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Contemporary Philosophers (contemporary + philosophers)
Selected AbstractsReading Romans with Contemporary Philosophers and Theologians.THE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 1 2009Edited by David Odell-Scott No abstract is available for this article. [source] Responsibilities of Criminal Justice OfficialsJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2010KIMBERLEY BROWNLEE abstract In recent years, political philosophers have hotly debated whether ordinary citizens have a general pro tanto moral obligation to follow the law. Contemporary philosophers have had less to say about the same question when applied to public officials. In this paper, I consider the latter question in the morally complex context of criminal justice. I argue that criminal justice officials have no general pro tanto moral obligation to adhere to the legal dictates and lawful rules of their offices. My claim diverges not only from the commonsense view about such officials, but also from the positions standardly taken in legal theory and political science debates, which presume there is some general obligation that must arise from legal norms and be reconciled with political realities. I defend my claim by highlighting the conceptual gap between the rigid, generalised, codified rules that define a criminal justice office and the special moral responsibilities of the various moral roles that may underpin that office (such as guard, guardian, healer, educator, mediator, counsellor, advocate, and carer). After addressing four objections to my view, I consider specific contexts in which criminal justice officials are obligated not to adhere to the demands of their offices. Amongst other things, the arguments advanced in this paper raise questions about both the distribution of formal discretion in the criminal justice system and the normative validity of some of the offices that presently exist in criminal justice systems. [source] Foucault, Educational Research and the Issue of AutonomyEDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 3 2005Mark Olssen Abstract This article seeks to demonstrate a particular application of Foucault's philosophical approach to a particular issue in education: that of personal autonomy. The paper surveys and extends the approach taken by James Marshall in his book Michel Foucault: Personal autonomy and education. After surveying Marshall's writing on the issue I extend Marshall's approach, critically analysing the work of Rob Reich and Meira Levinson, two contemporary philosophers who advocate models of personal autonomy as the basis for a liberal education. [source] That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal RelationismEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2007Benj Hellie A gift of a dollar for each article in the philosophy of perception and consciousness published since 1990 making reference, explicitly or implicitly, to Moore's discussion in the second half of Moore 19031 of an alleged ,transparency' and ,diaphanousness' pertaining to some aspect of perceptual experience would very likely cover the tab of a mid-priced dinner for two.2 Moore's poetically expressed observations have captured the imagination of contemporary philosophers of perception and consciousness, and have served as the basis of much fruitful discussion in those areas. Still, despite all the attention these observations have received, the contemporary literature lacks a close reading of the second half of Moore's paper, without which it is impossible to understand Moore's observations in the context in which they were originally expressed. It is understandable that such a close reading is lacking: the second half of Moore's paper has been rightly described by one of his most sympathetic and dedicated interpreters as ,extremely dense and opaque' (Klemke 2000: 55).3 But despite the evident difficulties of the task, I aim here, with some trepidation, to provide the missing close reading. The main points of my interpretation will be these. The centerpiece of the anti-idealist manoeuvrings of the second half of the paper is a phenomenological argument for what I will call a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, ,that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric.4 The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be. My discussion will proceed as follows. In section 1, I will discuss some theses and elucidate some notions from the philosophy of perception and consciousness which will be central to my interpretation; having done so, I will be in a position to explain how an accurate understanding of Moore may contribute to theoretical advances in the philosophy of perception and consciousness. The next two sections contain the exegetical heart of the paper: section 2 provides an analysis of Moore's case for the relational view; section 3 attempts to explain the place of the relational view in the overall refutation of idealism. Section 4 critically discusses a pair of competing interpretations. Section 5 wraps things up, drawing concluding morals as to the campaigns on behalf of which Moore should and should not be enlisted. [source] Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of ShameHYPATIA, Issue 3 2003JENNIFER C. MANION Few contemporary philosophers discuss the ways in which the emotion of shame may be gendered. This paper addresses this situation, examining Gabriele Taylor's (1985 and 1995) account of genuine vs. false shame. 1 argue that, by attending to the social pressures placed on many women to conform to a certain vision of femininity, an analysis of the shame to which women may be prone shows that Taylor's account of shame remains incomplete. [source] Theistic Ethics and the Euthyphro DilemmaJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 1 2002Richard Joyce It is widely believed that the Divine Command Theory is untenable due to the Euthyphro Dilemma. This article first examines the Platonic dialogue of that name, and shows that Socrates's reasoning is faulty. Second, the dilemma in the form in which many contemporary philosophers accept it is examined in detail, and this reasoning is also shown to be deficient. This is not to say, however, that the Divine Command Theory is true,merely that one popular argument for rejecting it is unsound. Finally some brief thoughts are presented concerning where the real problems lie for the theory. [source] Aquinas on the Materiality of the Human Soul and the Immateriality of the Human IntellectPHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 2 2009Gyula Klima This paper argues that Aquinas's conception of the human soul and intellect offers a consistent alternative to the dilemma of materialism and post-Cartesian dualism. It also argues that in their own theoretical context, Aquinas' arguments for the materiality of the human soul and immateriality of the intellect provide a strong justification of his position. However, that theoretical context is rather "alien" to ours in contemporary philosophy. The conclusion of the paper will point in the direction of what can be done to render Aquinas's position more palatable to contemporary philosophers. [source] The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions ThesisPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2009SUNGHO CHOI The idea that dispositions are an intrinsic matter has been popular among contemporary philosophers of dispositions. In this paper I will first state this idea as exactly as possible. I will then examine whether it poses any threat to the two current versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions, namely, the simple and reformed conditional analysis of dispositions. The upshot is that the intrinsic nature of dispositions, when properly understood, doesn't spell trouble for either of the two versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions. Along the way, I will propose an extensionally correct and practically useful criterion for identifying nomically intrinsic dispositions and criticize one objection raised by Lewis against the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. [source] |