Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Competition
Kinds of Competition Terms modified by Competition Selected AbstractsINNOVATION AND COMPETITION IN GENERATION AND RETAIL POWER MARKETSECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2010Elizabeth Hooper There has been considerable merger activity in EU energy markets in recent years. It could be argued that competition authorities should be required to take into account potential innovation effects of mergers. In the UK, regulators are now trying to achieve multiple objectives within the current framework. There is a danger that if markets are expected to deliver mutually incompatible objectives they will be unable to achieve any of them. [source] COMPETITION AMONG STAKEHOLDER GROUPS FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE OVER BUSINESS REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE UK PENSIONS INDUSTRYECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2003Paul Klumpes This paper applies a stakeholder perspective to estimate various types of costs (taxes) and benefits (subsidies) affecting stakeholder groups whose constituents are most affected by recent, major reforms to the public regulation of the UK pensions industry. Both direct and indirect subsidies and taxes arising from regulation distinguishes groups representing both sophisticated and vulnerable investors. The analysis suggests that financial intermediaries, and industry regulators, are all effectively subsidised by other stakeholder groups. [source] THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COMPETITION ON THE INVESTMENT OF AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES IN NEW ZEALANDECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 2 2005Malcolm Abbott In this paper the regulatory differences between Australia and New Zealand in higher education are examined to determine if they have encouraged the entry of Australian universities into the New Zealand education market. Some general observations are also made about the nature of regulatory competition and the manner in which it influences the development of the international education export industry. [source] THE NEW PORTS OF ASIA AND THE COMPETITION FOR REGIONAL SUPREMACYECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 4 2002MARIKA A. VICZIANY First page of article [source] EVOLUTION OF DOMINANCE UNDER FREQUENCY-DEPENDENT INTRASPECIFIC COMPETITION IN AN ASSORTATIVELY MATING POPULATIONEVOLUTION, Issue 2 2010Stephan Peischl We study the evolution of higher levels of dominance as a response to negative frequency-dependent selection. In contrast to previous studies, we focus on the effect of assortative mating on the evolution of dominance under frequency-dependent intraspecific competition. We analyze a two-locus two-allele model, in which the primary locus has a major effect on a quantitative trait that is under a mixture of frequency-independent stabilizing selection, density-dependent selection, and frequency-dependent selection caused by intraspecific competition for a continuum of resources. The second (modifier) locus determines the degree of dominance at the trait level. Additionally, the population mates assortatively with respect to similarities in the ecological trait. Our analysis shows that the parameter region in which dominance can be established decreases if small levels of assortment are introduced. In addition, the degree of dominance that can be established also decreases. In contrast, if assortment is intermediate, sexual selection for extreme types can be established, which leads to evolution of higher levels of dominance than under random mating. For modifiers with large effects, intermediate levels of assortative mating are most favorable for the evolution of dominance. For large modifiers, the speed of fixation can even be higher for intermediate levels of assortative mating than for random mating. [source] EFFECTS OF POLLEN LOAD SIZE ON SEED PATERNITY IN WILD RADISH: THE ROLES OF POLLEN COMPETITION AND MATE CHOICEEVOLUTION, Issue 8 2007Diane L. Marshall For sexual selection to be important in plants, it must occur at pollen load sizes typical of field populations. However, studies of the impact of pollen load size on pollen competition have given mixed results, perhaps because so few of these studies directly examined the outcome of mating when pollen load size was varied. We asked whether seed paternity after mixed pollination of wild radish was affected by pollen load sizes ranging from 22 to 220 pollen grains per stigma. We examined the seed siring abilities of 12 pollen donors across 11 maternal plants. Seed paternity was statistically indistinguishable across the pollen load sizes even though, overall, the pollen donors sired different numbers of seeds. This lack of effect of pollen load size on seed paternity may have occurred because fruit abortion and early abortion or failure of fertilization of seeds increased as load size decreased. Thus, failures of fruits and seeds sired by poorer pollen donors may keep seed paternity constant across pollen load sizes. [source] TESTING THE ROLE OF INTERSPECIFIC COMPETITION IN THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN OF ELEVATIONAL ZONATION: AN EXAMPLE WITH BUARREMON BRUSH-FINCHES (AVES, EMBERIZIDAE) IN THE NEOTROPICAL MOUNTAINSEVOLUTION, Issue 5 2007Carlos Daniel Cadena Interspecific competition might drive the evolution of ecological niches and result in pairs of formerly competing species segregating along ecological gradients following a process of character displacement. This mechanism has been proposed to account for replacement of related species along gradients of elevation in many areas of the world, but the fundamental issue of whether competition is responsible for the origin of elevational replacements has not been tested. To test hypotheses about the role of interspecific competition in the origin of complementary elevational ranges, I combined molecular phylogenetics, phylogeography, and population genetic analyses on Buarremon torquatus and B. brunneinucha (Aves, Emberizidae), whose patterns of elevational distribution suggest character displacement or ecological release. The hypothesis that elevational distributions in these species changed in opposite directions as a result of competition is untenable because: (1) a historical expansion of the range of B. brunneinucha into areas occupied by B. torquatus was not accompanied by a shift in the elevational range of the former species; (2) when B. brunneinucha colonized the range of B. torquatus, lineages of the latter distributions had already diverged; and (3) historical trends in effective population size do not suggest populations with elevational ranges abutting those of putative competitors have declined as would be expected if competition caused range contractions. However, owing to uncertainty in coalescent estimates of historical population sizes, the hypothesis that some populations of B. torquatus have declined cannot be confidently rejected, which suggests asymmetric character displacement might have occurred. I suggest that the main role of competition in elevational zonation may be to act as a sorting mechanism that allows the coexistence along mountain slopes only of ecologically similar species that differ in elevational distributions prior to attaining sympatry. The contrasting biogeographic histories of B. brunneinucha and B. torquatus illustrate how present-day ecological interactions can have recent origins, and highlights important challenges for testing the hypothesis of character displacement in the absence of data on population history and robust reconstructions of the evolution of traits and geographic ranges. [source] THE CONDITIONS FOR SPECIATION THROUGH INTRASPECIFIC COMPETITIONEVOLUTION, Issue 11 2006Reinhard Bürger Abstract It has been shown theoretically that sympatric speciation can occur if intraspecific competition is strong enough to induce disruptive selection. However, the plausibility of the involved processes is under debate, and many questions on the conditions for speciation remain unresolved. For instance, is strong disruptive selection sufficient for speciation? Which roles do genetic architecture and initial composition of the population play? How strong must assortative mating be before a population can split in two? These are some of the issues we address here. We investigate a diploid multilocus model of a quantitative trait that is under frequency-dependent selection caused by a balance of intraspecific competition and frequency-independent stabilizing selection. This trait also acts as mating character for assortment. It has been established previously that speciation can occur only if competition is strong enough to induce disruptive selection. We find that speciation becomes more difficult for very strong competition, because then extremely strong assortment is required. Thus, speciation is most likely for intermediate strengths of competition, where it requires strong, but not extremely strong, assortment. For this range of parameters, however, it is not obvious how assortment can evolve from low to high levels, because with moderately strong assortment less genetic variation is maintained than under weak or strong assortment sometimes none at all. In addition to the strength of frequency-dependent competition and assortative mating, the roles of the number of loci, the distribution of allelic effects, the initial conditions, costs to being choosy, the strength of stabilizing selection, and the particular choice of the fitness function are explored. A multitude of possible evolutionary outcomes is observed, including loss of all genetic variation, splitting in two to five species, as well as very short and extremely long stable limit cycles. On the methodological side, we propose quantitative measures for deciding whether a given distribution reflects two (or more) reproductively isolated clusters. [source] CHARACTER DISPLACEMENT AS THE "BEST OF A BAD SITUATION": FITNESS TRADE-OFFS RESULTING FROM SELECTION TO MINIMIZE RESOURCE AND MATE COMPETITIONEVOLUTION, Issue 10 2005Karin S. Pfennig Abstract Character displacement has long been considered a major cause of adaptive diversification. When species compete for resources or mates, character displacement minimizes competition by promoting divergence in phenotypes associated with resource use (ecological character displacement) or mate attraction (reproductive character displacement). In this study, we investigated whether character displacement can also have pleiotropic effects that lead to fitness trade-offs between the benefits of avoiding competition and costs accrued in other fitness components. We show that both reproductive and ecological character displacement have caused spadefoot toads to evolve smaller body size in the presence of a heterospecific competitor. Although this shift in size likely arose as a by-product of character displacement acting to promote divergence between species in mating behavior and larval development, it concomitantly reduces offspring survival, female fecundity, and sexual selection on males. Thus, character displacement may represent the "best of a bad situation" in that it lessens competition, but at a cost. Individuals in sympatry with the displaced phenotype will have higher fitness than those without the displaced trait because they experience reduced competition, but they may have reduced fitness relative to individuals in allopatry. Such a fitness trade-off can limit the conditions under which character displacement evolves and may even increase the risk of "Darwinian extinction" in sympatric populations. Consequently, character displacement may not always promote diversification in the manner that is often expected. [source] THE EVOLUTION OF SPERM-ALLOCATION STRATEGIES AND THE DEGREE OF SPERM COMPETITIONEVOLUTION, Issue 3 2005Paul D. Williams Abstract The prevailing viewpoint in the study of sperm competition is that male sperm-allocation strategies evolve in response to the degree of sperm competition an ejaculate can expect to experience within a given mating. If males cannot assess the degree of sperm competition their ejaculate will face and/or they are unable to facultatively adjust sperm investment in response to perceived levels of competition, high sperm allocation (per mating) is predicted to evolve in the context of high sperm competition. An implicit assumption of the framework used to derive this result is that the degree of sperm competition is unaffected by changes in sperm-allocation strategies. We present theory based on an alternative perspective, in which the degree of sperm competition and the sperm-allocation strategy are coupled traits that coevolve together. Our rationale is that the pattern of sperm allocation in the population will, in part, determine the level of sperm competition by affecting the number of ejaculates per female in the population. In this setting, evolution in sperm-allocation strategies is driven by changes in underlying environmental parameters that influence both the degree of sperm competition and sperm allocation. This change in perspective leads to predictions that are qualitatively different from those of previous theory. [source] INTERSEXUAL COMPETITION AS AN EXPLANATION FOR SEX-RATIO AND DISPERSAL BIASES IN POLYGYNOUS SPECIESEVOLUTION, Issue 11 2004Henri Leturque Abstract In polygynous mammals, it is commonly observed that both sex ratios at birth and dispersal are male biased. This has been interpreted as resulting from low female dispersal causing high female local resource competition, which would select for male-biased sex ratios. However, a female-biased sex ratio can be selected despite lower female than male-biased dispersal. This will occur if the low female dispersal is close to the optimal dispersal rate, while the male dispersal is not close to the optimal dispersal rate. The actual outcome depends on the joint evolution of sex-biased dispersal and sex ratio. Earlier analyses of joint evolution imply that there will be no sex-ratio nor dispersal biases at the joint evolutionarily stable strategy, thus they do not explain the data. However, these earlier analyses assume no intersexual competition for resources. Here, we show that when males and females compete with each other for access to resources, male-biased dispersal will be associated with male-biased birth sex ratio, as is commonly observed. A trend toward male-biased birth sex ratios is also expected if there is intersexual local resource competition and if birth sex ratio is constrained so that it cannot depart from balanced sex ratio. [source] REPRESSION OF COMPETITION AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIONEVOLUTION, Issue 4 2003Steven A. Frank Abstract Repression of competition within groups joins kin selection as the second major force in the history of life shaping the evolution of cooperation. When opportunities for competition against neighbors are limited within groups, individuals can increase their own success only by enhancing the efficiency and productivity of their group. Thus, characters that repress competition within groups promote cooperation and enhance group success. Leigh first expressed this idea in the context of fair meiosis, in which each chromosome has an equal chance of transmission via gametes. Randomized success means that each part of the genome can increase its own success only by enhancing the total number of progeny and thus increasing the success of the group. Alexander used this insight about repression of competition in fair meiosis to develop his theories for the evolution of human sociality. Alexander argued that human social structures spread when they repress competition within groups and promote successful group-against-group competition. Buss introduced a new example with his suggestion that metazoan success depended on repression of competition between cellular lineages. Maynard Smith synthesized different lines of thought on repression of competition. In this paper, I develop simple mathematical models to illustrate the main processes by which repression of competition evolves. With the concepts made clear, I then explain the history of the idea. I finish by summarizing many new developments in this subject and the most promising lines for future study. [source] ECOLOGICAL BISTABILITY AND EVOLUTIONARY REVERSALS UNDER ASYMMETRICAL COMPETITIONEVOLUTION, Issue 6 2002Fabio Dercole Abstract How does the process of life-history evolution interplay with population dynamics? Almost all models that have addressed this question assume that any combination of phenotypic traits uniquely determine the ecological population state. Here we show that if multiple ecological equilibria can exist, the evolution of a trait that relates to competitive performance can undergo adaptive reversals that drive cyclic alternation between population equilibria. The occurrence of evolutionary reversals requires neither environmentally driven changes in selective forces nor the coevolution of interactions with other species. The mechanism inducing evolutionary reversals is twofold. First, there exist phenotypes near which mutants can invade and yet fail to become fixed; although these mutants are eventually eliminated, their transitory growth causes the resident population to switch to an alternative ecological equilibrium. Second, asymmetrical competition causes the direction of selection to revert between high and low density. When ecological conditions for evolutionary reversals are not satisfied, the population evolves toward a steady state of either low or high abundance, depending on the degree of competitive asymmetry and environmental parameters. A sharp evolutionary transition between evolutionary stasis and evolutionary reversals and cycling can occur in response to a smooth change in ecological parameters, and this may have implications for our understanding of size-abundance patterns. [source] COMPETITION FOR MARKET SHARE OR FOR MARKET SIZE: OLIGOPOLISTIC EQUILIBRIA WITH VARYING COMPETITIVE TOUGHNESS,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2007Claude D'Aspremont For an industry producing a composite commodity, we propose a comprehensive concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parameterized continuum of regimes varying in competitive toughness. Each firm sets simultaneously its price and its quantity under two constraints, relative to its market share and to market size. The price and the quantity equilibrium outcomes always belong to the set of oligopolistic equilibria. When firms are identical and we let their number increase, any sequence of symmetric oligopolistic equilibria converges to the monopolistic competition outcome. Further results are derived in the symmetric CES case, concerning in particular the collusive solution enforceability. [source] COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE U.K. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY (WITH A BRIEF LOOK AT CALIFORNIA)JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2001Stephen C. Littlechild In this article, the U.K.'s Director General of Electricity Supply from 1989 to 1998 assesses the effects of deregulation and competition on the U.K. electricity industry after about a decade. Expansion of existing competitors, new entry, and further restructuring have reduced the aggregate share of the largest two generation companies from nearly 80% to 26%. Efficiency has improved and wholesale prices have fallen after an initial increase. Voluntary bilateral contracts markets are about to replace the mandatory "Pool," with centralised control limited to physically balancing the system and settling contract imbalances. Retail supply competition has been active for large industrial customers since the beginning, and 80% of them now buy from another supplier. The market for residential customers opened in early 1999, and already nearly a quarter of them have chosen another supplier. Incentive price controls on transmission and distribution have stimulated increased efficiency and significantly reduced use-of-system charges. Overall, prices for all classes of customers have fallen by 25,35% in real terms since privatisation, and quality of service has improved. California has adopted a policy that is similar in many respects, but with very different results. The problems there have stemmed partly from less favourable demand and supply conditions, but also from significant policy differences, including barriers to building new capacity, obstacles to the use of long-term supply (or hedging) contracts, retail price controls at untenable levels, and the requirement that (after a transition period) utilities pass through wholesale spot prices directly to their customers. Changes in such policies will eventually enable both producers and consumers in California to benefit from competition. [source] COALESCENCE VERSUS COMPETITION: FIELD AND LABORATORY STUDIES OF INTRA- AND INTERSPECIFIC ENCOUNTERS AMONG COALESCING SEAWEEDSJOURNAL OF PHYCOLOGY, Issue 2000B. Santelices Classical ecological theory predicts that whenever growing individuals share a common and limiting resource, such as substratum in mid-intertidal and shallow subtidal habitats, preemptive competition will occur determining species abundance and distribution patterns. However, conspecificity of several ecologically dominant Rhodophyta may coalesce when grown in laboratory cultures. The extent at which intraspecific coalescence occurs in the field and whether the process may also happens during interspecific encounters remain to be determined. If intra- and interspecific coalescence effectively occurs, then coexistence through coalescence rises as an alternative to competition among red-algal dominated intertidal and shallow subtidal communities. Populations of Mazzaella laminarioides and Nothogenia fastigiata living in mid-intertidal, semi-exposed rocky habitats in Central Chile are being used to test the above ideas. Intra- and interspecific encounters occur in the field throughout the year. Coalescence does occur among conspecific partners but it has not been detected in interspecific encounters. Rather, a thick interface of compressed cells, necrotic tissues and cyanobacterial nodules is formed between the two contacting partners. In addition, observations of laboratory cultures indicate that spore germination, germling survival and differentiation of erect axes in bispecific cultures may be reduced when compared to single-species controls. Interspecific differences in growth and differentiation rates appear as the mechanisms explaining a lack of coalescence and negative effects during interspecific contacts. On the other hand, the existence of conspecific coalescence in the field suggests this process should be considered as a real alternative to intraspecific competition among coalescing Rhodophyta. [source] TAX COMPETITION IN THE PRESENCE OF INTERJURISDICTIONAL EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF CRIME PREVENTION,JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 5 2007Santiago M. Pinto ABSTRACT The paper analyzes the effect of fiscal competition when local governments choose the level of public goods that generate spillover effects elsewhere. For instance, law enforcement activities affect both the crime level in the jurisdiction providing the good and in neighboring communities. The model shows that when local governments rely on capital taxation to finance these expenditures the spillover effects may not lead to an inefficient provision of public goods as predicted by the tax competition literature. In the model, capital is costlessly mobile and offenders relocate responding to differential criminal opportunities and differential local law enforcement efforts. [source] MANAGING COMPETITION IN CITY SERVICES: THE CASE OF BARCELONAJOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 5 2009GERMÀ BEL ABSTRACT:,"Clean and safe" strategies are part of urban regeneration in the entrepreneurial city. These strategies are often characterized by privatization and public,private partnerships that enhance investment and create a city space more amenable to tourists and consumers. While such approaches promote increased investment, and differentiate services by district, they raise challenges of competition, cost escalation, and public participation. Barcelona's solid waste management strategy is presented to show the importance of a strong public coordination role when using competition to promote technological innovation and improved quality in city service delivery. [source] STEINDL ON IMPERFECT COMPETITION: THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL CHANGEMETROECONOMICA, Issue 3 2006Article first published online: 24 JUL 200, Harry Bloch ABSTRACT Josef Steindl offers an innovative dynamic analysis of competition in Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism, with a key role for technical change. However, in his later writings he suggests that he had not gone far enough and that his account was not ,sufficiently dynamic', noting particularly his neglect of fundamental issues in technological development. Here, we critically examine the nature of technical change in Steindl's analysis, pointing to ambiguities and contradictions that arise. Standard characterizations of the nature of technical change are then introduced and used to further integrate technical change into Steindl's analysis of competition. [source] A MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WITH PERSONAL INCOME DISPERSIONMETROECONOMICA, Issue 3 2005Corrado Benassi ABSTRACT We introduce non-homothetic preferences in the Dixit,Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, and enquire about the effects of a change in income dispersion on the firms' optimal decisions and market equilibrium. Income dispersion, modeled as a mean preserving spread, is shown to affect only the degree of product differentiation under the standard negligibility hypothesis on the firms' decision making process, while it generates a positive co-movement of demand and demand elasticity, when this assumption is removed and the price index effect is taken into account. [source] MONOPOLY, POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND PRIVATE STOCK INFORMATION IN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE MARKETSNATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 4 2000MARK D. AGEE ABSTRACT. This paper develops an exhaustible resource model with an incumbent monopolist that faces future potential entry of a single rival or backstop technology. The model is characterized by private stock information in the sense that firms do not know with certainty the size and/or quality of their rival's reserve stock. Results indicate that if such information is private, the strategic response of the monopolist to an entry threat is to extract reserves in the pre-entry era at a rate faster than would a pure monopolist in an uncontested market, and thus could lead to an improvement in economic welfare relative to the situation where entry is restricted. [source] STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE OF MARKET COMPETITION: THE TAIWANESE CABLE TV INDUSTRY IN THE 1990sTHE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, Issue 3 2002Lu-Lin CHENG Cable TV plays a dominant role in the media environment of Taiwanese society. Before the passage of the Cable TV Law in 1993, the industry was a vibrant informal sector; it was highly differentiated, and acted as a democratic alternative to the formal media. The 1993 Cable TV Law, which designed a competitive market with five licenses issued in each area, was touted as a victory for democracy by the opposition parties. In less than a decade, however, drastic merger movements led to a monopolistic structure. The abuse of monopolistic power has become pervasive. This article studies this unexpected historical twist by examining the industry's market dynamics during the country's democratization in the 1990s. To show the path-dependent mechanisms in the nonlinear development trajectory of the market, a sociological approach is applied that emphasizes firms' competitive strategies in controlling the multiple dimensions of uncertainties and rules that induce this competition. [source] WHY SOCIAL PREFERENCES MATTER , THE IMPACT OF NON-SELFISH MOTIVES ON COMPETITION, COOPERATION AND INCENTIVESTHE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 478 2002Ernst Fehr A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solely motivated by material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs of relevant reference agents. We show empirically that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences, in particular, that without taking social preferences into account, it is not possible to understand adequately (i) effects of competition on market outcomes, (ii) laws governing cooperation and collective action, (iii) effects and the determinants of material incentives, (iv) which contracts and property rights arrangements are optimal, and (v) important forces shaping social norms and market failures. [source] MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WITH EFFICIENCY GAPS AND A HECKSCHER-OHLIN TRADE PATTERN,THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2006TORU KIKUCHI We develop a two-factor, three-sector model of international trade in which the monopolistically competitive firms are characterized by different fixed production costs. We show that, depending on the pattern of the international distribution of factor endowments, the trade pattern is determined not only by relative factor endowments as suggested by Heckscher and Ohlin, but also by absolute factor endowments via a mechanism of competitive selection in the monopolistically competitive sector. [source] HOW THE GLOBALIZATION OF R&D COMPETITION AFFECTS TRADE AND GROWTHTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2004GWANGHOON LEE The implications of international R&D competition on trade and growth are investigated. The model is one in which a separate R&D sector competes with the manufacturing sector to secure human capital, and technology is licensed to manufacturers by the winner of a pre-emptive R&D competition. The results show that globalization of R&D competition leads to trade between countries (even identical countries), because the result of competition leads to a reallocation of human capital between sectors. The winning country exports technology and traditional goods, while the loser exports manufactured goods. Globalization with indiscriminate technology licensing increases the world's economic growth rate. [source] PATENT DAMAGES AND SPATIAL COMPETITION,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010MATTHEW D. HENRY We analyze price competition between a spatially differentiated product patentee and an imitator anticipating probabilistic future patent damages. We compare the performance of three damage regimes. The ,reasonable royalty' regime, which yields symmetric equilibrium pricing, maximizes static welfare and yields the highest innovation incentives when patent enforcement is nearly certain. The ,lost profits' regime, which may deter infringement, yields the highest innovation incentives when patent enforcement is less-than-certain and products are sufficiently valuable. The ,unjust enrichment' regime yields low static efficiency and low innovation incentives. We offer new insights into the ,hypothetical negotiation' that courts use to construct reasonable royalties. [source] CUT-THROAT FRINGE COMPETITION IN AN EMERGING COUNTRY MARKET: TAX EVASION OR THE ABSENCE OF MARKET POWER?,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2009ALBERTO SALVO Brazil's established soft-drink firms recently lost ground to multiple low-price entrants, with small-scale operations and minimal advertising. While incumbents attributed such undercutting to entrants' lower costs from non-compliance with the law, ,generics' counterargued that incumbents' high prices stemmed from unilateral market power rather than cost heterogeneity. By estimating a structural model, I can single-handedly explain established brands' high prices through low equilibrium price elasticities of demand. Tax evasion in the fringe, while plausible, appears to be offset by higher procurement costs or less efficient scale. More generally, a competitive informal sector can alleviate the allocative distortions in certain concentrated industries. [source] INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND COMPETITION IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2008CARLO CAMBINI Interconnection; Access charges; Reception charges; Information exchange We develop a model of information exchange between calling parties. We characterize the equilibrium when two interconnected networks compete by charging both for outgoing and incoming calls. We show that networks have reduced incentives to use off-net price discrimination to induce a connectivity breakdown when calls originated and received are complements in the information exchange. This breakdown disappears if operators are allowed to negotiate reciprocal access charges. We also study the relationship between sending and receiving retail charges as a function of the level of access charges. We identify circumstances where private negotiations over access charges induce first-best retail prices. [source] COMPETITION AND COST OVERRUNS IN PROCUREMENT,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2007JUAN-JOSÉ GANUZA Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper provides a rationale for the observed pattern in public procurement of underinvestment in design specification. We propose a two-stage model in which the sponsor first decides how much to invest in design specification and auctions the project to horizontally differentiated contractors. After the contract has been awarded and implemented, the sponsor and contractor receive new information about the optimal project design and renegotiate the contract to accommodate changes in the initial project's design. We show that the sponsor's optimal strategy is to underinvest in design specification, which makes significant cost overruns likely. Since no such underinvestment occurs when contractors are not horizontally differentiated, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market. [source] COMPETITION AND WELFARE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF LICENSING,THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 1 2010ARIJIT MUKHERJEE If firms with asymmetric costs can engage in technology licensing, we show that welfare may be higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. Under fixed-fee licensing, consumer surplus and welfare are higher under Cournot competition if the technological difference between the firms is moderate. Under royalty licensing, if the bargaining power of the licenser is not very high and the technological difference between the firms is large, consumer surplus and welfare are higher under Cournot competition. We also show that technology licensing has important implications on the profit differential between Bertrand and Cournot competition. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||