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Capitation Payment (capitation + payment)
Selected AbstractsDual job holding general practitioners: the effect of patient shortageHEALTH ECONOMICS, Issue 10 2009Geir Godager Abstract In 2001, a listpatient system with capitation payment was introduced in Norwegian general practice. After an allocation process where each inhabitant was listed with a general practitioner (GP), a considerable share of the GPs got fewer persons listed than they would have preferred. We examine whether GPs who experience a shortage of patients to a larger extent than other GPs seek to hold a second job in the community health service even though the wage rate is low compared with the wage rate in general practice. Assuming utility maximization, we model the effect of patient shortage on a GP's decision to contract for a second job in the community health service. The model predicts a positive relationship between patient shortage and participation in the community health service. This prediction is tested by means of censored regression analyses, taking account of labour supply as a censored variable. We find a significant effect of patient shortage on the number of hours the GPs supply to community health service. The estimated marginal effect is 1.72,hours per week. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. [source] HMO Participation in Medicare+ChoiceJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 3 2005John Cawley In recent years, many health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have exited Medicare+Choice (M+C), the program that provides a managed-care option to Medicare. This paper answers the following questions: How does the equilibrium number of HMOs participating in county M+C markets vary with the capitation payment they are offered? How large a payment is required at the margin to ensure that various percentages of county markets have a M+C HMO, or to ensure that various percentages of Medicare beneficiaries have the choice of a M+C plan in their county of residence? The strategy for identifying the effect of government payment on HMO participation relies on a natural experiment; in 1997, Congress divorced M+C payments to HMOs from changes in underlying costs. The results in this paper suggest that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has consistently underestimated the payment necessary to support HMOs in rural, sparsely populated areas. We also find that it would require a large incremental payment to support HMOs in M+C for the final 10% of counties or final 10% of Medicare beneficiaries. [source] Reducing avoidable inequalities in health: a new criterion for setting health care capitation paymentsHEALTH ECONOMICS, Issue 8 2002Katharina Hauck Abstract Traditionally, most health care systems which pretend to any sort of rationality and cost control have sought to allocate their limited funds in order to secure equal opportunity of access for equal need. The UK government is implementing a fundamental change of resource allocation philosophy towards ,contributing to the reduction of avoidable health inequalities'. The purpose of this essay is to explore some of the economic issues that arise when seeking to allocate health care resources according to the new criterion. It indicates that health inequalities might arise because of variations in the quality of health services, variations in access to those services, or variations in the way people produce health, and that the resource allocation consequences differ depending on which source is being addressed. The paper shows that an objective of reducing health inequalities is not necessarily compatible with an objective of equity of access, nor with the objective of maximising health gain. The results have profound consequences for approaches towards economic evaluation, the role of clinical guidelines and performance management, as well as for resource allocation methods. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Practice Characteristics and HMO Enrollee Satisfaction with Specialty Care: An Analysis of Patients with Glaucoma and Diabetic RetinopathyHEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, Issue 4 2003José J. Escarce Background. The specialist's role in caring for managed care patients is likely to grow. Thus, assessing the correlates of patient satisfaction with specialty care is essential. Objective. To examine the association between characteristics of eye care practices and satisfaction with eye care among working age patients with open-angle glaucoma (OAG) or diabetic retinopathy (DR). Subjects/Study Setting. A total of 913 working age patients with OAG or DR enrolled in six commercial managed care health plans. The patients were treated in 144 different eye care practices. Study Design. We used a patient survey to obtain information on patient characteristics and satisfaction with eye care, measured by scores on satisfaction subscales of the 18-item Patient Satisfaction Questionnaire. We used a survey of eye care practices to obtain information on practice characteristics, including provider specialties, practice organization, financial features, and utilization and quality management systems. We estimated logistic regression models to assess the association of patient and practice characteristics with high levels of patient satisfaction. Principal Findings. Treatment in a practice with a glaucoma specialist (for OAG patients) or a retina specialist (for DR patients) was associated with higher satisfaction, whereas treatment in a practice that obtained a high proportion of its revenues from capitation payments or in a group practice where providers obtained a high proportion of their incomes from bonuses was associated with lower satisfaction. Conclusions. Many eye care patients prefer to be treated by specialists with expertise in their conditions. Financial arrangement features of eye care practices also are associated with patient satisfaction with care. The most likely mechanisms underlying these associations are effects on provider behavior and satisfaction, which in turn influence patient satisfaction. Managed care plans and provider groups should aim to minimize the negative impact of managed care features on patient satisfaction. [source] | ||||||||||