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Competition Rules (competition + rule)
Selected AbstractsManipulating Rules, Contesting Solutions: Europeanization and the Politics of Restructuring Olympic Airways1GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 1 2007Kevin Featherstone In recent years much debate has been generated over the reshaping of the European airline industry and the restructuring of many of the heavily indebted national flag-carriers across the European Union. The European Commission has sought to orchestrate this reform process by the gradual break up of monopolies in air travel and its associated services and a much tighter policing of state aid practices. The EU's liberalizing agenda in air transport, however, has met with strong domestic opposition in the member states. Nowhere else has the resistance to reform been stronger than in Greece, where for a decade successive attempts to restructure or privatize Olympic Airways have yielded very limited success. By focusing, in particular, on the initiative of the Greek government in 2003 to create a new ,Olympic Airlines', the article examines how domestic pressures prompted the Greek government to shift away from cooperation with the Commission and invite conflict. The Greek government lost an ECJ case and both Athens and the Commission were left with a sub-optimal outcome. By linking the narrative to the conceptual literature on Europeanization and compliance, the article addresses a number of themes including: the contestation of European competition rules and the ability of national governments to manipulate them, policy entrepreneurship and complex problem-solving, as well as the Commission's role as a stimulus, but potentially also an obstacle to domestic reform. [source] ,Consumer' versus ,Customer': The Devil in the DetailJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 2 2010Pinar Akman According to the European Commission, the objective of EU competition rules is enhancing ,consumer welfare'. In EU competition law, however, ,consumer' means ,customer' and encompasses intermediate customers as well as final consumers. Under Article 102TFEU, harming intermediate ,customers' is generally presumed to harm ,consumers' and where intermediate customers are not competitors of the dominant undertaking, there is no requisite to assess the effects of conduct on users further downstream. Using advances in economics of vertical restraints and, in particular, non-linear pricing, this article shows that there are instances where the effect on ,customer welfare' does not coincide with the effect on ,consumer welfare' and the presumption can potentially lead to decisional errors. Thus, if the law is to serve the interests of ,consumers', the Commission should reconsider this presumption and its interpretation of the ,consumer' in ,consumer welfare'; otherwise, it remains questionable whose interests EU competition law serves. [source] Interoperability and Other Issues at the IP,Anti-trust Interface: The EU Microsoft CaseTHE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Issue 4 2008Dr Duncan Curley The judgment in 2007 of the Court of First Instance in Microsoft Corporation v European Commission was the culmination of one of the biggest anti-trust battles ever to have taken place in the European Union. Although most aspects of the European Commission's original decision of 2004 were upheld, the Microsoft case remains interesting at several levels. The judgment deals with the question of when it is permissible, in the public interest, to encroach upon the exclusivity of intellectual property rights-holders, by requiring the grant of licences to third parties seeking to enter or remain on the market. The case provides an illustration of Community policy objectives being implemented through the medium of the competition rules, namely the opening up of the software industry to more competition and the encouragement of innovation in information technology. It also provides an illustration of differing attitudes to the anti-trust regulation of unilateral conduct by companies with a dominant market position in Europe and the United States. [source] Questions About the Initiative of the European Commission Concerning the Awarding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering of Public Service ConcessionsANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2003H. Cox The ruling of the European Commission is that the award of contracts by regional or local authorities for the provision of services of general economic interest must be done by way of competitive tendering. Such contracts must not be awarded to the authority's own public enterprises or to any other enterprise, including by means of unilateral State act, without a call for tenders, a practice that had previously been common in many Member States. Public service concessions are also subject to the competition rules of the EC Treaty. Should the European Commission enact a directive concerning compulsory competitive tendering, this would result, for several Member States, in a serious change of paradigm as regards the awarding of public service concessions. Against this background, this article will attempt to find answers to the following questions: ,How is the present relationship of the regional or local authority with its own public enterprise to be considered? ,Are there any limits to applying the rules on competition of the EC Treaty to public service concessions? ,What kind of positive and negative effects concerning economic efficiency and supply of specific public services result from the awarding of public service concessions and from compulsory competitive tendering? ,What kind of, and what amount of, transaction costs result from compulsory competitive tendering and from the awarding of concessions? ,Does competitive tendering work properly, and are public tenderers given equal opportunities? ,Are there any alternatives to compulsory competitive tendering that would achieve an efficient market performance and provide sufficient supply? [source] | ||||||||||