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Causal Explanations (causal + explanation)
Selected AbstractsMoral Blame and Causal ExplanationJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2000Robert E. Lane First page of article [source] Changes in clutch size, brood size and numbers of nesting Squacco Herons Ardeola ralloides over a 32-year period in the Camargue, southern FranceIBIS, Issue 1 2001HEINZ HAFNER Changes in numbers of nesting pairs, clutch size, and brood size of Squacco Herons Ardeola ralloides in the Camargue, southern France were analysed over a 32-year period. The annual numbers of breeding pairs [average 84 pairs pL 30 sd, n = 32 years) exhibited a possible increasing trend, but with considerable variability. This variability is associated with local spring rainfall, which may influence the available surface area of their preferred freshwater habitats. In contrast to population size, clutch size decreased substantially in recent years. Our data do not provide a causal explanation for this change in clutch size, although the reduction temporally corresponds with increasing rice cultivation and with a dramatic increase in the number of Cattle Egrets Bubulcus ibis in the Camargue. [source] Critical Realism and Causality: Tracing the Aristotelian LegacyJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 2 2009STEPHEN PRATTEN Rom Harré's generative account of causality has been drawn on heavily by advocates of critical realism. Yet Harré argues that critical realists often exaggerate the extent to which powerful causal explanations of social phenomena can be developed. Certain proponents of critical realism have responded to Harré's criticisms by suggesting that it is useful to consider the relevant issues in relation to the familiar Aristotelian classification of four causes. In this paper I contribute to this debate and pursue a similar strategy. The paper adds to existing contributions in two ways. Firstly, I outline how Harré sees his generative account of causality as linking up with Aristotelian themes. It emerges that Harré at times conceives of his generative theory as part of an alternative to the Aristotelian system while at other times he draws connections between it and a reformulated account of formal causality. Secondly, I argue that when we consider the positions of Harré and proponents of critical realism on the scope of causal explanation in the social realm in relation to the interpretation of final causes offered by another philosopher profoundly influenced by the Aristotelian tradition, namely Charles Peirce, we can see both as limited in certain respects. [source] Taking a Position: A Reinterpretation of the Theory of Planned BehaviourJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 2 2005ANDREW J. COOK This paper examines methodological issues associated with the theory of planned behaviour and explains that an alternative account of data used to support this theory can be provided by positioning theory. A case is presented that shows tests of the theory of planned behaviour fail to eliminate the possibility of alternative explanations for co-variation in its data. An agency or person-centered alternative shows how a causal interpretation can be reinterpreted as evidence of the actions of a person. Unlike the conceptualisation of the individual as behaving in keeping with postulated underlying cognitive laws or rules we assume that the person has, through socialisation, acquired the skills necessary to initiate and manage their own actions. Unlike the interest in TPB data as a causal explanation of action we draw attention to the interpretation of patterns in these data as an aggregate of each person using a common mode of explanation to justify and explain their intentions. [source] Do Normative Facts Need to Explain?PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2000Jeremy Randel Koons Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse (by which I mean our practice of evaluating beliefs as justified or unjustified, and so forth) are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotentas well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not servethe function of causal explanation. [source] The significance of geographic range size for spatial diversity patterns in Neotropical palmsECOGRAPHY, Issue 1 2006Holger Kreft We examined the effect of range size in commonly applied macroecological analyses using continental distribution data for all 550 Neotropical palm species (Arecaceae) at varying grain sizes from 0.5° to 5°. First, we evaluated the relative contribution of range-restricted and widespread species on the patterns of species richness and endemism. Second, we analysed the impact of range size on the predictive value of commonly used predictor variables. Species sequences were produced arranging species according to their range size in ascending, descending, and random order. Correlations between the cumulative species richness patterns of these sequences and environmental predictors were performed in order to analyse the effect of range size. Despite the high proportion of rare species, patterns of species richness were found to be dominated by a minority of widespread species (,20%) which contained 80% of the spatial information. Climatic factors related to energy and water availability and productivity accounted for much of the spatial variation of species richness of widespread species. In contrast, species richness of range-restricted species was to a larger extent determined by topographical complexity. However, this effect was much more difficult to detect due to a dominant influence of widespread species. Although the strength of different environmental predictors changed with spatial scale, the general patterns and trends proved to be relatively stabile at the examined grain sizes. Our results highlight the difficulties to approximate causal explanations for the occurrence of a majority of species and to distinguish between contemporary climatic factors and history. [source] Theories of drug craving, ancient and modernADDICTION, Issue 1 2001D. Colin Drummond This paper reviews the principal theoretical models of drug craving and provides some directions for future research. The main models are classified broadly into three categories: (1) phenomenological models; based on clinical observation and description; these have been influential in classification systems of addictive disorders and in the development of pharmacological therapies; (2) conditioning models: based on conditioning theory; these have been influential in the development of cue exposure treatments; (3) cognitive theories; based on cognitive social learning theory: these have been influential in the development of cognitive therapies of addiction. It is concluded that no one specific theory provides a complete explanation of the phenomenon of craving. However, theories of craving grounded in general theories of human behaviour offer greatest promise, and generate more specific and testable research hypotheses. Theories that do not require craving to be present for relapse to occur have more empirical support than those that provide simplistic causal explanations. The cue-reactivity model shows promise in the exploration of the relationship between craving and relapse. However, further attention to the phenomenology of craving could help to advise the future measurement and study of drug craving, particularly in the context of research in which drugs are available to human subjects, with adequate ethical safeguards. There is a need for further study of the temporal dynamics of craving and consensus in the field on the most appropriate methods of measurement. Finally, new psychotherapies such as cue exposure and pharmacotherapies that aim to attenuate drinking behaviour, such as naltrexone and acamprosate, provide opportunities to improve understanding of the nature and significance of craving. However, the relatively uncritical assumption that craving is the underlying basis of addiction and represents the most appropriate target for treatment is challenged. [source] EXPLICATION, EXPLANATION, AND HISTORYHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 2 2008CARL HAMMER ABSTRACT To date, no satisfactory account of the connection between natural-scientific and historical explanation has been given, and philosophers seem to have largely given up on the problem. This paper is an attempt to resolve this old issue and to sort out and clarify some areas of historical explanation by developing and applying a method that will be called "pragmatic explication" involving the construction of definitions that are justified on pragmatic grounds. Explanations in general can be divided into "dynamic" and "static" explanations, which are those that essentially require relations across time and those that do not, respectively. The problem of assimilating historical explanations concerns dynamic explanation, so a general analysis of dynamic explanation that captures both the structure of natural-scientific and historical explanation is offered. This is done in three stages: In the first stage, pragmatic explication is introduced and compared to other philosophical methods of explication. In the second stage pragmatic explication is used to tie together a series of definitions that are introduced in order to establish an account of explanation. This involves an investigation of the conditions that play the role in historiography that laws and statistical regularities play in the natural sciences. The essay argues that in the natural sciences, as well as in history, the model of explanation presented represents the aims and overarching structure of actual causal explanations offered in those disciplines. In the third stage the system arrived at in the preceding stage is filled in with conditions available to and relevant for historical inquiry. Further, the nature and treatment of causes in history and everyday life are explored and related to the system being proposed. This in turn makes room for a view connecting aspects of historical explanation and what we generally take to be causal relations. [source] What Do Historians Argue About?HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2004C. Behan Mccullagh abstract Those who think that general historical interpretations do no more than express a personal point of view deny that arguments over their credibility can have any point. They commonly believe that historians decide upon particular facts about the past in the context of a general interpretation of those facts. Consequently they deny that there is any independent basis for judging the credibility of general interpretations of the past, and conclude that each coherent account is as good as every other. Similarly, those who think causal explanations are arbitrary can make no sense of arguments about their adequacy. They assume that historians simply pick out causes that interest them, and that there is no objective basis for judging the adequacy of the explanations they provide. This essay defends the credibility of interpretations against the skeptics, and the adequacy of causal explanations too. It shows that historians do discover a mass of particular facts independently of the general interpretations they finally provide, facts that provide a basis for assessing the credibility and fairness of those interpretations. It will also show that there is an objective basis for judging the adequacy of causal explanations, as some causes of an event are far more influential in bringing it about than others. A much more difficult problem concerns the need for historical interpretations to provide not just a credible account of the past, but also one that is fair, balanced, not misleading. Historians frequently argue about the fairness of general interpretations. Does this mean that fairness is always required? Quite often historians produce partial interpretations, in both senses, with no apology. It would be wrong to call such interpretations "biased" because they do not pretend to be comprehensive. So long as they are credible, they are acceptable. On the other hand, many interpretations are intended to present a fair, comprehensive account of their subject. When judging the adequacy of interpretations, it is necessary to know whether they are meant to be fair or not. [source] Explanation And Thought Experiments In HistoryHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2003Tim De Mey Although interest in them is clearly growing, most professional historians do not accept thought experiments as appropriate tools. Advocates of the deliberate use of thought experiments in history argue that without counterfactuals, causal attributions in history do not make sense. Whereas such arguments play upon the meaning of causation in history, this article focuses on the reasoning processes by which historians arrive at causal explanations. First, we discuss the roles thought experiments play in arriving at explanations of both facts and contrasts. Then, we pinpoint the functions thought experiments fulfill in arriving at weighted explanations of contrasts. [source] Critical Realism and Causality: Tracing the Aristotelian LegacyJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 2 2009STEPHEN PRATTEN Rom Harré's generative account of causality has been drawn on heavily by advocates of critical realism. Yet Harré argues that critical realists often exaggerate the extent to which powerful causal explanations of social phenomena can be developed. Certain proponents of critical realism have responded to Harré's criticisms by suggesting that it is useful to consider the relevant issues in relation to the familiar Aristotelian classification of four causes. In this paper I contribute to this debate and pursue a similar strategy. The paper adds to existing contributions in two ways. Firstly, I outline how Harré sees his generative account of causality as linking up with Aristotelian themes. It emerges that Harré at times conceives of his generative theory as part of an alternative to the Aristotelian system while at other times he draws connections between it and a reformulated account of formal causality. Secondly, I argue that when we consider the positions of Harré and proponents of critical realism on the scope of causal explanation in the social realm in relation to the interpretation of final causes offered by another philosopher profoundly influenced by the Aristotelian tradition, namely Charles Peirce, we can see both as limited in certain respects. [source] Evidence-based practice and health visiting: the need for theoretical underpinnings for evaluationJOURNAL OF ADVANCED NURSING, Issue 6 2000Ruth Elkan BA(Hons) Evidence-based practice and health visiting: the need for theoretical underpinnings for evaluation In this paper we argue that evidence-based practice, which is being introduced throughout the British National Health Service to make decisions about the allocation of limited resources, provides a welcome opportunity for health visitors to demonstrate their efficacy, skills and professionalism. However, the paper argues that to view health visiting as evidence-based is not to reduce health visiting merely to a technology through which scientific solutions are applied to social problems. Rather, health visiting needs to be viewed as a political movement, based on a particular model of society, which shapes the goals which health visitors pursue and influences the strategies they adopt to achieve their goals. The paper describes various models of health visiting as a way of showing how the goals of health visiting are always framed within a particular set of assumptions and causal explanations. The paper then turns to look at the issue of evaluating health visiting services. It is argued that evaluation should properly take account of the models which shape health visitors' goals and intervention strategies, and in turn, health visitors need to be explicit about the theoretical frameworks underpinning their interventions. Finally, it is argued that health visitors' knowledge and understanding of a range of models of society enables them to move between the various models to choose the most appropriate and effective means of intervention. Hence it is concluded that the emphasis on evidence-based practice provides health visitors with a valuable opportunity to show that their unique, professional skills and understanding are the preconditions for effective intervention. [source] Self-Serving Attributions in Corporate Annual Reports: A Replicated StudyJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 1 2002Eric W. K. Tsang This study is a replication of Bettman and Weitz (1983) in the Singapore context. Data from Letters to Shareholders in 208 annual reports published in 1985 and 1994 were used to analyse the patterns of causal explanations for corporate performance outcomes. The general self-serving pattern of attributions found in the original study was also identified in this study. However, the data of the original study do not unequivocally support either the motivational or informational explanation for the existence of self-serving attributions, whereas the latter explanation is strongly supported by the data of this study. This finding is consistent with the growing evidence provided by cross-cultural psychological research indicating East Asians' greater sensitivity to situational influences when making causal attributions. In short, the present study clearly illustrates the important role of replication in the knowledge accumulation and theory development of strategy research. [source] The selling of the President 2004: a marketing perspectiveJOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2007Nicholas J. O'Shaughnessy George W. Bush won the 2004 US Presidential election despite the facts of one thousand people losing their life in the Iraq war, the highest rate of increase in unemployment in 70 years and a vitriolic propaganda campaign (Michael Moore, etc.) against him. This case study seeks to explain the success through the prism of marketing theory and conceptual structures, that is, that the Bush team had a superior communications strategy and, within those parameters, superior marketing elements. Thus we seek to surface and integrate a number of causal explanations for his victory that arose from a political marketing orientation, specifically the offer of a ,coherent narrative'; the conduct of a ,permanent campaign'; more effective negative advertising (especially by pro-Bush 527 groups), targeting and packaging; the success of the late campaign ,big tent' ploy. None of this however seeks to exclude the more purely political explanations for his success (located in such phenomena as the mobilization of the ,Christian Right' and the continuity to the aura attached to the ,911 President'); nor is the application of marketing thought to political contexts treated uncritically. A further aim is to introduce political marketing modes of analysis to a political science audience,not to present them as a new ,correctness', for they are certainly vulnerable to challenge, but rather to precipitate more of an intellectual exchange between these two disciplines. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The error of excessive proximity preference , a modest proposal for understanding holismNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2000Peter Cave The exposure is a prelude to noting the importance of proximity in causal explanations of illnesses and wounds. The paper then draws attention to how the proximate should not hold exclusive sway regarding what constitutes best nursing treatment and care. The error of excessive preference for proximity is shown to be an error, using as an example the treatment of leg ulcers. One component of holism that can be clearly expressed amounts therefore simply to the claim: resist the error of excessive proximity preference, resist the error of concentrating solely on nearness. It is left open whether there is any further sense to be gleaned from the holistic babble. [source] Do Normative Facts Need to Explain?PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2000Jeremy Randel Koons Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse (by which I mean our practice of evaluating beliefs as justified or unjustified, and so forth) are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotentas well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not servethe function of causal explanation. [source] Teaching the Politics of Obesity: Insights into Neoliberal Embodiment and Contemporary BiopoliticsANTIPODE, Issue 5 2009Julie Guthman Abstract:, This article reflects on the author's experiences teaching an undergraduate lecture course on the politics of obesity. The course involved a critical examination of the construction and representation of the so-called epidemic of obesity and the major causal explanations for the rise in obesity. Students were unusually discomfited by the course and invoked pedagogical concerns and instructor embodiments in expressing their reactions. Student responses demonstrate how obesity talk reflects and reinforces neoliberal rationalities of self-governance, particularly those that couple bodily control and deservingness and see fatness as weakening the health of the body politic. The course also animated many students to scrutinize more deeply their own diet and exercise practices. I argue that the intensity of reaction stems from the productive power of the discourse of obesity and considerable investment students had in their bodies as neoliberal subjects. Besides classroom observations, the data in this paper are taken from student journals. [source] Patients' explanations for depression: a factor analytic studyCLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THEORY & PRACTICE), Issue 1 2008Rick Budd Objectives: Previous questionnaire studies have attempted to explore the factor structure of lay beliefs about the causes of depression. These studies have tended to either fail to sample the full range of possible causal explanations or extract too many factors, thereby producing complex solutions. The main objective of the present study was to obtain a more complete and robust factor structure of lay theories of depression while more adequately sampling from the full range of hypothesized causes of depression. A second objective of the study was to explore the relationship between respondents' explanations for depression and their perceptions of the helpfulness of different treatments received. Method and design: A 77-item questionnaire comprising possible reasons for ,why a person might get depressed' was mailed out to members of a large self-help organization. Also included was a short questionnaire inviting respondents to note treatments received and their perceptions of the helpfulness of these treatments. Data from the 77-item questionnaire were subjected to a principal components analysis. Results: The reasons rated as most important causes of depression related to recent bereavement, imbalance in brain chemistry and having suffered sexual assault/abuse. The data were best described by a two-factor solution, with the first factor clearly representing stress and the second factor depressogenic beliefs, the latter corresponding to a cognitive,behavioural formulation of depression aetiology. The two scales thus derived did not, however, correspond substantially with rated helpfulness for different treatments received. Conclusions: The factor structure obtained was in contrast to more complex models from previous studies, comprising two factors. It is likely to be more robust and meaningful. It accords with previous research on lay theories of depression, which highlight ,stress' as a key cause for depression. Possible limitations in the study are discussed, and it is suggested that using the questionnaire with more recently depressed people might yield clearer findings in relation to perceptions of treatment helpfulness.,Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Accessibility of causal explanations for future positive and negative events in adolescents with anxiety and depressionCLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THEORY & PRACTICE), Issue 3 2004Lisa J. Kagan Anxious and depressed adults' pessimism about future events has been shown to be underpinned by their ability to think of reasons why future events would or would not happen (see, e.g., Byrne and MacLeod, 1997). This study sought to extend this finding to adolescents by investigating the accessibility of explanations given for future events in adolescents with elevated anxiety and depression scores. A school sample of 11,17 year olds (N = 123) participated. Participants completed self-report measures of anxiety, depression and positive and negative affect. In addition they were given a set of potential future positive and negative events and asked to provide reasons as to why the events would (pro reasons) or would not (con reasons) happen. Anxious participants, relative to controls, generated significantly more pro relative to con reasons for negative events happening and showed a non-significant trend towards the opposite pattern for positive events. Depressed participants showed clear differences from controls in their pattern of accessible explanations for both negative events and positive events. Correlational analysis showed that positive and negative affect had differential relationships to positive and negative cognitions concerning future outcomes. The results suggest that the processes that underlie pessimism in depressed and anxious adults also operate in relatively depressed and anxious adolescents.,Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||