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Complete Markets (complete + market)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Asset Trading Volume with Dynamically Complete Markets and Heterogeneous Agents

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 5 2003
Kenneth L. Judd
Trading volume of infinitely lived securities, such as equity, is generically zero in Lucas asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents. More generally, the end-of-period portfolio of all securities is constant over time and states in the generic economy. General equilibrium restrictions rule out trading of equity after an initial period. This result contrasts the prediction of portfolio allocation analyses that portfolio rebalancing motives produce nontrivial trade volume. Therefore, other causes of trade must be present in asset markets with large trading volume. [source]

BEHAVIORAL PORTFOLIO SELECTION IN CONTINUOUS TIME

MATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 3 2008
Hanqing Jin
This paper formulates and studies a general continuous-time behavioral portfolio selection model under Kahneman and Tversky's (cumulative) prospect theory, featuring S-shaped utility (value) functions and probability distortions. Unlike the conventional expected utility maximization model, such a behavioral model could be easily mis-formulated (a.k.a. ill-posed) if its different components do not coordinate well with each other. Certain classes of an ill-posed model are identified. A systematic approach, which is fundamentally different from the ones employed for the utility model, is developed to solve a well-posed model, assuming a complete market and general Itô processes for asset prices. The optimal terminal wealth positions, derived in fairly explicit forms, possess surprisingly simple structure reminiscent of a gambling policy betting on a good state of the world while accepting a fixed, known loss in case of a bad one. An example with a two-piece CRRA utility is presented to illustrate the general results obtained, and is solved completely for all admissible parameters. The effect of the behavioral criterion on the risky allocations is finally discussed. [source]

Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2008
Pierre Dubois
We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions in which commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure each other through both formal contracts and informal agreements, that is, self-enforcing agreements specifying voluntary transfers. This theoretical setting nests the case of complete markets and the case where only informal agreements are available. We derive a system of nonlinear equations for income and consumption growth. A key prediction of our model is that both variables are affected by lagged consumption as a consequence of the interplay of formal and informal contracting possibilities. In a semiparametric setting, we prove identification, derive testable restrictions, and estimate the model with the use of data from Pakistani villages. Empirical results are consistent with the economic arguments. Incentive constraints due to self-enforcement bind with positive probability and formal contracts are used to reduce this probability. [source]

Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2000
Fernando Alvarez
We introduce a new equilibrium concept and study its efficiency and asset pricing implications for the environment analyzed by Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996). Our equilibrium concept has complete markets and endogenous solvency constraints. These solvency constraints prevent default at the cost of reducing risk sharing. We show versions of the welfare theorems. We characterize the preferences and endowments that lead to equilibria with incomplete risk sharing. We compare the resulting pricing kernel with the one for economies without participation constraints: interest rates are lower and risk premia depend on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Additionally, we show that asset prices depend only on the valuation of agents with substantial idiosyncratic risk. [source]

OPTIONS AND EFFICIENCY IN MULTIDATE SECURITY MARKETS

MATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 4 2005
Alexandre M. Baptista
This paper extends the work of Ross (1976; Q. J. Econ. (90)1, 75,89) to multidate security markets. First, we show that if a primitive security separates states at the terminal date, then there exist multiperiod European options on that security generating dynamically complete markets. Second, we show that if a primitive security conditionally separates states at the terminal date, then there exist multiperiod European options on that security generating generically dynamically complete markets provided that certain conditions hold. Third, we show that there are economies for which the minimum number of multiperiod European options on a primitive security generating generically dynamically complete markets is relatively large. Finally, we show that in these economies, a relatively small number of multiperiod European options on possibly different portfolio strategies of primitive securities generates generically dynamically complete markets. [source]

Investment risk allocation in decentralised electricity markets.

OPEC ENERGY REVIEW, Issue 2 2008
The need of long-term contracts, vertical integration
None of the far-reaching experiments in electricity industry liberalisation was able to ensure the timely and optimal capacity mix development. The theoretical market model features market failures due to the specific volatility of prices, and the difficulty of creating complete markets for hedging. In this paper, we focused on a specific failure, i.e. the impossibility of allocating the various risks borne by the producer onto suppliers and consumers in order to allow capacity development. Promotion of short-term competition by mandating vertical de-integration tends to distort investments in generation by impeding efficient risk allocation. Following Joskow's (2006) line, we developed an empirical analysis of how to secure investments in generation through vertical arrangements between decentralised generators and large purchasers, suppliers or consumers. Empirical observations as risk analysis shows that adopting such arrangements may prove necessary. Various types of long-term contracts between generators and suppliers (fixed-quantity and fixed-price contract, indexed price contract, tolling contract, financial option) appear to offer effective solutions for risk allocation. Vertical integration appears to be another effective way to allocate risk. But it remains an important complementary condition to efficient risk allocation, i.e. that retail competition is sticky or legally limited in order to have a large part of risks borne by consumers on the different market segments. [source]

Heterogeneity, Efficiency and Asset Allocation with Endogenous Labor Supply: The Static Case

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 3 2001
Marcelo Bianconi
We study the implications of consumption and labor allocations with ex ante efficiency and possibly ex post inefficiency on international/interregional portfolio diversification. The answers we obtain depend crucially on the market regime relative to unemployment insurance. If there are complete markets for unemployment insurance, changes in asset allocation are small in the presence of ex post inefficiency, but if there are incomplete markets for unemployment insurance, changes in asset allocation can be large. The direction of the asset movement is towards more diversification. [source]