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Compensation Packages (compensation + packages)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Politically-Connected Boards and the Structure of Chief Executive Officer Compensation Packages in Taiwanese Firms,

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 5 2010
Hsin-Yi Yu
G32; G34; J33 Abstract This paper examines the relationship between the level of political connection of the board and chief executive officer (CEO) equity-based compensation. Using a sample of Taiwanese firms, the paper provides evidence that politically connected boards grant a lower proportion of equity-based compensation to CEOs. Political intervention can reduce the proportion of equity-based compensation and, thereby, can have negative consequences for the alignment between the interests of CEOs and shareholders in firms. The findings obtained in this paper could be useful to policy-makers in emerging economies, where there is wide scope for political intervention. [source]

Measuring Investment Distortions when Risk-Averse Managers Decide Whether to Undertake Risky Projects

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2005
Robert Parrino
We create a dynamic model in which a self-interested, risk-averse manager makes corporate investment decisions at a levered firm with characteristics typical of public US firms. We examine the magnitude of distortions in those decisions when a new project changes firm risk and find expected changes in the values of future tax shields and bankruptcy costs to be important factors. We evaluate the extent to which these distortions vary with firm leverage, debt duration, project size, managerial risk aversion, managerial non-firm wealth, and the structure of management compensation packages [source]

New Rules for the Treatment of Stock Options: Caveats for Management

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2001
Jeanne Sylvestre
Stock options have become an increasingly popular part of compensation packages. But some of the latest rules for handling them are complex. The authors explain how to navigate these treacherous waters, and list a variety of caveats you must heed. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [source]

EVIDENCE ON THE COMPENSATION OF PORTFOLIO MANAGERS

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006
Heber Farnsworth
Abstract We surveyed 396 portfolio managers about the structure of their compensation. Overall, more compensation packages are subjective/discretionary than objective/formula based. Firm success factors such as firm profitability have more effect on bonuses than do client success factors such as investment performance. Differences in the structure of compensation across firms, clients, job types, and manager characteristics reflect likely differences in the underlying contracting environments, especially differences in the difficulty of monitoring performance and exerting control. [source]