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Compliance Costs (compliance + cost)
Selected AbstractsThe accuracy of regulatory cost estimates: a study of the London congestion charging schemeENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2007Chris Sherrington Abstract This paper considers the accuracy of regulatory cost estimates using the London congestion charging scheme as a case study. In common with other regulations, ex ante estimates of the direct costs of the scheme were produced by the regulator, Transport for London. Reviews of a number of environmental and industrial regulations have shown that ex ante costs tend to exceed the ex post (or outturn) costs. This study finds that while Transport for London moderately overestimated the total costs of the scheme (by 16%) there was a significant overestimate of chargepayer compliance costs (by 64%). The main reasons for this were greater than expected reductions in traffic and unanticipated technological innovation. As the compliance cost is essentially the cost of transacting payment of the charge, these results have wider implications for other similar regulations. One example is the proposed national road user charging in the UK, where it could reasonably be expected that the ex post cost of compliance will again be lower than the ex ante estimate, and that compliance costs will continue to reduce over time. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Integrated Environmental and Financial Performance Metrics for Investment Analysis and Portfolio ManagementCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2007Simon Thomas This paper introduces a new measure, based on a study by Trucost and Dr Robert Repetto, combining external environmental costs with established measures of economic value added, and demonstrates how this measure can be incorporated into financial analysis. We propose that external environmental costs are relevant to all investors: universal investors are concerned about the scale of external costs whether or not regulations to internalise them are likely; mainstream investors need to understand external costs as an indication of future regulatory compliance costs; and SRI investors need to evaluate companies on both financial and social performance. The paper illustrates our new measure with data from US electric utilities and illustrates how the environmental exposures of different fund managers and portfolios can be compared. With such measures fund managers can understand and control portfolio-wide environmental risks, demonstrate their environmental credentials quantitatively and objectively and compete for the increasing number of investment mandates that have an environmental component. [source] The operating costs of taxation: a review of the researchECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2001Chris Evans This paper considers key aspects of the literature on the operating costs of taxation, identifying the factors that have led to its development and evaluating its impact on policy responses to compliance and administrative costs issues. It starts by identifying the key components of the operating costs of the taxation system. The paper then identifies the main research trends over the past 60 years or so around the world, placing current concerns about taxation compliance and administrative costs within a broader - deregulatory - context and analyzing governmental responses to concerns about compliance costs highlighted by the literature. Finally, it offers some tentative views on the likely directions that research in the area may take in the coming decades. [source] THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION IN AUSTRALIAECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 1 2004Gary Banks Chairman The paper examines the existing scope and role of regulations in Australia. While there are many benefits from regulation, there is also a myriad of, often underplayed, costs associated with regulations. While compliance costs are large, probably the most significant costs arise from behavioural responses to regulations that reduce efficiency or compromise social goals. These adverse effects are often unanticipated and arise from complex interactions between regulations. The main reasons for regulatory failure are excessive ambition (underestimating the deficiencies of the regulatory ,solution'), capture of regulatory agencies, and poor regulatory processes and institutions. The paper offers some guidelines for producing better regulation. [source] The accuracy of regulatory cost estimates: a study of the London congestion charging schemeENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2007Chris Sherrington Abstract This paper considers the accuracy of regulatory cost estimates using the London congestion charging scheme as a case study. In common with other regulations, ex ante estimates of the direct costs of the scheme were produced by the regulator, Transport for London. Reviews of a number of environmental and industrial regulations have shown that ex ante costs tend to exceed the ex post (or outturn) costs. This study finds that while Transport for London moderately overestimated the total costs of the scheme (by 16%) there was a significant overestimate of chargepayer compliance costs (by 64%). The main reasons for this were greater than expected reductions in traffic and unanticipated technological innovation. As the compliance cost is essentially the cost of transacting payment of the charge, these results have wider implications for other similar regulations. One example is the proposed national road user charging in the UK, where it could reasonably be expected that the ex post cost of compliance will again be lower than the ex ante estimate, and that compliance costs will continue to reduce over time. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Cost of compliance assessments and the water industry in England and WalesENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2002Paul McMahon Environmental compliance cost assessments (CCAs) are being increasingly demanded and used in the water industry, in order to allow regulators to balance conflicting objectives. The 1999 periodic review of water company price limits concerned massive environmental expenditures, and consequently major use of CCAs. There were major differences between Ofwat (the economic regulator) and the water companies relating to the compliance costs submitted. The assumptions used by Ofwat vis-à-vis future efficiency savings and the cost of capital are notable causes of the differentials. There are a number of other reasons why this differential might have arisen, including gaming. However, the principal cause might be more a real lack of knowledge on the part of companies of future efficiencies and the actual costs of projects. The CCAs produced in the water industry have had massive impact on policy design. A number of specific improvements to CCA are identified. These changes relate to increased collaboration between industry and regulators in working groups to design/approve, inter alia, regulatory methodologies for use in the periodic review. More detailed guidance is required for preparation of a CCA. Further use of compliance cost databases is recommended. The entire process would be facilitated by increased training and awareness raising of economics for the engineers largely responsible for preparation of CCAs. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment. [source] The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Audit Fees of Australian Listed FirmsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AUDITING, Issue 2 2009Fazlina Mohd Salman The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) (SOX) was enacted to improve the corporate governance practices of US firms. Significantly, foreign registrants traded on US stock exchanges are also required to comply with SOX. This study assesses the impact of the SOX legislation on non-US firms by examining audit fees for Australian firms with foreign registrant status in the US from 2001 to 2005, compared with audit fees for other Australian firms. The findings indicate that Australian companies issuing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) incurred substantial increases in audit fees and Australian firms subject to the full provisions of SOX incurred larger increases in audit fees. These findings provide a broader understanding of the compliance costs for non-US firms subject to SOX and therefore inform both policy-makers and firms. [source] Use of Compliance Rewards in Agri-environmental SchemesJOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009Yuki Yano Q12; Q20; Q28; Q57 Abstract Ensuring that farmers comply with the terms of agri-environmental schemes is an important issue. This paper explores the use of a ,compliance,reward' approach under heterogeneous net compliance costs with respect to cost-share working lands programmes such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) in the United States. Specifically, we examine the use of a reward under asymmetric information and output price uncertainty. We examine two possible sources of financing under the assumption of budget neutrality: (i) funds obtained by reducing monitoring effort; and (ii) money saved by reducing the number of farmers enrolled. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each source of funding and analyse these numerically for both risk-neutral and risk-averse farmers. We also examine the trade-off between increased expenditure on monitoring effort and compliance rewards when additional budgetary resources are available. We show that under certain conditions a compliance reward can increase compliance rates. For risk-averse farmers, however, conditions that ensure a positive outcome become more restrictive. [source] Was bedeutet Steuervereinfachung wirklich?,PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 1 2006Franz W. Wagner These must, apart from the tax declaration costs, comprise the costs of tax planning that individuals are willing to bear to avoid taxes. Crude forms of taxation lower declaration costs and give rise to tax avoidance planning through unequal tax burdens. Tax simplification by means of lowering tax compliance costs must pay attention to both types of costs. Altogether, the potential of a reduction of tax compliance costs is thus lower than hoped for. [source] Use and Misuse of Tax Compliance Costs in Evaluating the GSTTHE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2001Binh Tran-Nam This article examines the use of tax compliance costs in evaluating tax reform and seeks to demonstrate that the Government's current approach is flawed. [source] U.S. Hog Production and the Influence of State Water Quality RegulationCANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2001Mark Metcalfe The U.S. hog industry is experiencing an increase in both the average size and in the geographical concentration of feeding operations. These increases have caused public attention to focus on the environmental consequences of hog production and on the regulations imposed to limit these consequences. This study examines the influence of state water quality regulatory stringency on hog production in the United States. The results of this analysis provide evidence that environmental compliance costs are significant for small hog feeding operations, while production on large operations does not appear to be influenced by the level of state environmental regulatory stringency. On assiste présentement à une augmentation de la taille des exploitations et à une concentration géographique des établissements d'engraissement dans le secteur américain de l'élevage porcin. Ces changements ont amené la population à s'intéresser aux répercussions de la production porcine sur l'environnement et aux réglements adoptés en vue d'atténuer de telles répercussions. L'auteur détermine de quelle maniére la sévérité des réglements d,État sur la qualité de l'eau influe sur l'élevage des pores aux États-Unis. Les résultats de son analyse prouvent que le respect des règlements sur la protection de l'environnement engendre des coûts appréciables pour les petits éleveurs, alors que les exploitations de plus grande envergure ne sont pas aussi affectées par la rigueur de la réglementation d'État en matiére d'environnement. [source] |