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Common Market (common + market)
Selected AbstractsTHE NON-TRADED SECTOR, LOBBYING, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE COMMON MARKETECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2008CYRILLE SCHWELLNUS This paper models immigration policy as the outcome of political competition between interest groups representing individuals employed in different sectors. In standard positive theory, restrictive immigration policy results from a low-skilled median voter voting against predominantly low-skilled immigration. In the present paper, in contrast, once trade policies are liberalized, restrictive immigration policy results from anti-immigration lobbying by interest groups representing the non-traded sectors. It is shown that this is in line with empirical regularities from recent episodes of restrictive immigration legislation in the European Union. It is further shown that if governments negotiate bilaterally over trade and migration policy regimes, the equilibrium regime depends (i) on the sequencing of the international negotiation process and (ii) on the set of available trade and migration policy regimes. In particular, the most comprehensive and most welfare-beneficial type of liberalization may be rejected only because a less comprehensive type of liberalization is available. [source] The European Commission's Guidance on Article 102TFEU: From Inferno to Paradiso?THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 4 2010Article first published online: 8 JUL 2010, nar Akman The European Commission has for the first time issued a document expressing its official position on the enforcement of Article 102TFEU which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position on the Common Market. The Commission Guidance on enforcement priorities in applying Article 102TFEU to exclusionary abuses (adopted in December 2008) has ended a review of about four years. Given the increased enforcement of Article 102TFEU at the European level and the fact that many national provisions in the EU on unilateral conduct are modelled after Article 102TFEU, how the Commission intends to enforce Article 102TFEU is crucial for the application of competition law and the undertakings subject to it under European and/or national laws. The review period was preceded by severe criticisms of the Commission's approach to Article 102TFEU for protecting competitors instead of competition and for being insufficiently grounded in modern economic thinking. At the heart of the review and the discussions surrounding it lay the question of the objective of Article 102TFEU. Some, including the Directorate General for Competition claimed the objective to be ,consumer welfare', whereas some argued that ,consumer welfare' cannot be adopted as the objective at the expense of the protection of the competitive process. This article critically reviews the Commission Guidance, with an eye to assessing the ultimate objective of and the test of harm under Article 102TFEU. After discussing whether the Guidance indeed sets priorities, it examines the general approach of the Guidance to exclusionary conduct. It points out that despite there being some welcome novelties in the Guidance, there are also suggestions therein whose legitimacy and legality are questionable. Reflecting on the Guidance as a soft-law instrument, the article argues that although regarding the objective of Article 102TFEU, the Commission's apparent tendency towards ,consumer welfare' is not unlawful, the reform of Article 102TFEU to bring it more in line with modern economic and legal thinking seems to be far from complete. [source] After the Health Check What is the Future for the Common Agricultural Policy?EUROCHOICES, Issue 1 2009Nach dem Gesundheitscheck: Wie geht es weiter mit der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik? Summary After the Health Check What is the Future for the Common Agricultural Policy? The CAP has now completed another stage in its development. The Health Check negotiating marathon has ended. The Czech Republic has been against unequal conditions for member states as these deform fair competition and the common market. Progressive modulation in the originally proposed form would have created barriers to a unified Europe, thus going against the motto of the Czech presidency ,Europe without Barriers'. The Czech Republic can certainly be satisfied with the essence of the compromise. The cancellation of the milk quota in 2015 is a liberalising measure, and as such we support it. The Health Check opens the door to the Czech presidency for a discussion on the elimination of unfair differences in direct payments between member states and we will definitely take up the opportunity. After 2013 the CAP will have to take much greater account of the situation following the unprecedented expansion of the EU in 2004 and 2006. For the Czech Republic, a further reinforcing of freedom in decision making for farmers and their focus on the specific needs of the local, community and global market is fundamental. Further simplification of the CAP and ,better regulation', focussing on a reduction in the administrative burden on farmers, is one of the priority challenges. La PAC a maintenant atteint un autre stade de son développement. Le marathon de négociation du bilan de santé a abouti. La République tchèque s'est opposée aux conditions inégales proposées aux pays membres car elles faussent la concurrence équitable et le marché commun. La modulation progressive sous sa forme initiale aurait créé des barrières dans une Europe unifiée, ce qui va à l'encontre de la devise de la présidence tchèque "Une Europe sans barrières". La République tchèque peut certainement être satisfaite de l'essence du compromis. La suppression du système des quotas laitiers en 2015 est une mesure de libéralisation et nous la soutenons en tant que telle. Le bilan de santé ouvre la porte à la présidence tchèque pour une discussion sur l'élimination des différences injustes entre paiements directs selon le pays membre et nous profiterons bien entendu de l'occasion. Après 2013, la PAC devra prendre davantage en compte la situation créée par l'élargissement sans précédent de l'UE entre 2004 et 2006. Pour la République tchèque, il est fondamental de renforcer encore la liberté qu'ont les agriculteurs pour prendre leurs décisions et de s'orienter vers les besoins spécifiques du marché local, communautaire et mondial. Un des défis prioritaires est de continuer à simplifier la PAC et d'améliorer la réglementation en s'orientant vers une réduction de la charge administrative qui pèse sur les agriculteurs. Eine weitere Phase in der Entwicklung der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik ist nun abgeschlossen. Der Verhandlungsmarathon hinsichtlich des Gesundheitschecks ist vorbei. Die Tschechische Republik war dagegen, dass für die Mitgliedsstaaten unterschiedliche Bedingungen gelten sollen, da diese den fairen Wettbewerb und den gemeinsamen Markt verzerren. Eine progressive Modulation in der ursprünglich vorgeschlagenen Form hätte einem einheitlichen Europa Steine in den Weg gelegt und somit dem Motto "Europa ohne Grenzen" der tschechischen Präsidentschaft widersprochen. Die Tschechische Republik hat zweifellos mit dem Kompromiss ein im Wesentlichen zufriedenstellendes Ergebnis erzielt. Die Abschaffung der Milchquote bis 2015 ist eine Maßnahme zur Liberalisierung, und als solche findet sie unsere Unterstützung. Der Gesundheitscheck eröffnet der tschechischen Präsidentschaft die Diskussion über die Beseitigung unterschiedlich hoher , und somit ungerechter , Direktzahlungen an die Mitgliedsstaaten. Diese Gelegenheit werden wir uns nicht entgehen lassen. Nach 2013 wird sich die GAP sehr viel mehr mit der Situation beschäftigen müssen, die sich aus der beispiellosen EU-Erweiterung aus den Jahren 2004 und 2006 ergibt. Für die Tschechische Republik ist es von grundlegender Bedeutung, die Entscheidungsfreiheit für Landwirte und deren Orientierung an den lokalen, regionalen und globalen Märkten fortwährend zu stärken. Die weitere Vereinfachung der GAP und eine "bessere Regulierung", die den Verwaltungsaufwand für Landwirte verringern soll, gehören zu den vorrangigen Zielen. [source] Regulated Firms with Transboundary Pollution: Does International Competition Improve Efficiency?JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2003Isabelle Péchoux We consider a model of strategic trade and environmental policies with transboundary pollution. A regulated monopoly produces in each country and emits pollution. Under complete information, opening borders leads to a reallocation of the production from the large country to the small one. Total production increases, leading to an increase in the total level of pollution. The creation of a common market sometimes leads to a deterioration of total welfare. Under asymmetric information, the international competition generated by the common market decreases the informational rents of the firms, thereby reinforcing the potential gain to open markets to international competition. [source] Regulation and Coordination of International Environmental Externalities with Incomplete Information and Costly Public FundsJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2000Faysal Mansouri In this article, we study cross-border externalities in a game played by two principal-agent pairs with adverse selection. Each firm/agent is located in one country and generates pollution by producing complementary or substitute goods, sold on a common market. A fraction of pollution is transferred from one country to another. Each regulator/principal is imperfectly informed about the marginal cost of his domestic firm and accordingly uses secret incentive contracts with costly public funds. We show the necessity of cooperation between competing regulators to effectively internalize all the damages caused to the environment, while reaching the first best. If the level of uncertainty is sufficiently low, we obtain an infinity of noncooperative Bayesian differentiable equilibria, which may necessitate competing regulators to coordinate on an equilibrium. Such coordination constitutes an incentive for competing regulators to cooperate. Our major result states that under some circumstances asymmetric information relaxes the transborder externality problem. Indeed, we show that, when there is a major transfer of pollution and firms' marginal costs are sufficiently high, competing regulators are better off under uncertainty. Therefore, asymmetry of information can have the very consequence of generating regulation that is too strict from the domestic viewpoint but that improves social efficiency when the benefits to both countries are taken into account. [source] Social Capital And Community Governance*THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 483 2002Samuel Bowles Community governance is the set of small group social interactions that, with market and state, determine economic outcomes. We argue (i) community governance addresses some common market and state failures but typically relies on insider-outsider distinctions that may be morally repugnant and economically costly; (ii) the individual motivations supporting community governance are not captured by either selfishness or altruism; (iii) communities, markets and states are complements, not substitutes; (iv) when poorly designed, markets and states crowd out communities; (v) some distributions of property rights are better than others at fostering community governance; and (vi) communities will probably increase in importance in the future. [source] EVALUATING EU POLICIES ON PUBLIC SERVICES: A CITIZENS' PERSPECTIVEANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010Judith Clifton ABSTRACT,:,This article evaluates EU policies on public services , particularly public network services , from the citizens' point of view. It is first argued that citizens' perceptions are important because the provision of fundamental services is at stake and because they constitute the infrastructure necessary for social and economic development. Citizens',voice' can, therefore, be known, analyzed and used in the design of improved policy on public services along with other indicators. Changing EU policy on public services is synthesized and classified into two main phases in section two. Citizen satisfaction with public services as revealed through surveys from 1997 to 2007 is explored in the third section. In the discussion, the prospects for EU policy on public services are considered and, it is argued that, from the perspectives of subsidiarity and proportionality, policy towards strengthening the common market is being increasingly uploaded to the supranational level in the form of directives, whilst cohesion and redistribution policies are being downloaded to the national level or dealt with at the supranational level by ,soft' instruments. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||