Customs Union (custom + union)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


THE NON-TRADED SECTOR, LOBBYING, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE COMMON MARKET

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2008
CYRILLE SCHWELLNUS
This paper models immigration policy as the outcome of political competition between interest groups representing individuals employed in different sectors. In standard positive theory, restrictive immigration policy results from a low-skilled median voter voting against predominantly low-skilled immigration. In the present paper, in contrast, once trade policies are liberalized, restrictive immigration policy results from anti-immigration lobbying by interest groups representing the non-traded sectors. It is shown that this is in line with empirical regularities from recent episodes of restrictive immigration legislation in the European Union. It is further shown that if governments negotiate bilaterally over trade and migration policy regimes, the equilibrium regime depends (i) on the sequencing of the international negotiation process and (ii) on the set of available trade and migration policy regimes. In particular, the most comprehensive and most welfare-beneficial type of liberalization may be rejected only because a less comprehensive type of liberalization is available. [source]


THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF IN A CUSTOMS UNION: VOTING, LOGROLLING, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INTERESTS

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2007
SAMIA COSTA TAVARES
Missing from the analysis of customs unions has been a consideration of collective decision-making by countries regarding the union's common trade policy. In the case of the common European external tariff, how governments voted was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to derive member states' tariff preferences, which are then used to establish the decision rule before 1987, when individual governments had veto power. Results indicate a principle of unanimity, as well as the presence of logrolling. The political equilibrium for the common external tariff is also illustrated to have shifted as a result of union enlargements. [source]


Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969,75 , Edited by J. Van Der Harst

JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 4 2008
LUIS SIMON
No abstract is available for this article. [source]


On the Welfare Implications of Customs Unions in the Presence of Finance Constraints

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 2 2001
Theodore Palivos
We examine the welfare effects of a customs union on a small monetary economy. The role of money is captured by a generalized cash-in-advance constraint which allows for non-uniform monetization across sectors. This generates a demand-side distortion which results in a discrepancy between the marginal domestic rate of substitution and the world price. We show that, depending on the economy's inflation rate and the difference between the existing and the optimal tariff rate, trade creation may reduce welfare while trade diversion may improve it. [source]


PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION*

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2006
Kamal SaggiArticle first published online: 23 JAN 200
Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) building or stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization? I address this question in an infinitely repeated tariff game between three countries engaged in intraindustry trade under oligopoly. The central result is that when countries are symmetric, a free trade agreement (FTA) undermines multilateral tariff cooperation by adversely affecting the cooperation incentive of the nonmember whereas a customs union (CU) does so via its effect on the cooperation incentives of members. However, when countries are asymmetric with respect to either market size or cost, there exist circumstances where PTAs facilitate multilateral tariff cooperation. [source]


Winners and losers from regional integration agreements,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 490 2003
Anthony J. Venables
How are the benefits and costs of a customs union divided between member countries? Outcomes depend on the comparative advantage of members, relative to each other and relative to the rest of the world. Countries with a comparative advantage between that of their partners and the rest of the world do better than countries with an ,extreme' comparative advantage. Consequently, integration between low income countries tends to lead to divergence of member country incomes, while agreements between high income countries cause convergence. Results suggest that developing countries are likely to be better served by ,north-south' than by ,south-south' agreements. [source]


On the Welfare Implications of Customs Unions in the Presence of Finance Constraints

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 2 2001
Theodore Palivos
We examine the welfare effects of a customs union on a small monetary economy. The role of money is captured by a generalized cash-in-advance constraint which allows for non-uniform monetization across sectors. This generates a demand-side distortion which results in a discrepancy between the marginal domestic rate of substitution and the world price. We show that, depending on the economy's inflation rate and the difference between the existing and the optimal tariff rate, trade creation may reduce welfare while trade diversion may improve it. [source]


THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF IN A CUSTOMS UNION: VOTING, LOGROLLING, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INTERESTS

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2007
SAMIA COSTA TAVARES
Missing from the analysis of customs unions has been a consideration of collective decision-making by countries regarding the union's common trade policy. In the case of the common European external tariff, how governments voted was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to derive member states' tariff preferences, which are then used to establish the decision rule before 1987, when individual governments had veto power. Results indicate a principle of unanimity, as well as the presence of logrolling. The political equilibrium for the common external tariff is also illustrated to have shifted as a result of union enlargements. [source]