Home About us Contact | |||
Competing Firms (competing + firm)
Selected AbstractsStrategic Decisions of New Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information: A Game-Theoretic Model*DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 4 2003Kevin Zhu ABSTRACT In this paper we explore strategic decision making in new technology adoption by using economic analysis. We show how asymmetric information affects firms' decisions to adopt the technology. We do so in a two-stage game-theoretic model where the first-stage investment results in the acquisition of a new technology that, in the second stage, may give the firm a competitive advantage in the product market. We compare two information structures under which two competing firms have asymmetric information about the future performance (i.e., postadoption costs) of the new technology. We find that equilibrium strategies under asymmetric information are quite different from those under symmetric information. Information asymmetry leads to different incentives and strategic behaviors in the technology adoption game. In contrast to conventional wisdom, our model shows that market uncertainty may actually induce firms to act more aggressively under certain conditions. We also show that having better information is not always a good thing. These results illustrate a key departure from established decision theory. [source] Private road competition and equilibrium with traffic equilibrium constraintsJOURNAL OF ADVANCED TRANSPORTATION, Issue 1 2009Hai Yang Abstract Toll road competition is one of the important issues under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme, which is being encountered nowadays in many cities. When there are two or more competing firms and each firm operates a competitive toll road, their profits are interrelated due to the competitors' choices and demand inter-dependence in the network. In this paper we develop game-theoretic approaches to the study of the road network, on which multiple toll roads are operated by competitive private firms. The strategic interactions and market equilibria among the private firms are analyzed both in determining their supply (road capacity) and price (toll level) over the network. The toll road competition problems in general traffic equilibrium networks are formulated as an equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints or bi-level variational inequalities. Heuristic solution methods are proposed and their convergences are demonstrated with simple network examples. It is shown that private pricing and competition can be both profitable and welfare-improving. [source] The Strategic Effects of Vertical Market Structure: Common Agency and Divisionalization in the US Motion Picture IndustryJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2001Kenneth S. CortsArticle first published online: 28 JAN 200 I examine the release-date scheduling of all motion pictures that went into wide release in the US in 1995 and 1996 to investigate the effects of vertical market structure on competition. The evidence suggests that complex vertical structures involving multiple upstream or downstream firms generally do not achieve efficient outcomes in movie scheduling. In addition, analysis of the data suggests that the production divisions of the major studios act as integrated parts of the studio, rather than as independent competing firms. [source] Compatibility and Bundling with Generalist and Specialist FirmsTHE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2000Vincenzo Denicolo I analyze compatibility and bundling choices when one generalist firm offering both components of a system competes against two specialist firms each supplying one component only (but not the same one). I show that the generalist firm may have an incentive to choose incompatibility or engage in pure bundling when one component is less differentiated than the other. In this case, the system is more differentiated than the relatively undifferentiated component, and so under incompatibility the specialist firm that produces the undifferentiated component will relax price competition. This may result in higher profits for some of the competing firms. [source] Value Creation Versus Value Capture: Towards a Coherent Definition of Value in StrategyBRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2000Cliff Bowman Resource-based theory has tended to focus on the development and protection of valuable resources. What determines a valuable resource has received less attention. This paper addresses three related issues concerning value and valuable resources: what is value? how is it created? and who captures it? We have tried here to integrate different strands of the literature to address these questions. First, we argue that a distinction needs to be made between use value, which is subjectively assessed by customers, and exchange value, which is only realized at the point of sale. Second, we argue that the source of new use values is the labour performed by organizational members, and that firm profits can be attributed to this labour. Profit differences between competing firms derive from labour performing heterogeneously across firms. Finally, we argue that value capture is determined by the perceived power relationships between buyers and sellers. [source] |