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Chinese County (chinese + county)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences75%

Selected Abstracts

Fertility and Distorted Sex Ratios in a Rural Chinese County: Culture, State, and Policy

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 4 2003
Rachel Murphy
This article explores how gender bias in population policies interacts with local culture to reinforce distortions in sex ratios among infants and young children in rural China. It argues that population policies introduce new sources of inequality into local culture while, conversely, gender inequalities embedded in local culture influence formal population policy and practice. Applying an institutional approach to the study of an agricultural county in Jiangxi province, southeast China, the analysis identifies four ways in which an interplay between gender bias in policy and culture produces gendered fertility outcomes: (1) the creation of gendered official categories such as "daughter-only households"; (2) a male bias embedded in local government; (3) the use of local gender norms in state pedagogy; and (4) the reworking or subverting of official norms in ways that reinforce gender inequalities in local reproductive culture. The article concludes that despite indications of contestation of village patriarchy, discrimination against daughters is likely to persist. [source]

China's Local Political Budget Cycles

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2009
Gang Guo
This article examines the political budget cycles in Chinese counties. The shift to a more performance-based cadre evaluation and mobility system during the reform era has created an incentive structure for local leaders to increase government spending at strategically important time points during their tenure to enhance the prospect of official promotion. Such expenditures help local leaders to impress their superiors with economic and political achievements, especially those visible and quantifiable large-scale development projects. At the same time, economic and fiscal decentralization increased the capacity of local leaders to influence government budget expenditures as the need rises. The hypothesized curvilinear relationship between a leader's time in office and increased spending was tested using a comprehensive data set of all Chinese counties from 1997 through 2002. The panel data analysis shows that growth in local government spending per capita is the fastest during a leader's third and fourth years in office. [source]

Governing by goals and numbers: A case study in the use of performance measurement to build state capacity in China

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 1 2009
Jie Gao
Abstract This article examines why performance measurement, a tool adopted by western countries chiefly to improve government services, has been designed and implemented as an instrument for building state capacity and for ensuring policy compliance in China. Under China's performance measurement system, the central government translates its macro reform goals into specific policy objectives, which it then assigns downwards through the administrative hierarchy. Local governments at the county level convert the policy objectives allocated to them into a variety of prioritised performance targets for local officials to achieve. Using the experience of an inland Chinese county as a case study, this article argues that performance measurement accrues significant political benefits to its users. It forces local Chinese officials to concentrate their efforts on realising the policy priorities set by the higher-level authorities. However, the way that performance measurement is conducted,governing by goals and numbers,does not address the substantial governance issues and fundamental social and political tensions that exist in Chinese society. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Putting the Cart before the Horse: Accountability or Performance?

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2009
Hon S. Chan
Conventional wisdom argues that a good set of performance measures builds accountability and that improved accountability generates better productivity in the organisation. By way of an analysis of a case study in one inland Chinese county, this article shows that the assumed relationship between performance and accountability is more rhetoric than real. In practice, the implementation of performance measurement in local China leads to an accountability paradox, in which enhanced accountability tends to hinder the improvement of government productivity. The implementation of the Chinese target-based responsibility system risks boosting the short term accountability of public employees while undermining the long term productivity of government agencies. With the deepening of China's market-oriented reform, this choice appears to put the cart before the horse. [source]