under certain conditions, a perfectly revealing equilibrium exists; the incumbent signals her quality by raising funds from the interest group to accumulate a war chest. The entry deterrence effect thus operates solely through the role of war chests in signaling incumbent quality. [source] Nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-useINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2009DAVID JAMES GILL The two books under review, The tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons, by T. V. Paul and Deterrence: from Cold War to long war. Lessons from six decades of RAND research, by Austin Long, highlight the continued interest in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Long traces the RAND Corporation's research on the subject, exploring the role that nuclear deterrence has played as a strategy of the Cold War. The author goes on to argue for the relevance of nuclear deterrence to the future strategic environment, considering threats from peer-competitors to non-state actors. By contrast Paul considers the rise and persistence of a tradition, or informal social norm, of non-use which has encouraged self-deterrence. Employing a series of examples, Paul argues that this tradition best explains why, since 1945, nuclear states have not used nuclear weapons against non-nuclear opponents. Taken together, these books encourage further consideration of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the two practices can successfully coexist if non-nuclear states have, as Paul suggests, already begun to exploit the existence of a tradition of non-use. Such deterrence failures, real or perceived, have profound implications for relationships between nuclear and non-nuclear states. [source] Immigration as Local Politics: Re-Bordering Immigration and Multiculturalism through Deterrence and IncapacitationINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2009LIETTE GILBERT Small town governments in North America have, in recent years, posed the most aggressive challenge to national immigration policy and multiculturalism. Immigration-related municipal ordinances were introduced by local officials to defend the rights of local residents from the adverse effects of (unauthorized) immigration. Municipal measures proposed to control im/migrants not only present a constitutional challenge to the federal pre-emption in matters of immigration law (which ineptitude they purport to redress), they expand on what Didier Bigo called a ,governmentality of unease', where migration is increasingly rationalized as a security problem. Municipal measures are re-bordering the inclusion/exclusion of (unauthorized) migrants by expanding the territorial and political rationality of immigration control from the border to the interior, and by imposing and dispersing new mechanisms of control into the everyday spaces and practices of im/migrants regarded as ,illegal' and undesirable. This article examines two immigration-related municipal measures (Hazleton, PA and Hérouxville, QC) which impose a logic of immigration control and identity protection through deterrence and incapacitation strategies, and thus erode civil rights of im/migrants. Résumé Certaines petites municipalités nord-américaines ont récemment bousculé les politiques d'immigration nationales et le multiculturalisme. Les autorités locales en question ont fait voter des arrêtés municipaux liés à l'immigration afin de défendre les droits de leurs concitoyens contre les perceptions néfastes de l'immigration (irrégulière). Tout en représentant un défi constitutionnel à l'égard de la préemption fédérale en matière de législation sur l'immigration (dont l'inadéquation est censée être corrigée), les propositions municipales de contrôler les (im)migrants prolongent ce que Didier Bigo a appelé une ,gouvernementalité du malaise' qui voit de plus en plus la migration comme un problème de sécurité. Les mesures municipales redessinent les limites de l'inclusion-exclusion des migrants (irréguliers) en amenant, de la frontière jusqu'à l'intérieur, la logique territoriale et politique propre au contrôle de l'immigration, tout en imposant et en diffusant de nouveaux mécanismes de contrôle dans les pratiques et espaces quotidiens des (im)migrants jugés ,illégaux' et indésirables. L'article étudie deux mesures municipales liées à l'immigration (à Hazleton en Pennsylvanie et à Hérouxville au Québec), lesquelles dictent une logique de contrôle de l'immigration et de protection identitaire au travers de stratégies de dissuasion et de création d'incapacités; ce faisant, ces dispositions amoindrissent les droits civils des (im)migrants. [source] Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive DiplomacyINTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 2 2006MARIA SPERANDEI Despite decades of research on coercive diplomacy, the linkage between deterrence and compellence still remains unexplored. The present essay provides both a theoretical and empirical analysis of why studying their linked relationship is desirable. After overviewing the literature, it investigates the interplay between US strategies of deterrence and compellence in the First Gulf Crisis (1990,1991), suggesting that the deterrence,compellence linkage is stronger when the two strategies coexist or after they have coexisted. In particular, such a linkage was absent at the beginning of the First Gulf Crisis but very much present from the middle of the crisis until its end. Although this essay represents only a preliminary foray into exploring the potential linkage between deterrence and compellence, it appears that a better grasp of this relationship could provide us with the tools to counteract as well as reduce the negative effects of miscalculation and misperception, practices that are partially responsible for unpredicted and unwanted outcomes in international politics. [source] Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure MarketsJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 3 2005Leemore S. Dafny Strategic investment models, though popular in the theoretical literature, have rarely been tested empirically. This paper develops a model of strategic investment in inpatient procedure markets, which are well-suited to empirical tests of this behavior. Potential entrants are easy to identify in such markets, enabling the researcher to accurately estimate the entry threat faced by different incumbents. I derive straightforward empirical tests of entry deterrence from a model of patient demand, procedure quality, and differentiated product competition. Using hospital data on electrophysiological studies, an invasive cardiac procedure, I find evidence of entry-deterring investment. These findings suggest that competitive motivations play a role in treatment decisions. [source] Executions, Deterrence, and Homicide: A Tale of Two CitiesJOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2010Franklin E. Zimring We compare homicide rates in two quite similar cities with vastly different execution risks. Singapore had an execution rate close to one per million per year until an explosive 20-fold increase in 1994,1995 and 1996 to a level that we show was probably the highest in the world. Then, over the next 11 years, Singapore executions dropped by about 95 percent. Hong Kong, by contrast, had no executions at all during the last generation and abolished capital punishment in 1993. Homicide levels and trends are remarkably similar in these two cities over the 35 years after 1973, with neither the surge in Singapore executions nor the more recent steep drop producing any differential impact. By comparing two closely matched places with huge contrasts in actual execution but no differences in homicide trends, we have generated a unique test of the exuberant claims of deterrence that have been produced over the past decade in the United States. [source] An Economic Analysis of Academic Dishonesty and Its Deterrence in Higher EducationJOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES EDUCATION, Issue 2 2008Stephen K. Happel [source] Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical ArithmeticJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2008ERIC LANGLAIS This paper extends Malik's analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public expenditures in the detection of criminals are strategic complements in the aggregate technology of control of illegal behaviors. In this set up, we show that whenever criminals' avoidance efforts are more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity of sanctions, it is always socially efficient to set the fine at the maximal possible level. However, several paradoxical consequences occur: there may exist overdeterrence at optimum; more repressive policies lead to fewer arrests of offenders while more crimes may be committed; at the same time, the society may be closer to the first best number of crimes. [source] Wage Commitment, Signalling, and Entry Deterrence or AccommodationLABOUR, Issue 4 2006Rupayan Pal The wage carries information about market demand, which is crucial to an uninformed entrant, and in addition affects the entrant's post-entry cost through labour market institutions. The union may wish to deter or accommodate entry depending on whether the entrant will hire from a different source or from the union. Equilibrium wage is distorted downwardly (upwardly) for deterrence (accommodation); but because of wage correlation a low (high) wage can also turn entry profitable (unprofitable). Therefore, separating equilibrium may not always exist, and entry outcomes may be inefficient. [source] Nuclear Deterrence and Animosity in Japan-North Korean Relations: Steps to CoexistencePACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 1 2006Anthony DiFilippo The relationship between Japan and North Korea continues to be characterized by a considerable amount of animus and distrust, their geographical proximity notwithstanding. While the "history problem" still creates antagonism in the bilateral relationship, several other matters, such as the North Korean nuclear crisis and the missile and abduction issues, have not made the prospects for rapprochement especially good. Also not helping to better this very strained bilateral relationship is Japan's recent willingness to strengthen its security alliance with the United States and Washington's policy toward North Korea, which Pyongyang sees as uncompromising and hubristic. Of particular concern is that both Japan and North Korea reason that a real or claimed nuclear deterrent force is necessary for the purpose of national security. This article argues that Tokyo and Pyongyang need to implement bold measures that palpably demonstrate their commitment to improving bilateral ties, stressing that trust-building actions are important for them to experience peaceful coexistence. [source] Vaporware as a Means of Entry DeterrenceTHE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2003Marco A. Haan Firms in the computer industry are often accused of vaporware, the untruthful pre-announcement of a new version of their product. By claiming they have a new product, critics argue, these firms try to deter potential entrants. The paper analyzes this phenomenon. It shows that vaporware is an equilibrium strategy in a signaling game in which the possibility to market a new product is private information. In this model, the possibility of vaporware can hurt consumers, also in the case the incumbent does have a new version of its product. The welfare effects of vaporware are ambiguous. [source] Deterrence and Incapacitation Effects in a Closed Area: A Case Study of Auto Theft in TaiwanASIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 3 2010Hung-Lin Tao K42; R19 Deterrence and incapacitation effects of auto theft are estimated with a full consideration of substitution effects across crime types and across districts in a closed area in which none of the effects will leak out. It is found that the increase in the cleared rate of auto theft crime in a certain district and in other districts strongly deters the auto theft in that district, indicating that the across-district deterrence effect dominates the across-district substitution effect. The across-crime deterrence effect significantly exceeds the across-crime substitution effect for close crime (general theft), but is insignificant for distant crime (violence). [source] Lifetime Employment Contract and Strategic Entry Deterrence: Cournot and BertrandAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2001Kazuhiro Ohnishi This paper is based on a two-stage model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant, and studies both quantity-setting competition and price-setting competition. We consider a lifetime-employment-contract policy as a strategic commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve. Furthermore, demand functions are classified into two cases in terms of the strategic relevance between both firms. Therefore, we examine the following four cases: ,quantity-setting competition with strategic substitutes', ,quantity-setting competition with strategic complements', ,price-setting competition with strategic substitutes' and ,price-setting competition with strategic complements'. The purpose of this paper is to analyse entry deterrence in the four cases and to show the effectiveness of the lifetime-employment-contract policy as a result of its analyses. [source] Import Quotas and Entry DeterrenceAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 2 2000Neil Campbell Using a simple version of the Milgrom and Roberts entry deterrence model, it is shown that adjusting a quota so that a greater volume of imports is allowed, can facilitate entry into the domestic industry. That is, the easing of a quota, can cause the domestic incumbent to shift from deterring entry to accommodating entry. [source] Toxicity and Synergism in the Feeding Deterrence of Some Coumarins on Spodoptera frugiperdaSmith (Lepidoptera: Noctuidae)CHEMISTRY & BIODIVERSITY, Issue 1 2006Nancy Vera Abstract The phagodepression activity of five coumarins (=2H -1-benzopyran-2-ones), 6-hydroxy-7-isoprenyloxycoumarin (1), 6-methoxy-7-isoprenyloxycoumarin (2), 6,7-methylenedioxycoumarin (3), 5-methoxy-6,7-methylenedioxycoumarin (4), and 6-methoxy-7-(2-hydroxyethoxy)coumarin (5), from the Argentine native herb Pterocaulon polystachyum, was tested against Spodoptera frugiperda (Lepidoptera: Noctuidae) larvae. Two analogs, scopoletin (6) and 2-methoxy-2-methyl-3,4,5,6,7,8-hexahydro-3H -chromen-5-one (7), synthesized in our laboratory, were also evaluated for comparison. The compounds were added to an artificial diet at doses ranging from 50 to 200,,g per g of diet. Natural coumarins induced 100% of phagodepression when 200,,g were added per g of diet. Binary equimolar mixtures of the natural coumarins were phagodepressors against S. frugiperda surpassing the expected additive responses, indicating that these compounds can act synergistically against S. frugiperda larvae. Compounds 1 and 3 (non-methoxylated coumarins), and the equimolar mixture of both, displayed the strongest phagodepression. Additionally, 50,,g/g of 1 and 3 incorporated to the larval diet caused 80 and 50% of pupal mortality, respectively, while a 100,,g/g dose of compounds 2, 4, 6, and 7 produced 60, 50, 10, and 80% pupal mortality, respectively. Larval growing rate during the early larval instars was significantly reduced by treatments with the methylenedioxycoumarins 3 and 4. Coincidentally, the larval period duration was significantly increased by the latter compounds. [source] POLICE INTERVENTION AND THE REPEAT OF DOMESTIC ASSAULTCRIMINOLOGY, Issue 3 2005RICHARD B. FELSON We use the National Crime Victimization Survey to examine whether domestic violence is less likely to be repeated if it is reported to the police and if the offender is arrested. Our longitudinal analyses suggest that reporting has a fairly strong deterrent effect, whereas the effect of arrest is small and statistically insignificant. We find no support for the hypothesis that offenders retaliate when victims (rather than third parties) call the police or when victims sign complaints. We also find no evidence that the effects of reporting or arrest depend on the seriousness of the offense, a history of violence by the offender or sociodemographic characteristics. Our results suggest that the best policies for deterrence will be those that encourage victims and third parties to report violence by intimate partners to the police. [source] THE MISSING LINK IN GENERAL DETERRENCE RESEARCH,CRIMINOLOGY, Issue 3 2005GARY KLECK Research on the deterrent effects of punishment falls into two categories: macro-level studies of the impact of aggregate punishment levels on crime rates, and individual-level studies of the impact of perceived punishment levels on self-reported criminal behavior. For policy purposes, however, the missing link,ignored in previous research,is that between aggregate punishment levels and individual perceptions of punishment. This paper addresses whether higher actual punishment levels increase the perceived certainty, severity, or swiftness of punishment. Telephone interviews with 1,500 residents of fifty-four large urban counties were used to measure perceptions of punishment levels, which were then linked to actual punishment levels as measured in official statistics. Hierarchical linear model estimates of multivariate models generally found no detectable impact of actual punishment levels on perceptions of punishment. The findings raise serious questions about deterrence-based rationales for more punitive crime control policies. [source] PROPOSITION 8 AND CRIME RATES IN CALIFORNIA: THE CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING DETERRENTCRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY, Issue 3 2006CHERYL MARIE WEBSTER Research Summary: In 1999, Daniel Kessler and Steven Levitt published an article that purported to provide support for the marginal deterrent effects of harsher sanctions on levels of crime. Specifically, they concluded that sentence enhancements that came into effect in California in June 1982 as a result of Proposition 8 were responsible for a subsequent drop in serious crime in this state. Our article examines the analyses and findings of this article and suggests that their conclusion of a deterrent impact fails to withstand scrutiny when more complete and more detailed crime data are used and the comparability of "control" groups is carefully examined. In particular, the addition of annual crime levels for all years (versus only the odd-numbered years that Kessler and Levitt examine) calls into question the prima facie support for a deterrent effect presented by Kessler and Levitt. Specifically, it demonstrates not only that the crime drop in California began before, rather than after, the passing into law of the sentence enhancements in 1982 but also that the downward slope did not accelerate after the change in law. Furthermore, the comparability of the two "control" groups with the "treatment" group is challenged, rendering suspect any findings based on these comparisons. Policy Implications: Case studies suggesting that crime decreased after the imposition of harsh sentencing policies are often cited as evidence of marginal general deterrence. As has been demonstrated in other contexts, the question that needs to be asked is "Compared with what?" Kessler and Levitt's (1999) article demonstrates that those interested in sentencing policy need to be sensitive not only to the appropriateness of the comparisons that are made, but also to the choice of data that are presented. [source] DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMEECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2002Samuel Cameron Digital crime is an area where the application of the economics of crime is complex. In a nutshell, the essential economic problem of digi-crime is the impact of technological progress making transactions costs of enforcement potentially too high, partly because of the low costs of copyright infringement due to technological advance, for there to be substantial amounts of deterrence from punishment. [source] DETERRENCE: CREDIBILITY AND PROPORTIONALITYECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2009DANIEL G. ARCE This paper extends the analysis of deterrence to examine terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and rogue nations. Such situations are characterized by differential pre-emptive and response capacity, in contrast to the traditional deterrence literature on nuclear superpowers, where such factors are absent. We focus on the credibility of deterrence responses to pre-emption and show that credible (subgame-perfect) responses are rarely proportional. The analysis is also extended to asymmetric deterrence scenarios whereby credibility and proportionality depend on the potential aggressor's access to conflict technology and the responder's preferences for indirect conflict vs. the status quo. [source] Electronically monitored cowpea aphid feeding behavior on resistant and susceptible lupinsENTOMOLOGIA EXPERIMENTALIS ET APPLICATA, Issue 3 2001Geoffrey W. Zehnder Abstract The feeding behavior of cowpea aphid, Aphis craccivora Koch (Homoptera: Aphididae) was examined on seedlings of narrow leafed lupin, Lupinus angustifolius L., and yellow lupin, L. luteus L., using electronic monitoring of insect feeding behavior (EMIF). Aphid feeding behavior was first compared between resistant (cv. Kalya) and susceptible (cv. Tallerack) varieties of narrow-leafed lupin. Aphids spent significantly more time in non- penetration and stylet pathway activities, and significantly less time in the sieve element phase on Kalya than on Tallerack, suggesting that feeding deterrence is an important component of aphid resistance in Kalya. Aphid feeding on a susceptible yellow lupin variety (cv. Wodjil) was then compared with that on two resistant lines, one (Teo) with high and the other (94D024-1) with low seed alkaloid content. There were no consistent differences in aphid feeding behavior between Wodjil and Teo. Total, mean and percentage sieve element phase times were significantly lower, and total and percentage times in non-phloem phase were greater on 94D024-1 than on Wodjil, suggesting the possibility of phloem-based deterrence in 94D024-1. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||