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Access Charges (access + charge)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND COMPETITION IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS,

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2008
CARLO CAMBINI
Interconnection; Access charges; Reception charges; Information exchange We develop a model of information exchange between calling parties. We characterize the equilibrium when two interconnected networks compete by charging both for outgoing and incoming calls. We show that networks have reduced incentives to use off-net price discrimination to induce a connectivity breakdown when calls originated and received are complements in the information exchange. This breakdown disappears if operators are allowed to negotiate reciprocal access charges. We also study the relationship between sending and receiving retail charges as a function of the level of access charges. We identify circumstances where private negotiations over access charges induce first-best retail prices. [source]

Network Competition and Access Charge Rules

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 1 2002
Toker Doganoglu
This paper presents a model of two competing local telecommunications networks which are mandated to interconnect. After negotiating the access charges, the companies engage in price competition. Given the prices, each consumer selects a network and determines the consumption of phone calls. Using a discrete/continuous consumer choice model, it is shown that a pure strategy equilibrium exists quite generally and satisfies desirable properties. This equilibrium can be implemented by a simple rule that sets the access charges at a common discount from the retail prices. It requires no information and the discount factor is chosen by the companies through negotiations. Finally, if the networks are highly substitute, the retail prices obtained by imposing this rule will approximate the efficient prices. [source]