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Credit Ratings (credit + rating)
Selected AbstractsThe Original Maturity of Corporate Bonds: The Influence of Credit Rating, Asset Maturity, Security, and Macroeconomic ConditionsFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 2 2006Geetanjali Bali G24 Abstract We examine the determinants of the new issue maturity of corporate bonds. As credit rating decreases, new bond issues have longer maturities, but substantial variation in maturity within each rating class remains. We seek to explain the variation of new issue maturity within credit classes. We find that asset maturity, security covenants, and macroeconomic conditions influence the new issue maturity of bonds within rating categories. [source] Credit Ratings and Taxes: The Effect of Book,Tax Differences on Ratings ChangesCONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2010BENJAMIN C. AYERS G29; H25; H32; M41 This paper examines whether credit analysts utilize the information contained in the difference between book and taxable income in analyzing a firm's credit risk. Increased book,tax differences may be informative for credit rating agencies as they may signal decreased earnings quality or changes in the firm's off,balance sheet financing. Results suggest a significant negative association between positive changes in book,tax differences and ratings changes. This evidence is consistent with large positive changes in book,tax differences signaling decreased earnings quality and/or increased off,balance sheet financing. We also find that large negative changes in book,tax differences result in less favorable rating changes, consistent with these changes signaling decreased earnings quality. In additional analyses, we find that the association between changes in book,tax differences and rating changes is attenuated for high,tax-planning firms (e.g., where book,tax differences more likely reflect tax planning than decreased earnings quality). [source] Credit Ratings and Taxes: The Effect of Book,Tax Differences on Ratings Changes,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2010BENJAMIN C. AYERS First page of article [source] Institutional Environment and Sovereign Credit RatingsFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2006Alexander W. Butler We use a sample of 86 counties to examine the cross-sectional determinants of sovereign credit ratings. We find that the quality of a country's legal and political institutions plays a vital role in determining these ratings. A one-standard-deviation increase in our legal environment index results in an average credit rating increase of 0.466 standard deviations, even when we control for obvious factors such as GDP per capita, inflation, foreign debt per GDP, previous defaults, and general development. Although part of this effect is due to the legal environment's endogeneity, its relative importance is robust to endogeneity concerns. [source] Do Solicitations Matter in Bank Credit Ratings?JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 2-3 2009Results from a Study of 72 Countries banks; credit rating; unsolicited; NRSROs Would the credit ratings of unsolicited banks be higher if they were solicited? Alternatively, would the credit ratings of solicited banks would be lower if they were unsolicited? To answer these questions, we use an endogenous regime-switching model and data from 460 commercial banks in 72 countries, excluding the United States, for the period 1998,2003. The answer to both questions is yes. Our results show that the observed differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings can be explained by both the solicitation status and financial profile of the banks. This finding is a new contribution to the literature. [source] Finding Generators for Markov Chains via Empirical Transition Matrices, with Applications to Credit RatingsMATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 2 2001Robert B. Israel In this paper we identify conditions under which a true generator does or does not exist for an empirically observed Markov transition matrix. We show how to search for valid generators and choose the "correct" one that is the most compatible with bond rating behaviors. We also show how to obtain an approximate generator when a true generator does not exist. We give illustrations using credit rating transition matrices published by Moody's and by Standard and Poor's. [source] Asymmetric information and credit quality: Evidence from synthetic fixed-rate financingTHE JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS, Issue 6 2006Betty J. Simkins In this article the usage of synthetic fixed-rate financing (SFRF) with interest rate swaps (i.e., borrowing short-term and using swaps to hedge interest rate risk, instead of selecting conventional fixed-rate financing) by Fortune 500 and S&P 500 nonfinancial firms is examined over the period 1991 through 1995. Credit ratings, debt issuance, and debt maturities of these firms are monitored through 1999. Strong evidence is found supporting the asymmetric information theory of swap usage as described by S. Titman (1992), even after controlling for industry, credit quality, size effects, and the simultaneity of the capital structure and the interest rate swap usage decision. Consistent with theoretical predictions, SFRF firms are more likely to undergo credit quality upgrades. When limiting the sample to firms where asymmetric information costs are potentially the greatest, the results are even stronger. These findings are important because they document that swaps serve a highly valuable service for firms subject to information asymmetries. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:595,626, 2006 [source] A comparison of nearest neighbours, discriminant and logit models for auditing decisionsINTELLIGENT SYSTEMS IN ACCOUNTING, FINANCE & MANAGEMENT, Issue 1-2 2007Chrysovalantis Gaganis This study investigates the efficiency of k -nearest neighbours (k -NN) in developing models for estimating auditors' opinions, as opposed to models developed with discriminant and logit analyses. The sample consists of 5276 financial statements, out of which 980 received a qualified audit opinion, obtained from 1455 private and public UK companies operating in the manufacturing and trade sectors. We develop two industry-specific models and a general one using data from the period 1998,2001, which are then tested over the period 2002,2003. In each case, two versions of the models are developed. The first includes only financial variables. The second includes both financial and non-financial variables. The results indicate that the inclusion of credit rating in the models results in a considerable increase both in terms of goodness of fit and classification accuracies. The comparison of the methods reveals that the k -NN models can be more efficient, in terms of average classification accuracy, than the discriminant and logit models. Finally, the results are mixed concerning the development of industry-specific models, as opposed to general models. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and PracticeJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2006Brian W. Nocco The Chief Risk Officer of Nationwide Insurance teams up with a distinguished academic to discuss the benefits and challenges associated with the design and implementation of an enterprise risk management program. The authors begin by arguing that a carefully designed ERM program,one in which all material corporate risks are viewed and managed within a single framework,can be a source of long-run competitive advantage and value through its effects at both a "macro" or company-wide level and a "micro" or business-unit level. At the macro level, ERM enables senior management to identify, measure, and limit to acceptable levels the net exposures faced by the firm. By managing such exposures mainly with the idea of cushioning downside outcomes and protecting the firm's credit rating, ERM helps maintain the firm's access to capital and other resources necessary to implement its strategy and business plan. At the micro level, ERM adds value by ensuring that all material risks are "owned," and risk-return tradeoffs carefully evaluated, by operating managers and employees throughout the firm. To this end, business unit managers at Nationwide are required to provide information about major risks associated with all new capital projects,information that can then used by senior management to evaluate the marginal impact of the projects on the firm's total risk. And to encourage operating managers to focus on the risk-return tradeoffs in their own businesses, Nationwide's periodic performance evaluations of its business units attempt to refl ect their contributions to total risk by assigning risk-adjusted levels of "imputed" capital on which project managers are expected to earn adequate returns. The second, and by far the larger, part of the article provides an extensive guide to the process and major challenges that arise when implementing ERM, along with an account of Nationwide's approach to dealing with them. Among other issues, the authors discuss how a company should assess its risk "appetite," measure how much risk it is bearing, and decide which risks to retain and which to transfer to others. Consistent with the principle of comparative advantage it uses to guide such decisions, Nationwide attempts to limit "non-core" exposures, such as interest rate and equity risk, thereby enlarging the firm's capacity to bear the "information-intensive, insurance- specific" risks at the core of its business and competencies. [source] How To Choose a Capital Structure: Navigating the Debt-Equity DecisionJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2005Anil Shivdasani In corporate offices as well as the classroom, there continues to be significant debate about the costs and benefits of debt financing. There is also considerable variation in corporate credit ratings, even among companies as large and successful as those that make up the S&P 500. Many companies have been reassessing how they manage their balance sheet and their rating agency relationships; and with the market's generally favorable response to recapitalizations and dividend increases, such financing issues are likely to receive even more attention. Underlying the diversity of corporate credit ratings is widespread disagreement about the "right" credit rating,a matter that is complicated by the fact that the cost of debt varies widely among companies with the same rating. Although credit ratings are clearly tied to measures of indebtedness such as leverage and coverage ratios, the most important factor in most industries is a company's size. For many mid-sized companies, an investment-grade rating can be attained only by making a large, equity-financed acquisition,or by making minimal use of debt. In this sense, the corporate choice of credit rating can be as much a strategic issue as a financial decision. Maintaining the right amount of financial fl exibility is a key consideration when determining the right credit rating for a given company (although what management views as value-preserving flexibility may be viewed by the market as value-reducing financial "slack"). A BBB rating will accommodate considerably more leverage (30,60%) in companies with fairly stable cash flows and limited investment requirements than in more cyclical or growth-oriented companies (10,20%). When contemplating taking on more leverage, companies should examine all major operating risks and view their capital structure in the context of an enterprisewide risk management framework. [source] TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE MODEL OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTUREJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2002Roger Heine Most corporate finance practitioners understand the trade-off involved in making effective use of debt capacity while safeguarding the firm's ability to execute its business strategy without disruption. But quantifying that trade-off to arrive at an optimal level of debt can be a complicated and challenging task. This paper develops a simulation model of capital structure that starts by generating multiple estimates of market rates (LIBOR, currency rates) and corresponding company operating cash flows. To arrive at an optimal capital structure, the model then incorporates the shareholder value effects of alternative financing decisions by directly measuring the costs of financial distress, including the costs of missed investment opportunities and higher working capital requirements. The model generates both a target credit rating and a lower fallback rating that permits a higher level of debt to maintain investments and dividends when operating cash flows are weak. As the model shows, companies with volatile cash flows and significant investment opportunities can add substantial shareholder value by establishing a fallback credit rating that is one or two notches below the target rating. The model also optimizes the mix of fixed versus floating debt, the maturity structure, and the currency composition. Another distinctive feature of the model is its ability to estimate the expected cost of alternative liability structures that can provide the liquidity insurance necessary to sustain the firm through periods of severe stress. This cost turns out to be quite small relative to the total market capitalization of the average firm. [source] Do Solicitations Matter in Bank Credit Ratings?JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 2-3 2009Results from a Study of 72 Countries banks; credit rating; unsolicited; NRSROs Would the credit ratings of unsolicited banks be higher if they were solicited? Alternatively, would the credit ratings of solicited banks would be lower if they were unsolicited? To answer these questions, we use an endogenous regime-switching model and data from 460 commercial banks in 72 countries, excluding the United States, for the period 1998,2003. The answer to both questions is yes. Our results show that the observed differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings can be explained by both the solicitation status and financial profile of the banks. This finding is a new contribution to the literature. [source] Financing Choice and Liability Structure of Real Estate Investment TrustsREAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2003David T. Brown We conduct an analysis of public financial offerings of equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), with a focus on liability structure effects and whether or not firms target longer-run debt ratios. Our major findings are that (1) proceeds from equity offers are more likely to fund investment, whereas public debt offer proceeds are typically used to reconfigure the liability structure of the firm; (2) public debt issuers are often capital constrained and target total leverage ratios to retain an investment grade credit rating; and (3) the preoffer liability structure affects the issuance choice decision, in that firms with higher preoffer levels of secured (unsecured) debt tend to issue equity (public debt). Other notable findings are that the market for public REIT debt is integrated with the broader debt markets and that higher credit quality firms issue longer-maturing bonds. [source] Institutional Environment and Sovereign Credit RatingsFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2006Alexander W. Butler We use a sample of 86 counties to examine the cross-sectional determinants of sovereign credit ratings. We find that the quality of a country's legal and political institutions plays a vital role in determining these ratings. A one-standard-deviation increase in our legal environment index results in an average credit rating increase of 0.466 standard deviations, even when we control for obvious factors such as GDP per capita, inflation, foreign debt per GDP, previous defaults, and general development. Although part of this effect is due to the legal environment's endogeneity, its relative importance is robust to endogeneity concerns. [source] Event study concerning international bond price effects of credit rating actionsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2001Manfred Steiner Abstract The influence of credit ratings on eurobond prices has been neglected for a long time. It is questionable whether non-US investors relate their investment decisions on US ratings and whether ratings from US agencies are relevant information sources for international capital markets. This paper examines daily excess eurobond returns associated with announcements of watchlistings and rating changes by Standard & Poor's and Moody's. Significant bond price reactions are observed for announcements of downgradings and negative watchlistings while upgradings and positive watchlistings do not cause announcement effects. Distinct from the results on national capital markets the international evidence shows that besides actual yield level and issuer type the issuer nationality is a key factor that determines the intensity of price reactions after downgrades. The price reaction is also significantly stronger for downgrades into speculative grade. This indicates, that the announcement effects can in part be explained by price pressure effects due to regulatory constraints rather than original information content of rating changes. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] How To Choose a Capital Structure: Navigating the Debt-Equity DecisionJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2005Anil Shivdasani In corporate offices as well as the classroom, there continues to be significant debate about the costs and benefits of debt financing. There is also considerable variation in corporate credit ratings, even among companies as large and successful as those that make up the S&P 500. Many companies have been reassessing how they manage their balance sheet and their rating agency relationships; and with the market's generally favorable response to recapitalizations and dividend increases, such financing issues are likely to receive even more attention. Underlying the diversity of corporate credit ratings is widespread disagreement about the "right" credit rating,a matter that is complicated by the fact that the cost of debt varies widely among companies with the same rating. Although credit ratings are clearly tied to measures of indebtedness such as leverage and coverage ratios, the most important factor in most industries is a company's size. For many mid-sized companies, an investment-grade rating can be attained only by making a large, equity-financed acquisition,or by making minimal use of debt. In this sense, the corporate choice of credit rating can be as much a strategic issue as a financial decision. Maintaining the right amount of financial fl exibility is a key consideration when determining the right credit rating for a given company (although what management views as value-preserving flexibility may be viewed by the market as value-reducing financial "slack"). A BBB rating will accommodate considerably more leverage (30,60%) in companies with fairly stable cash flows and limited investment requirements than in more cyclical or growth-oriented companies (10,20%). When contemplating taking on more leverage, companies should examine all major operating risks and view their capital structure in the context of an enterprisewide risk management framework. [source] ESTIMATING THE TAX BENEFITS OF DEBTJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2001John Graham The standard approach to valuing interest tax shields assumes that full tax benefits are realized on every dollar of interest deduction in every scenario. The approach presented in this paper takes account of the possibility that interest tax shields cannot be used in some scenarios, in part because of variations in the firm's profitability. Because of the dynamic nature of the tax code (e.g., tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards), it is necessary to consider past and future taxable income when estimating today's effective marginal tax rate. The paper uses a series of numerical examples to show that (1) the incremental value of an extra dollar of interest deduction is equal to the marginal tax rate appropriate for that dollar; and (2) a firm's effective marginal tax rate (and therefore the marginal benefit of incremental interest deductions) can actually decline as the firm takes on additional debt. Based on marginal benefit functions for thousands of firms from 1980,1999, the author concludes that the tax benefits of debt averaged approximately 10% of firm value during the 1980s, while declining to around 8% in the 1990s. By taking maximum advantage of the interest tax shield, the average firm could have increased its value by approximately 15% over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the consequences of being underlevered are significant. Surprisingly, many of the companies that appear best able to service debt (i.e., those with the lowest apparent costs of debt) use the least amount of debt, on average. Treasurers and CFOs should critically reevaluate their companies' debt policies and consider the benefits of additional leverage, even if taking on more debt causes their credit ratings to slip a notch. [source] Do Solicitations Matter in Bank Credit Ratings?JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 2-3 2009Results from a Study of 72 Countries banks; credit rating; unsolicited; NRSROs Would the credit ratings of unsolicited banks be higher if they were solicited? Alternatively, would the credit ratings of solicited banks would be lower if they were unsolicited? To answer these questions, we use an endogenous regime-switching model and data from 460 commercial banks in 72 countries, excluding the United States, for the period 1998,2003. The answer to both questions is yes. Our results show that the observed differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings can be explained by both the solicitation status and financial profile of the banks. This finding is a new contribution to the literature. [source] THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF BANK LOAN RATINGSTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2006Ha-Chin Yi Abstract We analyze the relatively new phenomenon of credit ratings on syndicated loans, asking first whether they convey information to the capital markets. Our event studies show that initial loan ratings and upgrades are not informative, but downgrades are. The market anticipates downgrades to some extent, however. We also examine whether public information reflecting borrower default characteristics explains cross-sectional variation in loan ratings and find that ratings are only partially predictable. Our evidence suggests that loan and bond ratings are not determined by the same model. Finally, we estimate a credit spread model incorporating bank loan ratings and other factors reflecting default risk, information asymmetry, and agency problems. We find that ratings are related to loan rates, given the effect of other influences on yields, suggesting that ratings provide information not reflected in financial information. Ratings may capture idiosyncratic information about recovery rates, as each of the agencies claims, or information about default prospects not available to the market. [source] On multiple-class prediction of issuer credit ratingsAPPLIED STOCHASTIC MODELS IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, Issue 5 2009Ruey-Ching Hwang Abstract For multiple-class prediction, a frequently used approach is based on ordered probit model. We show that this approach is not optimal in the sense that it is not designed to minimize the error rate of the prediction. Based upon the works by Altman (J. Finance 1968; 23:589,609), Ohlson (J. Accounting Res. 1980; 18:109,131), and Begley et al. (Rev. Accounting Stud. 1996; 1:267,284) on two-class prediction, we propose a modified ordered probit model. The modified approach depends on an optimal cutoff value and can be easily applied in applications. An empirical study is used to demonstrate that the prediction accuracy rate of the modified classifier is better than that obtained from usual ordered probit model. In addition, we also show that not only the usual accounting variables are useful for predicting issuer credit ratings, market-driven variables and industry effects are also important determinants. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Modeling dependencies between rating categories and their effects on prediction in a credit risk portfolioAPPLIED STOCHASTIC MODELS IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, Issue 3 2008Claudia Czado Abstract The internal-rating-based Basel II approach increases the need for the development of more realistic default probability models. In this paper, we follow the approach taken in McNeil A and Wendin J 7 (J. Empirical Finance 2007) by constructing generalized linear mixed models for estimating default probabilities from annual data on companies with different credit ratings. The models considered, in contrast to McNeil A and Wendin J 7 (J. Empirical Finance 2007), allow parsimonious parametric models to capture simultaneously dependencies of the default probabilities on time and credit ratings. Macro-economic variables can also be included. Estimation of all model parameters are facilitated with a Bayesian approach using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. Special emphasis is given to the investigation of predictive capabilities of the models considered. In particular, predictable model specifications are used. The empirical study using default data from Standard and Poor's gives evidence that the correlation between credit ratings further apart decreases and is higher than the one induced by the autoregressive time dynamics. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] A simple Markov chain structure for the evolution of credit ratingsAPPLIED STOCHASTIC MODELS IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, Issue 6 2007Amparo Baíllo Abstract We focus on continuous Markov chains as a model to describe the evolution of credit ratings. In this work it is checked whether a simple, tridiagonal type of generator provides a good approximation to a general one. Three different tridiagonal approximations are proposed and their performance is checked against two generators, corresponding to a volatile and a stable period, respectively. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] | ||||||||||