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CEOs
Selected AbstractsWhen a policy governance board hires a new CEO, what are some important dos and don'ts to remember during the hiring process and the new CEO's early weeks?BOARD LEADERSHIP: POLICY GOVERNANCE IN ACTION, Issue 74 2004Miriam Carver No abstract is available for this article. [source] The Impact of Financial and Tax Reporting Incentives on Option Grants to Canadian CEOs,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2000KENNETH J. KLASSEN Abstract This study explores the effects of financial and tax reporting incentives on options granted to chief executive officers in Canada. Extant studies with a similar objective (Yermack 1995; Matsunaga 1995) explore predominantly nonqualified U.S. option grants that are deductible to the extent that the options are in the money at the time of exercise. In contrast, Canadian firms do not get a tax deduction for their stock option grants at any time. In both countries, no expense is recorded for financial reporting purposes. As a result, the financial reporting and tax reporting trade-off is more pronounced in the Canadian setting of this study compared with the U.S. setting. We measure option granting behavior as the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants to the sum of cash compensation and the value of stock option grants. Using a sample of 806 firm-year observations during the period 1993-95, we find that observed option grants are significantly correlated with proxies for short-run financial reporting incentives. We also find evidence that option granting behavior is correlated with proxies for tax incentives. [source] Maturation of Corporate Governance Research, 1993,2007: An AssessmentCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2009Boris Durisin ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Review Research Question/Issue: This study seeks to investigate whether governance research in fact is a discipline or whether it is rather the subject of multi-disciplinary research. We map the intellectual structure of corporate governance research and its evolution from 1993,2007. Research Findings/Results: Based on the analysis of more than 1,000 publications and 48,000 citations in Corporate Goverance: An International Review (CGIR) and other academic journals, our study identifies the most influential works, the dominant subfields, and their evolution. Our study assesses the maturation of corporate governance research as a discipline; it finds increasing sophistication, depth and rigor, and consistency in its intellectual structure. Theoretical Implications: There is a large body of accumulated corporate governance research in the US, yet there is an empirical gap on cross-national studies in the literature. Furthermore, hardly any of the top cited works undertake their study in a cross-national setting. Thus, corporate governance research and CGIR in its quest to contribute to a global theory of corporate governance might benefit if articles have a cross-national methodological approach and empirical grounding in their research design and if articles explicitly aim at stating the theoretical underpinnings they draw on. Practical Implications: Globalists find in CGIR an outlet addressing economics and finance (e.g., whether and how compensation or dismissal of CEOs is related to board characteristics), management (e.g., whether and how best practice codes adoption is related to board characteristics and performance), and accounting (e.g., whether and how earnings manipulations is related to board characteristics) issues globally. [source] Correlates of Board Empowerment in Small CompaniesENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 5 2007Jonas Gabrielsson This study seeks to advance the understanding of board empowerment in small companies. Predictions based on agency and resource dependency theories were used to examine how contingency factors correlate with board empowerment, in this study conceptualized as a larger number of board members, a higher representation of outside directors, and separate CEO and board chair positions. Statistical analyses on a sample of 135 small companies gave ample support for the agency-theoretic prediction that board empowerment in small companies is a response to satisfy the demands from owners not directly involved in managing the company. Other factors influencing board empowerment were younger CEOs, high degree of exports, and past poor company performance. The influence of these contingency factors, however, was not as strong and extensive as the presence of outside owners. The article ends with a discussion of the findings and their implications for understanding boards and governance in small companies. [source] Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient?EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2009A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories D2; D3; G34; J3 Abstract Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive compensation is set by CEOs themselves rather than boards on behalf of shareholders, since many features of observed pay packages may appear inconsistent with standard optimal contracting theories. However, it may be that simple models do not capture several complexities of real-life settings. This article surveys recent theories that extend traditional frameworks to incorporate these dimensions, and show that the above features can be fully consistent with efficiency. For example, optimal contracting theories can explain the recent rapid increase in pay, the low level of incentives and their negative scaling with firm size, pay-for-luck, the widespread use of options (as opposed to stock), severance pay and debt compensation, and the insensitivity of incentives to risk. [source] Social Networks and Corporate GovernanceEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2008Avanidhar Subrahmanyam G30; G34 Abstract We analyse frameworks that link corporate governance and firm values to governing boards' social networks and innovations in technology. Because agents create social networks with individuals with whom they share commonalities along the dimensions of social status and income, among other attributes, CEOs may participate in board members' social networks, which interferes with the quality of governance. At the same time, social connections with members of a board can allow for better evaluation of the members' abilities. Thus, in choosing whether to have board members with social ties to management, one must trade off the benefit of members successfully identifying high ability CEOs against the cost of inadequate monitoring due to social connections. Further, technologies like the Internet and electronic mail that reduce the extent of face-to-face networking cause agents to seek satisfaction of their social needs at the workplace, which exacerbates the impact of social networks on governance. The predictions of our model are consistent with recent episodes that appear to signify inadequate monitoring of corporate disclosures as well as with high levels of executive compensation. Additionally, empirical tests support the model's key implication that there is better governance and lower executive compensation in firms where networks are less likely to form. [source] Option Expensing and Managerial Equity IncentivesFINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 3 2009Yi Feng We examine the impact of mandatory option expensing on managerial equity incentives. Though effective only after June 15, 2005, there is evidence that U.S. firms begin preparing for option expensing as early as 2002 by making changes to their equity incentive plans. We find that (1) CEO option incentives exhibit a sharp reversal during the period 1993-2005, with the median CEO option incentives increasing 25% a year before 2002 but declining 17% a year after 2001; (2) the reduction in option incentives after 2001 is larger for firms that use excessive levels of equity incentives prior to 2002; (3) firms make similar reductions to options granted to CEOs, other top executives and lower-level employees; (4) CEO stock incentives increase throughout the entire 13-year period, rising at an even greater rate after 2001; and (5) the increase in stock incentives after 2001 is far from offsetting the corresponding decrease in option incentives. These findings are robust to controls for firm and CEO characteristics and for concurrent regulatory, business and market events such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the option backdating scandal, and the 2000 stock market crash. We also provide a theoretical explanation for the documented changes in option incentives. [source] CEO Pay-For-Performance Heterogeneity Using Quantile RegressionFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 1 2010Kevin F. Hallock G3; J33; M52 Abstract We provide some examples of how quantile regression can be used to investigate heterogeneity in pay-firm size and pay-performance relationships for U.S. CEOs. For example, do conditionally (predicted) high-wage managers have a stronger relationship between pay and performance than conditionally low-wage managers? Our results using data over a decade show, for some standard specifications, there is considerable heterogeneity in the returns-to-firm performance across the conditional distribution of wages. Quantile regression adds substantially to our understanding of the pay-performance relationship. This heterogeneity is masked when using more standard empirical techniques. [source] The value of formative investment in organizational federationsHUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH, Issue 1 2001AJ Flanagin Public goods theories highlight an incentive system that rewards ,free riding' on the contributions of early contributors toward collective actions. However, because such theories focus on creation of the good, they may underestimate returns that accrue to early contributors subsequent to the good's realization. The concept of formative investment is introduced here to describe the extent to which organizations help to create public goods such as interorganizational linkages like participatory federations. Data from the CEOs of 48 organizations involved in a participatory federation were used to assess how an organization's level of formative investment is related to later patterns of dependency and interaction among federation members. Findings suggest that from a long-term perspective, and for goods that involve communication and interaction, the incentive structure may not be so favorable for free riders. To the extent that organizations with high formative investment have the capability to envision the future and communicate that vision to potential federation partners, they may be able to both reduce free riding and secure for themselves advantageous positions in the subsequent network of relations. [source] CEOs with a functional background in operations: Reviewing their performance and prevalence in the top postHUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Issue 5 2010Burak Koyuncu Abstract With this study, we update research by Ocasio and Kim (1999) by testing whether the trends that favored the prevalence of CEOs with an operations background in the 1980s and early 1990s continued between 1992 and 2005. Given that supply chain management became a top business priority during this period, we expect a greater prevalence of CEOs with an operations background. This is because, traditionally, executives belonging to the operations function have assumed responsibility for supply chain management issues. Our results, based on a sample of 437 CEOs who lead large-sized U.S. firms in eight industries, provide partial support for the hypothesis that CEOs with a functional background in operations attain higher post-succession performance than CEOs with other functional backgrounds. In addition, we find that the likelihood that newly appointed CEOs have a background in operations is greater in succession events that have taken place more recently and in situations that occurred in the face of poor firm financial performance. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] External labor market strategy and career success: CEO careers in Europe and the United StatesHUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2009Monika Hamori Abstract In this paper, we examine the career histories of the chief executive officers (CEOs) affiliated with the 500 largest organizations in Europe and the 500 largest in the United States. Our purpose is to determine whether frequent career moves across employers, a phenomenon we label an "external labor market strategy," brings greater career rewards than moves inside the same organization. The results reveal that an external labor market strategy is negatively related to career success. On both continents, CEOs who have spent a smaller fraction of their career in their current organization or have changed employers more often have taken a longer time from the start of their career to be promoted to the most influential corporate positions. The labor market institutions in the 22 countries sampled do not influence the relationship between an external labor market strategy and career success, while the specific geographic region in which the employers are located has a limited impact on this relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and VolatilityJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002John Core The costs associated with compiling data on employee stock option portfolios is a substantial obstacle in investigating the impact of stock options on managerial incentives, accounting choice, financing decisions, and the valuation of equity. We present an accurate method of estimating option portfolio value and the sensitivities of option portfolio value to stock price and stock-return volatility that is easily implemented using data from only the current year's proxy statement or annual report. This method can be applied to either executive stock option portfolios or to firm-wide option plans. In broad samples of actual and simulated CEO option portfolios, we show that these proxies capture more than 99% of the variation in option portfolio value and sensitivities. Sensitivity analysis indicates that the degree of bias in these proxies varies with option portfolio characteristics, and is most severe in samples of CEOs with a large proportion of out-of-the-money options. However, the proxies' explanatory power remains above 95% in all subsamples. [source] The Future of Private EquityJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Steve Kaplan A distinguished University of Chicago financial economist and longtime observer of private equity markets responds to questions like the following: ,With a track record that now stretches in some cases almost 30 years, what have private equity firms accomplished? What effects have they had on the performance of the companies they invest in, and have they been good for the economy? ,How will highly leveraged PE portfolio companies fare during the current downturn, especially with over $400 billion of loans coming due in the next three to five years? ,With PE firms now sitting on an estimated $500 billion in capital and leveraged loan markets shut down, are the firms now contemplating new kinds of investment that require less debt? ,If and when the industry makes a comeback, do you expect any major changes that might allow us to avoid another boom-and-bust cycle? Have the PE firms or their investors made any obvious mistakes that contribute to such cycles, and are they now showing any signs of having learned from those mistakes? Despite the current problems, the operating capabilities of the best PE firms, together with their ability to manage high leverage and the increased receptiveness of public company CEOs and boards to PE investments, have all helped establish private equity as "a permanent asset class." Although many of the deals done in 2006 and 2007 were probably overpriced, the "cov-lite" deal structures, deferred repayments of principal, and larger coverage ratios have afforded more room for reworking troubled deals. As a result of that flexibility, and of the kinds of companies that get taken private in leveraged deals in the first place, most troubled PE portfolio companies should end up being restructured efficiently, thereby limiting the damage to the overall economy. Part of the restructuring process involves the use of the PE industry's huge stockpile of capital to purchase distressed debt and inject new equity into troubled deals (in many cases, their own). At the same time the PE firms have been working hard to rescue their own deals, some have been taking significant minority positions in public companies, while gaining some measure of control. Finally, to limit overpriced and overlev-eraged deals in the future, and so avoid the boom-and-bust cycle that appears to have become a predictable part of the industry, the discussion explores the possibility that the limited partners and debt providers that supply most of the capital for PE investments will insist on larger commitments of equity by sponsors to their own funds and individual deals. [source] Corporate Portfolio Management RoundtableJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 2 2008Article first published online: 16 JUL 200 The dean of a top ten business school, the chair of a large investment management firm, two corporate M&A leaders, a CFO, a leading M&A investment banker, and a corporate finance advisor discuss the following questions: ,What are today's best practices in corporate portfolio management? What roles should be played by boards, senior managers, and business unit leaders? ,What are the typical barriers to successful implementation and how can they be overcome? ,Should portfolio management be linked to financial policies such as decisions on capital structure, dividends, and share repurchase? ,How should all of the above be disclosed to the investor community? After acknowledging the considerable challenges to optimal portfolio management in public companies, the panelists offer suggestions that include: ,Companies should establish an independent group that functions like a "SWAT team" to support portfolio management. Such groups would be given access to (or produce themselves) business-unit level data on economic returns and capital employed, and develop an "outside-in" view of each business's standalone valuation. ,Boards should consider using their annual strategy "off-sites" to explore all possible alternatives for driving share-holder value, including organic growth, divestitures and acquisitions, as well as changes in dividends, share repurchases, and capital structure. ,Performance measurement and compensation frameworks need to be revamped to encourage line managers to think more like investors, not only seeking value-creating growth but also making divestitures at the right time. CEOs and CFOs should take the lead in developing a shared value creation model that clearly articulates how capital will be allocated. [source] London Business School Roundtable on Shareholder Activism in the U.K.JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 2 2006Article first published online: 16 JUN 200 Finance scholars have produced little evidence of the effectiveness of direct attempts by institutional shareholders to improve corporate performance. What studies we have,focused mainly on the activities of U.S. pension funds,show no clear effect on shareholder returns. But a new study of shareholder activism in the U.K. looks promising. The subject of the study is a "Focus Fund," launched in 1998 by the U.K. investment firm Hermes, whose aim is to identify underperforming companies, propose changes to their managements and boards, and,in contrast to the practices of the best-known U.S. shareholder activists,work mainly "behind the scenes" with the companies to bring about those changes. In keeping with the more private nature of U.K. activism, which reflects in part the fewer restrictions on communication between companies and their investors than in the U S., the study's method of investigation is also notably different from the methods used in studies of U.S. investors. Four academics were allowed to examine Hermes' records of its "engagements" with companies, including letters, recordings and transcripts of telephone conversations, and the staff's personal notes and recollections. Using this information, the researchers show that the Fund has been remarkably successful in bringing about three kinds of proposed changes: replacements of CEOs and Chairmen; changes in investment and financial policies (mainly increased payouts and more disciplined capital spending); and restructurings (typically leading to greater corporate focus). Of equal importance, the study also shows that the market reaction to the announcement of such changes has been significantly positive, and that the cumulative effect of these positive reactions accounts for as much as 90% of the Fund's impressive "alpha," or market out-performance, over its eight-year life. The first public presentation of these findings took place on February 9 at the inaugural event of the London Business School's Center for the Study of Corporate Governance. In our account of the event, an overview of the study's findings by two of its authors is followed by an "insider's" view of the Hermes' success story (presented by the Chief Executive of the Fund from 2002,2004) and a panel discussion of the general import of the findings featuring four distinguished practitioners. [source] JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAMEJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2002Joseph Fuller CEOs are in a bind with Wall Street. Managers up and down the hierarchy work hard at putting together plans and budgets for the next year only to discover that the bottom line falls far short of Wall Street's expectations. CEOs and CFOs are therefore left in a difficult situation; they can stretch to try to meet Wall Street's projections or prepare to suffer the consequences if they fail. All too often, top managers react by suggesting or even mandating that middle- and lower-level managers redo their forecasts and budgets to get them in line with external expectations. In some cases, managers simply acquiesce to increasingly unrealistic analyst forecasts and adopt them as the basis for setting organizational goals and developing internal budgets. But either approach sets up the firm and its managers for failure if external expectations are impossible to meet. Using the recent experiences of Enron and Nortel, the authors illustrate the dangers of conforming to market pressures for unrealistic growth targets. They emphasize that an overvalued stock, by encouraging overpriced acquisitions and other value-destroying forms of overinvestment, can be as damaging to the long-run health of a company as an undervalued stock. Ending the "expectations game" requires that CEOs reclaim the initiative in setting expectations and forecasts so that stocks can trade at close to their intrinsic value. Managers must make their organizations more transparent to investors; they must promise only those results they have a legitimate prospect of delivering and be willing to inform the market when they believe their stock to be overvalued. [source] THE CEO: A VISIBLE HAND IN WEALTH CREATION?JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2000C. K. Prahalad Commensurate with the growth of their pay packages and public visibility, the role of the CEO in the corporate value creation process has increased significantly in recent years. This article argues that sustained wealth creation in a corporation has three distinct elements. The first and most basic is the selection of the lines of business in which to operate; this element is probably the most visible manifestation of CEO action in large corporations today. The second element is the value creation model, which answers the question: How is this particular set of businesses expected to add value over and above the sum of the values of each business or asset category standing alone? The third element is the internal governance system, which establishes the corporate structure and administrative processes of the firm and, perhaps even more important, defines the corporate values that drive the strategic and operational priorities of the different business units. The authors suggest that the essence of the work of the CEO is to develop and maintain a balanced relationship among these three elements of wealth creation and to ensure that the relationship evolves in the face of changing circumstances. CEOs are inevitably faced with dilemmas in managing this process,in particular, the need to balance continuity and change and to maintain the integrity of short-term performance disciplines while encouraging not only investment in growth opportunities (which can hurt near term performance), but also experimentation and collaboration among business units (which are difficult to measure and reward with most performance measurement and incentive schemes). Adding to the difficulties of managing such dilemmas, visibility and a strong public image are often thrust upon (if not sought by) CEOs, who must then determine how they can use that image to strengthen the commitment of their employees and investors. [source] Highly Valued Equity and Discretionary AccrualsJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2010Robert E. Houmes Abstract:, Overvalued equity provides a strong incentive for managers to report earnings that do not disappoint the market ( Jensen, 2005). We find that this can be extended to highly valued equity more generally. In the year following the classification as highly valued and compared to firms with less extreme valuations, highly valued firms have significantly higher discretionary accruals and exhibit a more pronounced positive association between discretionary accruals and proxies for the likelihood of failing to meet earnings targets. These findings are consistent with the use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings in support of extreme valuation. Because highly valued equity will likely result in CEOs with valuable stock and stock option portfolios, we test whether and show that the overvalued equity incentive is incremental to a CEO's equity portfolio incentive. One implication is that directors and audit committees should be especially on guard for possible earnings management when a firm has extremely high valuation multiples and when the CEO has a lot of equity at risk. [source] Auditor,Provided Consultancy Services and their Associations with Audit Fees and Audit OpinionsJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 5-6 2002Michael Firth This study examines the relationships between non,audit services fees (consultancy fees) paid to auditors and (1) audit fees, and (2) the occurrence of qualified audit opinions. The positive association between consultancy fees and audit fees is shown to be due to certain company specific events that generate a demand for consultancy services as well as requiring additional audit effort. Identified company specific events are mergers and acquisitions, new share issues, new accounting and information systems, new CEOs, and corporate restructurings. When these events are absent, there is no statistically significant relationship between audit fees and consultancy fees after controlling for company size. Companies that have relatively high consultancy fees are more likely to receive a clean audit opinion. This may be due to the non,audit work clearing up problem areas at the client company or it may be due to high consultancy fees impairing auditor independence. With the available data it is not possible to distinguish between these two reasons. [source] Greece: How can companies manage the new risks?JOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 6 2010Bento J. Lobo CEOs and CFOs must understand that political risk can have a significant impact on a company's profitability. The current situation in Greece is a prime example of this. But how does the risk of Greece's default affect U.S. firms doing business with Greek companies? The authors examine the impact on two kinds of U.S. firms: those exporting to Greece and those importing from Greece. The authors then look at ways to manage the impact of sovereign risk of default. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] An executive's guide to SOX auditsJOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 4 2010Jack W. Paul Auditors aren't the only ones who need a sharp understanding of internal control audits. Savvy CEOs and other executives also need this knowledge,to save time, money, and even professional careers. Because, as most readers know, CEOs and CFOs must now certify the veracity of their company's financial statements,under threat of heavy criminal penalties. So, how thorough is your knowledge about internal control audits? Let the author of this article lead you step by step through the process, as he offers advice on avoiding pitfalls and points out possible warning signs. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Internet security basics for treasury managersJOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2002Christine Christensen CEOs, CFOs, and treasury managers know company practices for things like accounts payable, funds transfers, and investment strategies. But how well do you know your company's technology infrastructure,including its strengths and weaknesses? © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] A conscious-authentic leadership approach in the workplace: Leading from withinJOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES, Issue 1 2008Robert E. Hofman Jr. This study combines components of the relatively nascent concepts of conscious leadership and authentic leadership. It is a synopsis of a recent empirical study comparing two groups of companies and their respective CEOs. Each group is comprised of three companies. Group I is led by CEOs who use a conscious-authentic leadership approach in the workplace. They infuse their personal values, beliefs, and relational leadership behavior into the policies, practices, and employee programs within their respective organizations to achieve specific organizational outcomes. Group II CEOs do not use this leadership approach. The companies selected for study were categorized by disinterested third parties in the business community. This study explores the perceptions of the employees of both groups and the impact of the conscious-authentic leadership model on organizational behavior and specific organizational outcomes in the workplace. The organizational outcomes tested in this study are voluntary employee-withdrawal behavior and absenteeism during the period 2003,2005. An employee questionnaire was administered to the employees of both groups to measure organizational behavior. The same questionnaire was administered to the CEOs to determine their level of self-awareness and their sense of the reality of the human condition within their respective organization. A separate leadership questionnaire was administered to the CEOs for a self-assessment of personal attributes and leadership style. The findings provide a working definition of conscious-authentic leadership behavior and a working model of the components of this approach as implemented by Group I CEOs in the workplace. [source] Decision Comprehensiveness and Corporate Entrepreneurship: The Moderating Role of Managerial Uncertainty Preferences and Environmental DynamismJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 8 2009Ciaran Heavey abstract Although comprehensiveness is considered among the most salient and enduring strategic decision-making characteristics in organizations, its influence on firm behaviour has remained elusive. As a first step, our study builds and tests a model that specifies the influence of comprehensiveness on the firm's pursuit of corporate entrepreneurship. Our core argument is that while comprehensiveness helps decision-makers gain the knowledge needed to escape the ignorance and overcome doubt associated with this pursuit, this beneficial influence is conditional upon managerial uncertainty preferences, together with the level of dynamism in the external environment. Findings from a large sample study of CEOs from 349 SMEs provide general support for this argument and associated hypotheses. [source] The Moderating Effect of CEO Power on the Board Composition,Firm Performance Relationship*JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 8 2007James G. Combs abstract Prior studies of the relationship between the composition of boards of directors and firm performance offer equivocal results. Drawing on agency and power circulation theories, we attempt to reduce this equivocality by asserting that CEO power moderates the relationship. Specifically, an outside director dominated board is needed to check a powerful CEO, but monitoring by other executives provides sufficient constraints on CEOs with low power. We used event study methodology to test the effects of the interaction between board composition and CEO power on stock market reaction to 73 unexpected CEO deaths. We found support for our theorizing among two of three sources of CEO power. Thus, although regulatory trends increasingly support outside director dominated boards, our findings indicate that this may not always benefit shareholders and that CEO power should be considered when constructing boards. [source] Decisional involvement of senior nurse leaders in Canadian acute care hospitalsJOURNAL OF NURSING MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2010CAROL A. WONG RN wong c.a., laschinger h., cummings g.g., vincent l. & o'connor p. (2010) Journal of Nursing Management 18, 122,133 Decisional involvement of senior nurse leaders in Canadian acute care hospitals Aim, The aim of the present study was to describe the scope and degree of involvement of senior nurse leaders (SNLs) in executive level decisions in acute care organizations across Canada. Background, Significant changes in SNL roles including expansion of decision-making responsibilities have occurred but little is known about the patterns of SNL decision-making. Methods, Data were collected by mailed survey from 63 SNLs and 49 chief executive officers (CEOs) in 66 healthcare organizations in 10 Canadian provinces. Regression analyses were used to examine whether timing, breadth of content expertise and the number of decision activities predicted SNL decision-making influence and quality of decisions. Results, Breadth of content expertise and number of decision activities with which the SNL was involved were significant predictors of decision influence explaining 22% of the variance in influence. Overall, CEOs rated SNL involvement in decision-making higher than the SNL. Conclusions, Senior nurse leaders contribute to organizational processes in healthcare organizations that are important for nurses and patients, through their participation in decision-making at the senior team level. Implications for nursing management, Findings may be useful to current and future SNLs learning to shape the nature and content of information shared with CEOs particularly in the area of professional practice issues. [source] CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND URBAN PROBLEM SOLVING: THE CHANGING CIVIC ROLE OF BUSINESS LEADERS IN AMERICAN CITIESJOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2010ROYCE HANSON ABSTRACT:,Our concern in this article is corporate civic elite organizations and their role in social production and urban policy in the United States. Recent urban literature has suggested that the power and influence of CEO organizations has declined and that there has been some disengagement of corporate elites from civic efforts in many urban areas. Yet while these trends and their likely consequences are generally acknowledged, relatively little empirical research has been conducted on the nature and extent of the shifts in corporate civic leadership and on how these shifts have affected the civic agendas of central cities and metropolitan regions. In this study we obtain data from 19 large metropolitan areas in order to more systematically examine shifts in corporate civic leadership and their consequences. Our results suggest that the institutional autonomy, time, and personal connections to the central cities of many CEOs have diminished and that the civic organizations though which CEOs work appear to have experienced lowered capacity for sustained action. These trends suggest that while many CEOs and their firms will continue to commit their time and their firms' slack resources to civic enterprises, the problems they address will differ from those tackled in the past. We discuss the important implications these shifts have for the future of corporate civic engagement in urban problem solving and for the practice of urban governance. [source] It's not the race I signed up for, but it's the race I'm in: The role of community college presidentsNEW DIRECTIONS FOR COMMUNITY COLLEGES, Issue 124 2003J. William Wenrich A shift in the fundraising landscape has prompted community college presidents to take a more proactive approach to winning the hearts and dollars of potential donors. This chapter focuses on how college presidents and foundation CEOs can work together to gain support from funding sources. [source] Nonprofit association CEOs how their context shapes what, how, and why they learnNONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 1 2007John J. Sherlock This qualitative study explored the learning experiences of twelve national nonprofit membership association CEOs using a phenomenological research design. While the professional context of an organization's chief executive is considered unique from other executive positions, the impact of this context on what and how CEOs learned was unclear. The findings describe association CEO learning as being affected in significant ways by the politically charged context in which the nonprofit association CEO operates with his or her board of directors. Power imbalances with staff and the board make learning through traditional organizational dialogue a less useful learning process for the CEOs. Furthermore, the feelings of isolation and vulnerability that are generated from the nonprofit association CEO context often cause CEOs to use private reflection and dialogue with their spouse as primary learning mechanisms. The study concludes that the association CEO context uniquely and profoundly shapes what, how, and why CEOs learn. Perhaps lacking the financial security of lucrative severance payments, which are often specified in employment contracts of for-profit CEOs, the nonprofit association CEO will often temper his or her actions to avoid personal vulnerability with a politically charged board of directors. [source] Board development practices and competent board members: Implications for performanceNONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 3 2007William A. Brown This study explores underlying assumptions about board development practices in nonprofit governance. Specifically, a model was developed to determine if using recommended recruitment, board member orientation, and evaluation practices resulted in more competent board members and if the presence of these board members led to better board performance. The sample consisted of 1,051 survey responses from CEOs and board chairs representing 713 credit unions. As member-benefit nonprofit organizations, credit unions rely almost exclusively on voluntary board members in an oversight capacity. Results support the contention that board development practices lead to more capable board members, and the presence of these board members tends to explain board performance. The study advances the understanding of nonprofit board development practices by further defining the concept and proposing an empirically tested assessment strategy. Furthermore, the findings support using specific recruitment practices that should strengthen nonprofit boards. [source] |