Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Competition Leads (competition + lead)
Selected AbstractsCompetition and Cost Accounting: Adapting to Changing Markets,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2002Ranjani Krishnan Abstract The relation of competition and cost accounting has been the subject of conflicting prescriptions, theories, and empirical evidence. Practitioner literature and textbooks argue that higher competition generally requires more accurate product costing. Theoretical economic analysis, in contrast, predicts that the optimal level of product-costing accuracy is sometimes higher at lower levels of competition. Results of survey research are inconsistent, suggesting a need for further identification of conditions under which higher competition leads to more accurate product costing. This study shows experimentally that individuals' choices of the level of product-costing accuracy depend not only on the current level of competition but also on the previous level of competition , that is, on an interaction between market structure (monopoly, duopoly, and four-firm competition) and market history (increasing versus decreasing competition). In the experiment, subjects decide on the quantity of data to collect at a pre-set price per datum to support more accurate product-cost estimates. Subjects collect the most cost data (i.e., choose the most accurate product costing) in monopoly, collect the least in duopoly, and an intermediate amount in the four-firm market, consistent with the pattern of optimal cost-data collection in Hansen's 1998 model. The process of convergence to the optimum differs significantly across market types and market histories, however. Subjects who begin in four-firm competition adapt more successfully to change than those who begin in monopoly. The lowest levels of decision performance occur when ex-monopolists face their first competitor: they overreact to this first encounter with competition and overspend on cost data. [source] Networks and dominance hierarchies: does interspecific aggression explain flower partitioning among stingless bees?ECOLOGICAL ENTOMOLOGY, Issue 2 2010KAI DWORSCHAK 1. The distribution of consumers among resources (trophic interaction network) may be shaped by asymmetric competition. Dominance hierarchy models predict that asymmetric interference competition leads to a domination of high quality resources by hierarchically superior species. 2. In order to determine the competitive dominance hierarchy and its effect on flower partitioning in a local stingless bee community in Borneo, interspecific aggressions were tested among eight species in arena experiments. 3. All species tested were strongly mutually aggressive in the arena, and the observed interactions were often lethal for one or both opponents. Aggression significantly increased with body size differences between fighting pairs and was asymmetric: larger aggressors were superior over smaller species. Additional aggression tests involved dummies with surface extracts, and results suggest that species- and colony-specific surface profiles are important in triggering the aggressive behaviour. 4. Sixteen stingless bee species were observed foraging on 41 species of flowering plants. The resulting bee,flower interaction network showed a high degree of generalisation (network-level specialisation H2' = 0.11), corresponding to a random, opportunistic distribution of bee species among available flower species. 5. Aggressions on flowers were rare and only occurred at a low level. The dominance hierarchy obtained in the arena experiments did not correlate significantly with plant quality, estimated as the number of flowers per plant or as total bee visitation rate. 6. Our findings suggest that asymmetries in interference competition do not necessarily translate into actual resource partitioning in the context of complex interacting communities. [source] Competition Among Banks, Capital Requirements and International SpilloversECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 3 2001Viral V. Acharya The design of prudential bank capital requirements interacts with the industrial organization of the banking sector, in particular, with the level of competition among banks. Increased competition leads to excessive risk-taking by banks which may have to be counteracted by tighter capital requirements. When capital requirements are internationally uniform but the levels of competition among banks in different countries are not, international spillovers arise on financial integration of these countries. This result begs a more careful analysis of the effect of financial liberalization on the stability of banking sectors in emerging countries. It also calls into question the merits of employing uniform capital requirements across countries that diverge in the industrial organization of their banking sectors. (J.E.L.: G21, G28, G38, F36, E58, D62) [source] HOW THE GLOBALIZATION OF R&D COMPETITION AFFECTS TRADE AND GROWTHTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2004GWANGHOON LEE The implications of international R&D competition on trade and growth are investigated. The model is one in which a separate R&D sector competes with the manufacturing sector to secure human capital, and technology is licensed to manufacturers by the winner of a pre-emptive R&D competition. The results show that globalization of R&D competition leads to trade between countries (even identical countries), because the result of competition leads to a reallocation of human capital between sectors. The winning country exports technology and traditional goods, while the loser exports manufactured goods. Globalization with indiscriminate technology licensing increases the world's economic growth rate. [source] How does alluvial sedimentation at range fronts modify the erosional dynamics of mountain catchments?BASIN RESEARCH, Issue 3 2005S. Carretier At the geological time scale, the way in which the erosion of drainage catchments responds to tectonic uplift and climate changes depends on boundary conditions. In particular, sediment accumulation and erosion occurring at the edge of mountain ranges should influence the base level of mountain catchments, as well as sediment and water discharges. In this paper, we use a landform evolution model (LEM) to investigate how the presence of alluvial sedimentation at range fronts affects catchment responses to climatic or tectonic changes. This approach is applied to a 25 km × 50 km domain, in which the central part is uplifted progressively to simulate the growth of a small mountain range. The LEM includes different slope and river processes that can compete with each other. This competition leads to ,transport-limited', ,detachment-limited' or ,mixed' transport conditions in mountains at dynamic equilibrium. In addition, two end-member algorithms (the channellized-flow and the sheet-flow regimes) have been included for the alluvial fan-flow regime. The three transport conditions and the two flow algorithms represent six different models for which the responses to increase of rock uplift rate and/or cyclic variation of the precipitation rate are investigated. Our results indicate that addition of an alluvial apron increases the long-term mountain denudation. In response to uplift, mountain rivers adapt their profile in two successive stages; first by propagation of an erosion wave and then by slowly increasing their channel gradients. During the second stage, the erosion rate is almost uniform across the catchment area at any one time, which suggests that dynamic equilibrium has been reached, although the balance between erosion and rock uplift rates has not yet been achieved. This second stage is initiated by the uplift of the mountain river outlets because of sedimentation aggradation at the mountain front. The response time depends on the type of water flow imposed on the alluvial fans domains (× by 1.5 for channelized flow regime and by 10 for the sheet flow one). Cyclic variations of precipitation rate generate cyclic incisions in the alluvial apron. These incision pulses create knick-points in the river profile in the case of ,detachment-limited' and ,mixed' river conditions, which could be mistaken for tectonically induced knick-points. ,Transport-limited' conditions do not create such knick-points, but nevertheless trigger erosion in catchments. The feedbacks linked to sedimentation and erosion at range front can therefore control catchment incision or aggradation. In addition, random river captures in the range front trigger auto-cyclic erosion pulses in the catchment, capable of generating incision,aggradation cycles. [source] | ||||||||||