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Commitment Problem (commitment + problem)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting63%
Humanities and Social Sciences18%
Engineering18%

Kinds of Commitment Problem

  • unit commitment problem
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    Selected Abstracts

    Fuzzy based fast dynamic programming solution of unit commitment with ramp constraints

    EXPERT SYSTEMS, Issue 4 2009
    S. Patra
    Abstract: A fast dynamic programming technique based on a fuzzy based unit selection procedure is proposed in this paper for the solution of the unit commitment problem with ramp constraints. The curse of dimensionality of the dynamic programming technique is eliminated by minimizing the number of prospective solution paths to be stored at each stage of the search procedure. Heuristics like priority ordering of the units, unit grouping, fast economic dispatch based on priority ordering, and avoidance of repeated economic dispatch through memory action have been employed to make the algorithm fast. The proposed method produced comparable results with the best performing methods found in the literature. [source]

    Optimal Thermal Unit Commitment Integrated with Renewable Energy Sources Using Advanced Particle Swarm Optimization

    IEEJ TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING, Issue 5 2009
    Shantanu Chakraborty Student member
    Abstract This paper presents a methodology for solving generation planning problem for thermal units integrated with wind and solar energy systems. The renewable energy sources are included in this model due to their low electricity cost and positive effect on environment. The generation planning problem also known by unit commitment problem is solved by a genetic algorithm operated improved binary particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm. Unlike trivial PSO, this algorithm runs the refinement process through the solutions within multiple populations. Some genetic algorithm operators such as crossover, elitism, and mutation are stochastically applied within the higher potential solutions to generate new solutions for next population. The PSO includes a new variable for updating velocity in accordance with population best along with conventional particle best and global best. The algorithm performs effectively in various sized thermal power system with equivalent solar and wind energy system and is able to produce high quality (minimized production cost) solutions. The solution model is also beneficial for reconstructed deregulated power system. The simulation results show the effectiveness of this algorithm by comparing the outcome with several established methods. Copyright © 2009 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [source]

    Stochastic unit commitment problem

    INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2004
    Takayuki Shiina
    Abstract The electric power industry is undergoing restructuring and deregulation. We need to incorporate the uncertainty of electric power demand or power generators into the unit commitment problem. The unit commitment problem is to determine the schedule of power generating units and the generating level of each unit. The objective is to minimize the operational cost which is given by the sum of the fuel cost and the start-up cost. In this paper we propose a new algorithm for the stochastic unit commitment problem which is based on column generation approach. The algorithm continues adding schedules from the dual solution of the restricted linear master program until the algorithm cannot generate new schedules. The schedule generation problem is solved by the calculation of dynamic programming on the scenario tree. [source]

    Exiting a Lawless State,

    THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 531 2008
    Karla Hoff
    An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This article looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The article identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition: the inability, under a rule of law, to forgive theft. This can lead to the perpetuation of the non-rule-of-law state, even when it might seem that the alternative is Pareto-improving. [source]

    Strategic Delegation in Monetary Unions

    THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 2004
    V. V. Chari
    In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation,that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union, are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem. [source]

    Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace

    INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2003
    David H. Bearce
    While the commercial institutional peace research program provides empirical evidence that international institutions, especially preferential trade arrangements, help reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict, it fails to delineate clearly how such institutions matter. Building from the logic that low opportunity costs for fighting, private information, and commitment problems constitute important causes of war, this article explores three interrelated causal mechanisms. First, the state leaders' increased expectations about future commerce create an incentive for these actors to consider peaceful bargains as an alternative to costly war. Second, security coordination under the umbrella of a commercial institution provides fuller information about state military capabilities, thus making inter-state bargaining for dispute resolution more efficient. Third, in bringing together high-level state leaders on a regular basis, commercial institutions may create the trust necessary to overcome commitment problems in inter-state bargaining. I explore how these mechanisms have operated within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Economic Community of West African States. [source]

    Durable Goods Monopoly, Buyer Uncertainty, and Concurrent Selling and Renting

    METROECONOMICA, Issue 4 2000
    Gregory E. Goering
    Stylized durable goods monopoly models typically conclude that monopolists prefer to rent their output due to commitment problems associated with sales. However, we commonly observe monopolistic firms in durable goods industries simultaneously selling and renting output. To address this apparent discrepancy a simple two-period asymmetric information model is constructed where buyers are uncertain of the good's durability and the firm's manufacturing costs. This is a natural asymmetric information specification since the firm typically has more precise knowledge of product durability and production costs than buyers do. The analysis indicates that a monopolist may wish to concurrently sell and rent output when buyers do not have perfect knowledge. If, for example, consumers believe that product durability and manufacturing costs are higher than they truly are, the firm may wish to simultaneously sell and rent output. Thus buyers' expectations about firm costs and product durability are of critical importance in durable goods models, particularly in terms of explaining concurrent rentals and sales. [source]

    Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements

    AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2010
    Michaela Mattes
    Civil war is usually examined from the perspective of commitment problems. This approach provides considerable insight regarding which civil war agreement provisions reduce the chance of renewed fighting. Yet, additional insight can be gained by examining information asymmetries as a potential cause of civil war recurrence. We argue that significant uncertainty regarding military capabilities may persist after fighting ends and that this uncertainty may lead to the breakdown of peace. However, carefully designed peace agreements can guard against renewed civil war by calling for international monitoring, making the belligerents submit military information to third parties, and providing for verification of this information. Our empirical analysis of 51 civil war settlements between 1945 and 2005 shows that these provisions significantly reduce the risk of new civil war. Encouraging the adoption of these provisions may be a useful policy in the international community's effort to establish peace in civil-war-torn societies. [source]

    Squeaky Wheel Gets the Oil: Incentives, Information and Drought Policy

    THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2007
    Arthur Ha
    Most economic assessments conclude there is no economic efficiency case for governments to provide drought assistance. However, significant public funds are allocated to farmers during droughts and there is a second-best case to improve drought policy design. In this article we show that the National Drought Policy suffers from adverse selection, moral hazard, incentive compatibility and government commitment problems. We use ABARE farm-level data that suggest that at least adverse selection was a problem in Victoria during the 2002-03 drought. These results are replicated at the national level. The current approach of the Commonwealth and state governments is ineffective because it is very difficult to design an efficient and fair drought policy that relies on ex post revelation of information. An alternative approach is investigated where incentives are designed so that farmers self-select into one of a number of drought policy agreements consistent with their capacity to prepare for drought. [source]

    Durable Goods, Commitment Power and Public Monopolies

    THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 6 2003
    Gregory E. Goering
    Since many publicly owned firms manufacture a durable product we examine a simple two-period, constant returns technology, durability choice monopoly model under public ownership. Various types of firm commitment ability are analyzed. The model suggests that many of the standard results of public ownership are not obtained when output is durable. Product durability is shown to be an important factor for public firm subsidization that is independent of the traditional economies of scale rationale. We show that this durable goods subsidization problem is due solely to the public firm's potential commitment problems with buyers. [source]