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Competition Policy (competition + policy)
Selected AbstractsON OPTIMAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR COMPETITION POLICY: A GENERAL WELFARE-BASED ANALYSIS,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009YANNIS KATSOULACOS We present a new welfare-based framework for optimally choosing legal standards (decision rules). We formalise the decision-theoretic considerations widely discussed in the existing literature by capturing the quality of the underlying analysis and information available to a regulatory authority, and we obtain a precise necessary and sufficient set of conditions for determining when an Economics or Effects-Based approach would be able to discriminate effectively between benign and harmful actions and consequently dominate per se as a decision-making procedure. We then show that in a full welfare-based approach, the choice between legal standards must additionally take into account, (i) indirect (deterrence) effects of the choice of standard on the behaviour of all firms when deciding whether or not to adopt a particular practice; and (ii) procedural effects of certain features of the administrative process in particular delays in reaching decisions; and the investigation of only a fraction of the actions taking place. We therefore derive necessary and sufficient conditions for adopting Discriminating Rules, as advocated by the Effects-Based approach. We also examine what type of Discriminating rule will be optimal under different conditions that characterise different business practices. We apply our framework to two recent landmark decisions , Microsoft vs. EU Commission (2007) and Leegin vs. PSKS (2007) , in which a change in legal standards has been proposed, and show that it can powerfully clarify and enhance the arguments deployed in these cases. [source] THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION POLICY IN AUSTRALIA: THE ROLE OF RON BANNERMANAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 2 2007David Merrett antitrust; Australia; restrictive trade practices The 1965 legislation to curb restrictive trade practices has been widely regarded as weak. By contrast, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has been considered as providing the platform for a more comprehensive competition policy. This paper argues that the 1965,67 and 1971 Acts were more effective than has been commonly recognised in raising awareness about the extent of restrictive trade practices, discrediting price agreements and laying the foundations for the 1974 Act. The role of Ron Bannerman, the sole Commissioner of Trade Practices, was critical to their success. This paper uses parliamentary debates, Bannerman's published works and an interview with him undertaken in early 2005. [source] Investment and Competition Policy in the WTO: Issues for Developing CountriesDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 1 2002Oliver Morrissey This article uses the case of trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) to examine the liberalisation of investment and its potential impact on developing countries. Very few developing countries actually use TRIMs to any appreciable degree, but, when taken in conjunction with the broader liberalisation of investment, the 1994 TRIMs Agreement has significant implications that will constrain governments' policy options and require issues of competition policy to be addressed. Multilateral competition policy would be difficult to agree and implement and the article considers alternative strategies that developing countries could adopt. [source] In Search of a Competition Policy in a Competitive Economy: The Case of Hong KongJOURNAL OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2003SUK-CHING HO The authors propose an exploratory framework to study competition policy development in general and apply it in the context of Hong Kong. Competition policy (in the U.S., commonly referred to as antitrust policy) is defined here as concerned with the public policy prohibiting anticompetitive behavior and the abuse of dominant market power on the part of businesses. The framework identifies four core variables that are important in influencing the development and implementation of a competition policy. These variables are the consumer protection agenda, external pressure, the political landscape, and the size of the economy. It is proposed that the way government responded to these forces has been instrumental in shaping how and why the competition policy debate in Hong Kong evolved the way it did. It also underscores the importance of recognizing the indigenous nature in the development of competition policy in any economy. Future research directions to generalize the framework are also suggested. These include further development and expansion of the core variables, contextualization of the framework for cross-national comparisons, and undertaking longitudinal studies to examine the sensitivities of the competition policy to changes in the core forces over time. [source] Competition Policy and Property Rights,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 544 2010John Vickers One of the most controversial questions in current competition policy is when, if ever, should competition law require a firm with market power to share its property, notably intellectual property, with its rivals? And if supply is required, on what terms? These questions are discussed with reference to recent law cases including the EC Microsoft judgment of 2007 and the US linkLine case of 2009. The analysis focuses on whether competition law and regulation are complements or substitutes and on incentives for investment and (sequential) innovation. [source] Reflections on National Competition PolicyAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 3 2001Christine Charles No abstract is available for this article. [source] Europeanising Antitrust: British Competition Policy Reform and Member State ConvergenceBRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 4 2006Gregory Baldi This article argues that the patterns of competition policy convergence in EU member states challenge formulations of the process of Europeanisation and specifically the notion that the likelihood of policy harmonisation is a function of the pre-existing compatibility or ,fit' between national and supranational policies. In the case of antitrust, the member states in which existing arrangements were least compatible with the European policy were generally the first to adopt the European competition enforcement regime, while Britain, in spite of having an established,albeit dysfunctional,competition regime since the 1940s, was the last of the medium- and large-sized members to move towards harmonising its antitrust rules. The article finds that the pre-existence of an antitrust system actually made harmonisation more difficult for Britain by allowing British industrial interests to develop preferences for the domestic system, which stymied attempts to Europeanise British policy. [source] In Search of a Competition Policy in a Competitive Economy: The Case of Hong KongJOURNAL OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2003SUK-CHING HO The authors propose an exploratory framework to study competition policy development in general and apply it in the context of Hong Kong. Competition policy (in the U.S., commonly referred to as antitrust policy) is defined here as concerned with the public policy prohibiting anticompetitive behavior and the abuse of dominant market power on the part of businesses. The framework identifies four core variables that are important in influencing the development and implementation of a competition policy. These variables are the consumer protection agenda, external pressure, the political landscape, and the size of the economy. It is proposed that the way government responded to these forces has been instrumental in shaping how and why the competition policy debate in Hong Kong evolved the way it did. It also underscores the importance of recognizing the indigenous nature in the development of competition policy in any economy. Future research directions to generalize the framework are also suggested. These include further development and expansion of the core variables, contextualization of the framework for cross-national comparisons, and undertaking longitudinal studies to examine the sensitivities of the competition policy to changes in the core forces over time. [source] Determinants of foreign direct investment in the food industry: The case of PolandAGRIBUSINESS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 3 2001Peter Walkenhorst; In this article, a statistical model is developed to analyze determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Polish food industry. Data on FDI inflows from three investor home country clusters is related to characteristics of 12 food industry branches. The results indicate that firm size, privatization speed, value-added, and import share are important determinants of food industry FDI. The findings confirm the importance of a swift reduction of state control over agro-industrial enterprises, while pointing to the need for effective competition policies in transition countries to contain potentially emerging market power of foreign multinationals in oligopolistic food industry branches. [Econ-Lit citations: F23 (multinational firms); P33 (international linkages in transition); Q13 (agribusiness)] © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [source] A Round By Any Other Name: The WTO Agenda After DohaDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 1 2002Sam Laird The WTO agenda decided at Doha in November 2001 has all the hallmarks of a new trade round, although the word ,round' has been carefully avoided. To the already mandated negotiations on agriculture and services, Doha added negotiations on industrial products and the environment as well as reviews of the operation of WTO rules in several areas. Negotiations are also to begin on the highly contentious areas of investment and competition policy. Developing countries have been reluctant to contemplate such wider commitments, arguing that much still remains to be done on implementation of the Uruguay Round, and in this they received a degree of satisfaction. In the work ahead, however, much needs to be done to take account of their needs. [source] Investment and Competition Policy in the WTO: Issues for Developing CountriesDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 1 2002Oliver Morrissey This article uses the case of trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) to examine the liberalisation of investment and its potential impact on developing countries. Very few developing countries actually use TRIMs to any appreciable degree, but, when taken in conjunction with the broader liberalisation of investment, the 1994 TRIMs Agreement has significant implications that will constrain governments' policy options and require issues of competition policy to be addressed. Multilateral competition policy would be difficult to agree and implement and the article considers alternative strategies that developing countries could adopt. [source] THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF COMPETITION LAWECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 1 2004Allan Fels This paper reviews the evolution and significance of the Trade Practices Act for the development of competition policy in Australia. The paper also discusses the role of the ACCC in the enforcement of competition law and speculates on future challenges facing the ACCC in this role. [source] SOME THOUGHTS ON ECONOMICS AND REGULATIONECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 1 2004Graeme Samuel The author discusses the role of the ACCC in promoting competition policy in Australia. The ACCC's regulatory activities in focusing on of those industries where competition is limited are examined. It is argued that the focus here is two fold: to create conditions for fair competition in industries that rely on the services of facilities with natural monopoly characteristics and the administration of price caps to minimise the impact of monopoly power. [source] The New Economy: Reality and PolicyFISCAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2001John Van Reenen Abstract This paper concerns the new economy (alias the knowledge-based economy). I examine the different meanings attached to the new economy term and the evidence surrounding it, concentrating on the upsurge in US productivity growth between 1995 and 2000. I argue that the reports of the death of the new economy have been greatly exaggerated. There is evidence that information technology has transformed the US economy and is thus likely to have a strong impact on the UK economy in coming years. I discuss how elements of public policy should adapt to these economic changes, both in terms of an overall framework and in applications to specific areas (technology policy, human capital policy, competition policy and industrial policy). The new economy is a place of hope and fear. The hope is that policy activism can cement in potential productivity gains; the fear is that government actions will not mitigate the seemingly ineluctable pressures towards social exclusion. [source] In Search of a Competition Policy in a Competitive Economy: The Case of Hong KongJOURNAL OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2003SUK-CHING HO The authors propose an exploratory framework to study competition policy development in general and apply it in the context of Hong Kong. Competition policy (in the U.S., commonly referred to as antitrust policy) is defined here as concerned with the public policy prohibiting anticompetitive behavior and the abuse of dominant market power on the part of businesses. The framework identifies four core variables that are important in influencing the development and implementation of a competition policy. These variables are the consumer protection agenda, external pressure, the political landscape, and the size of the economy. It is proposed that the way government responded to these forces has been instrumental in shaping how and why the competition policy debate in Hong Kong evolved the way it did. It also underscores the importance of recognizing the indigenous nature in the development of competition policy in any economy. Future research directions to generalize the framework are also suggested. These include further development and expansion of the core variables, contextualization of the framework for cross-national comparisons, and undertaking longitudinal studies to examine the sensitivities of the competition policy to changes in the core forces over time. [source] Market-Share Contracts with Asymmetric InformationJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 2 2009Adrian Majumdar In this paper, a dominant firm and competitive fringe supply substitute goods to a retailer who has private information about demand. We show that it is profitable for the dominant firm to condition payment on how much the retailer buys from the fringe (market-share contracts). The dominant firm thereby creates countervailing incentives for the retailer and, in some cases, is able to obtain the full-information outcome (unlike in standard screening models, where the agent earns an information rent in the high-demand state and output is distorted in the low-demand state). Our results have implications for fidelity rebates, all-units discounts, and competition policy. Although some crowding out of the fringe may occur when demand is low, we show that market-share contracts need not be harmful for welfare. [source] HOW TO RECTIFY UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND TO ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE SUPPLY CHAINS AND BETTER BUSINESS CULTURE UNDER THE GLOBAL MARKET ECONOMYPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 5 2009Tsugio Ide Banning unfair trade practices stands alongside private monopolization and the unjust restraint of trade as a key theme in competition policy. However, it poses much greater difficulties to deal with the matter than either private monopolization or unjust restraint of trade. In recent years, ongoing economic globalization, advances in information communication technology and other factors have wrought major changes in the traditional supply chain: for example, in subcontracting structure. Given the role of small and medium enterprises in underpinning economic growth, lifting the basic quality and performance level of these firms and improving business conditions for them have emerged as key policy themes. New efforts are needed to establish fair trade as a business practice and to create a new business culture in corporation with competition policy, small and medium enterprise policy and business ethics, such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices. [source] Brain competition policy as a new paradigm of regional policy: A European perspectivePAPERS IN REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2010Christian Reiner Brain competition policy; human capital; innovation; Europe Abstract The emerging knowledge economy has led to an increase of demand and locational competition for highly-skilled labour. Brain competition policy (BCP) is the reaction from national and regional policymakers. In short, BCP refers to the attraction, education and circulation of talent in and between regional and national economies. This new focus on human capital instead of physical capital indicates a paradigmatic shift in innovation policy and regional policy. While most of the contributions to this new policy approach come from the US, it can be demonstrated that different institutions in Europe prevent the simple copying of those strategies. The article contributes to the ongoing paradigmatic shift by conceptualizing a coherent framework for BCP from a European perspective. Abstract La emergente economía del conocimiento ha llevado a un aumento de la demanda y competencia en localización de mano de obra altamente especializada. Las políticas de competencia por talento (PCT) son la reacción nacional y regional de formuladores de políticas. En resumen, PCT se refiere a la atracción, educación y circulación de talento dentro de, y entre, economías regionales y nacionales. Este nuevo enfoque en cuanto a capital humano en lugar de capital físico indica un cambio paradigmático en políticas innovadoras y políticas regionales. Aunque la mayoría de aportes a este nuevo enfoque de políticas proviene de los EE.UU., se puede demostrar que las diferentes instituciones europeas impiden el copiar simplemente dichas estrategias. El artículo contribuye al cambio paradigmático continuo mediante la conceptualización de un marco coherente para PCT desde una perspectiva europea. [source] Marktplätze und indirekte NetzwerkeffektePERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2006Martin Peitz It presents key findings in this literature, derives some of them in numerical examples and discusses how these findings improve our understanding of real-world markets. It finally discusses some implications for competition policy. [source] China's Surge in Latin American Markets: Policy Challenges and ResponsesPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 3 2007Carol Wise Theories of economic development have yet to fully explain the remarkable ascendance of China in the global economy. From the standpoint of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), China's reform trajectory looks nothing like the market-based policies adopted in varying degrees in the early 1990s. Rather, China's transformation has been a lesson in experimentation with various policy combinations. This raises key questions concerning how the LAC region can best contend with China's growing presence in its markets. Whereas Mexico and Central America face stiff competition from China in low and intermediate technology-based industries (textiles, electronics, auto parts), South America has experienced vibrant growth since 2002 led by raw material exports to China, but at the expense of manufacturing exports. This article analyzes new patterns of complementarity and competition in the China,LAC relationship, and it highlights the need for a more targeted competition policy on the part of the latter. [source] Competition Policy and Property Rights,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 544 2010John Vickers One of the most controversial questions in current competition policy is when, if ever, should competition law require a firm with market power to share its property, notably intellectual property, with its rivals? And if supply is required, on what terms? These questions are discussed with reference to recent law cases including the EC Microsoft judgment of 2007 and the US linkLine case of 2009. The analysis focuses on whether competition law and regulation are complements or substitutes and on incentives for investment and (sequential) innovation. [source] POSTING MULTIPLE PRICES TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSUMER PRICE SEARCH,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2007NORMAN J. IRELAND In a model of competition with imperfect consumer price information and incomplete price search, some consumers may end up comparing prices originating from the same supplier: either because one firm sets multiple prices or because a group of firms colludes. This leads to added monopoly power for these firms, and average prices in the mixed strategy equilibrium become higher. There is a shift in welfare from consumers to producers, both with exogenous and endogenous consumer search behaviour. However consumers might search more or less with multiple prices. The implications for the price-setting equilibrium, competition policy and recent judgements are considered. [source] Competition And Its Regulation: Key IssuesANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2002P. Cook This article examines the role of competition policy in developing countries. The leading international development agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, have proclaimed their support for private sector,led development as the best strategy for reducing poverty. The benefits of private sector development are dependent on ensuring competitive market conditions, which are often absent in developing countries. However, theoretical notions of competition and the ways in which it is perceived to work vary widely and have implications for the type of competition policy that is to be implemented. Competition laws are widespread in industrialized countries but are only just beginning to be introduced in developing countries. The article examines some of the implications of applying competition policy in developing countries when account is taken of different theoretical perspectives, and of the structural and institutional differences between industrialized and developing countries. [source] BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION: THE ROLE OF PROFESSOR ROBERT BAXT, AOAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 2 2009Stephen Corones Baxt; competition policy; Trade Practices Commission Bob Baxt, the third chairman of the Trade Practices Commission, served for a single three-year term from 1988 to 1991. He followed Bob McComas, who had deliberately adopted a non-litigious approach to preserving the competitive process. Baxt was far more proactive and sought to push the frontiers of investigation and precedent, and perhaps, more significantly, to influence opinion about the need to expand the coverage of the Trade Practices Act. This article examines Baxt's role in teaching his interdisciplinary Trade Practices Workshops, the political context of his tenure, and his handling of the Queensland Wire case. [source] THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION POLICY IN AUSTRALIA: THE ROLE OF RON BANNERMANAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 2 2007David Merrett antitrust; Australia; restrictive trade practices The 1965 legislation to curb restrictive trade practices has been widely regarded as weak. By contrast, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has been considered as providing the platform for a more comprehensive competition policy. This paper argues that the 1965,67 and 1971 Acts were more effective than has been commonly recognised in raising awareness about the extent of restrictive trade practices, discrediting price agreements and laying the foundations for the 1974 Act. The role of Ron Bannerman, the sole Commissioner of Trade Practices, was critical to their success. This paper uses parliamentary debates, Bannerman's published works and an interview with him undertaken in early 2005. [source] Cooperatives and the Commodity Political Agenda: A Political Economy ApproachCANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2002Ellen Goddard Historically, major agricultural cooperatives in Canada have been intimately involved in commodity policy issues. Large cooperatives were created because farmers were upset about the perceived lack of competition in buying farm inputs or selling farm outputs. Often, the resulting cooperative was the organization farmers saw as the logical organization to represent their view of commodity policy or competition policy. As cooperatives grew and diversified, the ability to represent their members coherently across policy issues was hampered. For processing cooperatives in the supply-managed sector, the requirement that the cooperative be the political arm of industry, process product, and provide maximum returns to producer members made for a complicated objective function. This paper focuses on the twin objectives of providing efficient member services and performing political lobbying in a public choice framework. The results are illustrated by the recent history of a supply-managed further-processing cooperative and a diversified grain cooperative. [source] Retail price cycles and response asymmetryCANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2002Andrew Eckert Weekly retail gasoline prices in Windsor, Ontario, from 1989 to 1994 appear to respond faster to wholesale price increases than to decreases, but exhibit a cyclic pattern inconsistent with a common explanation of response asymmetry. I reconcile these observations through a model of price cycles. Prices on the downward portion of the cycle appear insensitive to costs, compared with price increases, supporting the theory that price decreases result from battles over market share. This pattern resembles a faster response to cost increases than to decreases, and the conclusion that asymmetry indicates a role for competition policy may be inappropriate. JEL Classification: L13, L71 Cycles des prix de détail et réponse asymétrique. Les prix de détail hebdomadaires de la gazoline à Windsor (Ont.) entre 1989 et 1994 semblent réagir plus vite aux accroissements qu'aux chutes des prix de gros, mais suivent un pattern cyclique qui ne semble pas consistant avec l'explication traditionnelle en termes de réponse asymétrique. L'auteur réconcilie ces observations à l'aide d'un modèle de cycle de prix. Les prix dans la portion descendante du cycle semblent insensibles aux variations de coûts, par comparaison avec les accroissements de prix, ce qui supporte la théorie que les chutes de prix résultent de luttes pour les parts de marché. Le pattern ressemble à celui déclenché par une réponse plus rapide aux augmentations qu'aux chutes de coûts, et la conclusion qui voudrait qu'on puisse attribuer le tout à l'asymétrie des réponses (et que donc une intervention de la politique de la concurrence s'impose) peut être inappropriée. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||